9/24/05
Env. philosophy class,
Here are some comments on your questions that I collected Thursday.
Let me know if you have more that I can help you with.
Ned
Examples of ecosystem processes that support culture include pollination
services of insects, wetland functions such as water purification and flood
control, and the CO2/oxygen exchange between animals and plants.
Qua means "as". Father qua father, means a father in his role as father.
The basic sources from which Rolston derives his intrinsic value in nature
are multiple: There are intrinsic values (plural) in nature. In animals, plants,
ecosystems, abiotic natural wonders, and the systemic creativity of nature
itself are all non-instrumentally valuable (intrinsically valuable) on his view.
The relationship between nature and culture is not always harmonious.
They have "entwined destinies", especially today. But culture eats nature
and couldn't have developed in the way necessary for human flourishing
without serious sacrifice of wild nature, or so Rolston argues. The best way
to foster nature and culture is to make sure that any destruction of natural
value is compensated for in equal amounts by the cultural value created.
Rolston appears to think this tradeoff is no longer possible: no amount of
natural value destruction can be offset by cultural value today, because the
balance is already so skewed toward cultural value that nature has
exceedingly high value due to its relative rarity.
Rolston's views on using animals for commerce have a number of
dimensions. He opposes disrespectful use of animals as in the prairie dog
shooting and rattle snake killing contests. Killing elephants to make
ashtrays out of their feet is another example of disrespectful use. He does
favor using animals for food, but since these are not wild animals, that is a
different issue for him. Some killing of wild animals for commercial reasons
if it is necessary to get support from locals for policies that will preserve the
species would be accepted.
I don't think he likes the idea of measuring the value of nature in monetary
terms, so putting $ value on wildlife does not sound like something he
would embrace (thought if it was a way to preserve the species, he might
agree to it).
Putting a suffering deer who will certainly die out of its misery makes a lot
of sense. Rolston however worries that it is inappropriately placing a value
in culture--sympathy-onto nature. One reason it might be inappropriate is
that if we let sympathy guide our feeling about suffering in nature, we will
think nature is a bad place because there is so much suffering. And
Rolston would not want such a view of nature-as an evil place where
suffering is great and we extend pity and sympathy to all the suffering
animals there.
Yes, things that lack systemic value can have value. They might not be
systems that are productive of value, but still have intrinsic value or at least
some instrumental value to others.
One of you made the point that for any value we are talking about nature
possessing-even supposed objective value in nature-we are valuing it.
This seems true. For Rolston that would mean that there are two things
going on, or at least two. There is the value in nature (the instrumental
nutritional value of nutrients to a tree, the intrinsic value of the tree's own
good) and then there is the human who is "tuned-in" to this value and
valuing it. There could be cases were we don't value, value that we
acknowledge is out there: Nutrients are valuable to poison ivy, but we
disvalue poison ivy and so we don't think those nutrients are doing
anything good (at least for us). And of course there is also the sentient
animal valuing its own life whether or not we value it.
The claim is made that "the real value we are observing is our subjective
valuing." But when I watch an antelope lope across the plains, I can focus
on the antelope and its grace and speed and how marvelously it gets away
from its predators and/or I can also pay attention to the pleasure I'm getting
at watching it and be happy about that (which would be observing my
subjective valuing, rather than observing the valuable creature in nature
and its value).
Is all valuing of nature self-interested because nature is of such great and
pervasive utilitarian value to humans? A reason to think not is that humans
can value and support policies toward nature that work against their self-interest. A logger might agree that the forest needs to be preserved for the
spotted owl, even though it will put him out of work.
The main difference between health and integrity of ecosystems is that
naturalness is much more important to integrity than to health. Adding
nutrients to a forest (fertilizing it) might make it healthier, but it makes it
less natural and this compromises its integrity, but not its health.
Endemic species is one that is found in a location and no place else on
earth (so if you wipe it out there, it is extinct). Indigenous species (native) is
one that has evolved for some time in a local area. One species might be
indigenous to many different areas (and hence is not endemic in those
areas). An exotic species is one that has come to a new area in which it
has not evolved (and so local animals/plants have had no chance to adapt
to it or the exotic to the locals). An exotic could be endemic in very unusual
circumstances only. Exotic means exotic in a location. Zebra mussels are
exotics in the U.S., but not in Europe their native land.