Rachels, Ch 14, What Would a Satisfactory Moral Theory Look Like?

• Call Rachels theory: "Morality without Hubris"
• Dimensions:
• One: Morality is a function of reason
• We ought to do what there are the weightiest reasons for doing
• Consistency in use of reason: If we accept a fact as a reason for acting on one occasion, then we must accept it as a reason for action on another occasion, except if there are morally relevant differences between these occasions


• Two: Rachels combines consequentialist (utilitarian), non-consequentialist (Kantian), and virtue ethics considerations
• Right action is specified as:
• We ought to act so as to promote impartially the interests of everyone alike
• This is utilitarian
• Except when individuals deserve particular responses as a result of their own past behavior
• This is a Kantian respect for persons
• Except when virtues like loyalty, friendship, artistic excellence, and doing one's job well override the impartial promotion of interests
• This is an appeal to virtues
• Multiple strategies utilitarianism:
  • Because Rachels justifies the second two - appeal to desert and the virtues-- by arguing that acting on these bases promotes the general welfare, he is in the end a consequentialist
• Calls it "multiple strategies"
• What best promotes impartially the interests of everyone is sometimes to sometimes not act impartially but as people deserves or in accordance with virtues.


• What impartial promotion of everyone's interests involves:
• Everyone's interest count equally
• He rejects psychological egoism; we are social creatures who can care about others interests (to some extent)
• Rejects egoism, racism, sexism
• Location of those with the interests is not relevant (rejects localism)
• Hence we must help sick and starving children around the world
• Time of those with the interests is not relevant (rejects nowism)
• Hence future generations interest count as much as ours and this has serious implications for use of nuclear weapons and out treatment of environment.
• Species of those with interest is not relevant (rejects speciesism)
• Must extent the moral communities to nonhumans who have interests
• Hence Rachels calls his view morality w/o hubris (without false pride)
• Humans have a modest place in the scheme of things
• Recent arrivals (1/4 million years ago?) to a planet that is 4.5 billion years old and has been teaming with other life forms for billions of years before we arrived
• We get here and immediately begin to think of ourselves as the most important part of creation: As if everything here is for our use
  • As if only humans have intrinsic value and the rest of creation has only instrumental value to human welfare
• "We exist by evolutionary accident as one species among many on a small and insignificant world in one little corner of the cosmos"
• I don't think earth with its teaming life and beauty is "insignificant"; on the contrary, it may be of ultimate significance.
• Main point: Rachels rejects anthropocentric (human-centered) view of morality


• What desert involves
• Backward looking (not directly consequentialist)
• Treating people as they deserve to be treated given their past behavior
• Those who have treated others well (or badly), deserve be treated well (or badly) in return
• Adjusting your treatment of others according to their behavior acknowledges them as free agents responsible for their actions
• This enhances their control over their lives
• If they want to be treated well by others, they will treat others well
• This is a way of treating people with respect
  
  
• Note: This is a departure from treating everyone's interests impartiality
• Desert is a reason to depart from equal treatment
• As are virtues of loyalty, friendship and so on.
  

• Justice, fairness, desert and the natural (and social) lottery
• The only grounds for desert are people's voluntary past actions
• Luck in the natural or social lotteries are not based on people's voluntary past actions and thus are not legitimate bases for desert
• Natural lottery: One's natural endowments or gifts: physical beauty, superior intelligence
• Social lottery: One's fortunate social circumstances (the family one was born into, the country was one born in, the wealth one was born into)
• We didn't do anything to earn these;
  • Both are a matter of luck and one doesn't deserve anything on the basis of luck
• Thus one doesn't deserve to be rewarded, praised or treated better on the basis of the results of the natural and social lottery
• A significant critique of our society
• For many important benefits are given out (at least in part) on the basis of fortunate social or natural circumstances
• "In practice, people often get better jobs and a greater share of life's good things just because they were born with greater natural gifts"
• One might justify these practices via utilitarian arguments about promoting the general welfare, but they are not justified on grounds of deservingness or fairness.