Alex Neill, Fiction and the Emotions



2.      Problems about emotions directed at fiction

         a.      Rational? Are emotional responses to fiction rational/irrational?

         b.      Possible? How are they even possible?

         c.      Unreality of fictional events: Since what happens in fiction is not real, how can we have emotional responses to it? How can they be rational?

         d.      Are emotions directed at fiction similar to emotions directed at non-fiction?

         e.      Are they real emotions (or perhaps pretend emotions)?

3.      Cognitive theory of emotions (CTE) suggests not rational/possible to direct emotions at fiction since we don’t have the beliefs that are required for those emotions

         a.      According to CTE (a theory Neill accepts)

         b.      Emotions are

                   i.       (1) Directed at objects, and

                   ii.      (2) Based on beliefs about those objects

         c.      Fear example

                   i.       If I’m afraid (emotion)

                            (1)    I must be afraid of something (some object)

                            (2)    I must believe it is dangerous to me

                   ii.      If I don’t believe it exists or is dangerous, I can’t be afraid of it

4.      Because fictional objects don’t exist, emotions about them are either

         a.      Irrational: Because we believe something exists that does not,

         b.      Impossible: Because if we don’t believe they exist we can’t have emotional responses about them

5.      Argument for why pity can’t be directed at fictional characters:

         a.      Because one does not believe they exist, one does not believe they are undergoing suffering

         b.      If pitying involves believing someone is suffering, one can’t rationally feel pity

         c.      Whatever we are feeling is not the emotion of pity

         d.      Note: This is not an argument that Neill accepts



7.      Neill’s view on which emotions are appropriate for fiction and which not

         a.      Impossible: Fear for oneself, jealousy

         b.      Possible: Fear for others, envy, admiration, and pity

8.      Note! Neill thinks we need different accounts for different emotions


9.      Fear for oneself of a fictional character not possible/rational

         a.      To be afraid of X one must believe X exists and is a danger to you

         b.      But a person can’t rationally believe that fictional characters are a danger to them

         c.      Fictional characters do exist (fictionally), but they have a kind of being (existence) that is different from actual beings

         d.      "Ontological gap" between fictional characters and ourselves precludes being threatened by them or needing to escape from them

         e.      Examples:

                   i.       Only monsters who can threaten me are actual monsters (not fictional ones)

                   ii.      I can't be threatened by or fear Lord Voldemorte just as he can't be threatened by or fear me

                   iii.     The only people Nosferatu can threaten are fictional people

10.    Neill’s explanation of fear in response to fiction

         a.      It is real fear, but not fear of fictional character or event, but rather either

         b.      (1) Fear of what we believe is an actual counterpart of what is represented in fiction,

                   i.       Spielberg's movie Poltergeistmay make us afraid of what we believe to be real ghosts (that may be lurking in our closets)

         c.      (2) Shock and alarm (which feel like fear but are not)

                   i.       When someone jumps out and scares you that is shock/alarm, but not fear in the sense that requires believing something is dangerous to you

         d.      (3) Fear for others or with others (not fear for oneself)

                   i.       These come from imaginatively putting ourselves in another's position


11.    Jealousy (also) not possible/rational toward a fictional character (though envy is)

         a.      To be jealous of someone one must

                   i.       Believe they “have designs on something that is rightfully mine

                   ii.      One must see them as rivals

         b.      But fictional characters can’t be rivals in this way

         c.      In contrast, we can envy fictional characters, e.g., want what they have (e.g., courage)


12.    Pity for and envy of fictional characters are possible

         a.      CTE: Need to identify the object of the emotion and the beliefs that go along with it


13.    Neill on how beliefs about fictional characters/events are possible (viz, they are aimed at the story; “it is fictional that”)

         a.      He rejects the claim that because they aren’t actual, we can't believe things about fictional characters (e.g., that they suffer misfortune)

                   i.       E.g., If we didn't believe that Harry Potter was courageous or suffered because of his parent’s deaths, then we would not have paid enough attention to Rowling's novels or we would not have understood them

         b.      Neill claims our beliefs about fictional characters are to be analyzed as claiming “it is fictional that” (in the story this is how it goes)

                   i.       The belief that Harry Potter is courageous amounts to the belief that it is fictional that Potter is courageous (or “in the story, Potter is courageous”)

         c.      *These are real beliefs (with fictional contents as objects), not fictional beliefs

                   i.       Real beliefs about the story


14.    Similarly, pity aimed at fictional characters involves real pity (not pretend pity)

         a.      Shed real tears (not fake ones or ones similar to those caused by smoke) and get lump in our throats

         b.      (Somewhat) similar bodily sensations and experiential features as pity aimed at real events/characters

15.    How it is possible to pity fictional characters given that no actual suffering is taking place?

         a.      Neill argues that belief in actual suffering not required

16.    What is required for pity is THE IMAGINATIVE ABILITY TO ADOPT A PERSPECTIVE (see things from someone’s point of view).

         a.      We can do this with the suffering of real refugees and with the suffering of fictional characters

         b.      Worry: Why couldn’t this ability get one fear for oneself?


17.    Neill believes there are general differences between feelings in response to fiction and feelings in response to beliefs about actual world

         a.      David Hume claimed that they feel “less firm and solid and lie on us with less weight”

18.    Neill: Our emotional responses to fiction are typically (though not invariably) of shorter duration and less intense than emotional responses to similar actual characters and events

         a.      Is Neill right about this?

         b.      But are cases when emotions directed at fiction are more intense than emotions directed at actual events/people

                   i.       What one feels for or about a fictional character can be more intense than one's feelings about actual events/people, e.g., children in Afghanistan who have lost their parents or legs

19.    Neill explains this difference by suggesting that in responding to fiction there are a variety of aspects to pay attention to and different approaches we can take to the work

         a.      Watching a performance of King Lear, we emotionally respond to the characters, but when lights go on, start thinking about the play as a whole and as work of art

         b.      The characters we care about are part of something else that demands our attention (other aspect of the work of fiction)

         c.      Is the idea that there are lots of different things to think about when responding to a work of fiction so the emotional response has lots of competition for our attention?

                   i.       But in real life, there is also lots else that competes for our attention




21.    One: Pleasure in suffering objection: Pity requires distress not pleasure

         a.      Pity directed at fictional characters not real because we enjoy the story of their suffering and pity requires distress not pleasure

         b.      If we really pitied fictional characters we would not seek out and enjoy the depiction of their suffering (but we do, so therefore we are not pitying them)

         c.      Taking pleasure in someone else’s suffering is not to pity them

                   i.       If we take pleasure in Oedipus gouging out his eyes when he finds out that Jocasta hanged herself, then we are not feeling pity toward Oedipus

22.    Neill’s response to talking pleasure in suffering/tragedy

         a.      First, sometimes our response to fictional suffering is not pleasurable

                   i.       We close the book or leave the theater

                   ii.      Or we continue to read/watch not because we enjoy it, but because we feel we should endure the story

                            (1)    Like we think we ought to suffer through Amnesty International reports of torture

         b.      Second, in cases where experience of distressing fiction does involve pleasure, the distress and pleasure must be aimed at different objects or aspects of the fiction

                   i.       Distressed at what is happening/depicted in story

                   ii.      Feel pleasure in how it is depicted (manner of depiction)

         c.      He agrees that if the object of pleasure was really the suffering depicted, we would not be feeling pity toward it

                   i.       It is possible to enjoy others suffering, but this is not compatible with pitying them (“schadenfreude”)


23.    Two: No desire to help objection, but pity requires this desire

         a.      If one pities someone, one must want to help them

         b.      We do not desire to help fictional characters

         c.      So we do not pity them

         d.      We know we can’t help fictional characters (its impossible)

                   i.       We don’t want to leap onto stage and prevent our favorite character from being killed

                   ii.      Those who write into soap-operas offering sympathy and advice have got something fundamentally wrong

24.    Neill’s reply to desire to help objection: Pity need not involve a desire to help

         a.      Examples: We can pity people of the past or people buried in a mine cave in and yet we know we can’t help them

         b.      Because we know we can’t help them, a desire to help them plays no role in our emotional response (pity)

                   i.       We might have a desire that we have the ability to help them, but this is different from a desire to help them

         c.      Is it true that if one realizes that one can’t help someone then the desire to help them is either irrational or not possible?

                   i.       Why can’t one want to help someone one knows one cannot possibly help?

                   ii.      Contrast

                            (1)    I want to help them (the desire to help)

                            (2)    I wish I could help them (the desire to have the ability to help)

         d.      Pity requires a desire to help only when one is able to help (and there are not overriding reasons not to help)


25.    Three: Pity requires we desire the story to change, but we don’t

         a.      If pity involves wanting the suffering to end or the misfortune not to have happened, then it involves a desire that story have gone differently, but we have no such desire

         b.      Example: Suppose that when the 6th Harry Potter movie came out (Half Blood Prince) that Dumbledore survived and was not killed by Snape. We would be disappointed or outraged at the audacity of the director changing the plot. But if we pity, then we want the suffering to end or not exist, and we should be happy that it does not. We should want the story to be written differently. But we don’t want this. So we don’t pity.

         c.      Looks like we have conflicting desires about suffering of fictional characters (we both want Dumbledore to die and for him not to)

26.    Neill’s reply to conflicting desires about the ending the fictional suffering

         a.      First: Desires may simply be aimed at different things (the suffering and the story) and not conflict

                   i.       E.g., We want (fictionally) Dumbledore to survive. Our being upset at the movie where he survives is not because we want him to die, but because we want the film director to be faithful to the Rowling book (Harry Potter and the Half Blood Prince)

                   ii.      Being upset about a change to a “happy ending” does not show we desire the characters to continue to suffer, but rather our desire for a film to be faithful to the book

                            (1)    Why not?

         b.      Second: Conflicting desires are not a problem but a fact of life

                   i.       We have conflicting desires about actual suffering also (where we also pity)

                   ii.      Example: May want a person whose spouse has died to stop suffering and also believe he/she needs to suffer in order to recover from the loss

                   iii.     So we may want a fictional character's suffering to end and also want it not to end for some other reason (it makes for a good story?)

         c.      Three: Desires don't directly conflict because we often don’t desire things that our other desires entail

                   i.       We can pity a fictional character, desire that fictionally things be different for him/her, and not have any desire about the fictional work of which she is a part

                   ii.      Even though our first desire can only be satisfied if the other thing we are not desiring comes to pass.

                   iii.     Iced buns example

                            (1)    Even though necessary for losing weight that I stop eating iced buns, my desire to lose weight is not in effect a desire to stop eating iced buns; I may desire to lose weight, w/o having any desires with regard to iced buns

                   iv.     This shows that we can desire things and not desire all the other things that follow from the first desire

                   v.      So yes we might desire that Dumbledore not die (in the story) and yet not also desire that Rowling wrote a different story (though for our first desire to be satisfied the second would also have to be satisfied)

                   vi.     This does suggest that our desires are not fully rational: That we desire things which require other things that we don’t desire

27.    What Neill would say about Dumbledore case:

         a.      When pity Dumbledore and wish he had not been killed, am focusing on particular aspect of the Half-Blood Prince (story Rowling tells)

         b.      In focusing on this, I don't have desires about other aspects of the novel, e.g., plot structure

         c.      If adopt different stance toward novel (as a work of art), feelings likely to change; won't have particular desires about Dumbledore


28.    Summary:

         a.      Emotions like pity can be genuinely directed at fiction

         b.      In addition to pitying them, we can envy and admire fictional characters and fear for and with them

         c.      But we can’t fear them (for ourselves) or be jealous of them

         d.      Emotions are very different from each other and can't assume one analysis works for all emotions.

Alex Neill, Fiction and the Emotions

1.         *Neill argues that some emotions directed at fiction are possible (and rational) and some not. Give examples of each and explain why he thinks they are (or are not) possible and rational.

2.         *Explain why Neill thinks that jealousy directed at fictional characters is not possible while envy is. Now consider fear.

3.         *Does Neill think it is rational to be afraid (for oneself) of fictional characers? Why or why not? How does he account for fear one sometimes feels in response to fiction?

4.         Explain how the “cognitive theory of emotions” creates trouble for the idea that emotional reactions to fiction are possible.

5.         Does Neill think that our emotion of pity directed at fiction involves fictional/pretend (not real) beliefs and fictional/pretend emotions? Explain.

6.         Does Neill think that we believe that “Harry Potter was courageous?” If so, how does he understand the meaning of this belief?

7.         Does Neill think that for pity to be rational/possible we must believe that someone is actually suffering? Does he think that fictional suffering can move us to pity? How?

8.         Give examples of an emotion that results from imaginatively placing ourselves in the position of others and then an example of an emotion that does not result from this mechanism.

9.         Explain the potential problem that arises from enjoying fictional suffering of characters that we pity? How does Neill solve this problem?

10.       How does Neill respond to the claim that pity involves the desire to help and since we have no desire to help people in fiction, we do not pity them?

11.       How does Neill respond to the objection that pitying fictional characters implies that we want the author to have written the story differently (so that the fictional characters do not suffer), but in fact we don’t want the story to be written differently? (Hint: iced buns example).

12.       Are our emotional response to fiction typically shorter and less intense than our responses to similar real-life situations? If you think so, what accounts for this difference?