Faith, Hope, and Doubt
a. Belief is not necessary for religious faith
b. Because faith–which is necessary for being religious–does not require belief
c. One may not be able to believe in God because the evidence is insufficient, but one may still live in hope, committed to a theistic worldview
d. Faith involves hope, not belief
e. Question: Does it make sense to live and act in a way based on a proposition that you don’t believe to be true?
2. NATURE OF FAITH
3. Faith as hope and not belief
a. Belief in God’s existence is not necessary for faith
b. Doubt is compatible with religious faith
i. One can doubt God’s existence (in the sense of not believe it) and still have faith as hope (e.g., want it to be true with all your heart)
ii. Paul Tillich (prominent 20th century theologian) thought faith includes doubt as a necessary component
(1) “Doubt is not the opposite of faith; it is one element of faith”
c. Hope, even without belief, is enough for faith
i. Hope does not require probability (but possibility)
(1) Must believe that what we hope for is at least possible
4. Belief, acceptance and faith
a. Belief: “An involuntary assenting of the mind to a proposition (p)/statement; a feeling of conviction about p”
i. This is a non-volitional event
b. Acceptance: “Deciding to include p in set of propositions you are willing to act on–a volitional act”
i. Unlike belief, we have control over acceptances
c. Difference belief and acceptance: Might believe p but not accept it and might accept p but not believe it
i. E.g., Believe that your mother is dying but not accept it
ii. E.g., Accept and act on the idea that you can beat the competition, but you don’t really believe you can
d. Faith: Commitment to something (e.g., person, hypotheses, religion, or worldview)
i. A deep kind of acceptance
ii. A volitional act
iii. Trusting & obeying the object of faith and doing what has the best chance of bringing its goals about
6. Volitionalism = Acquiring a belief by willing to have it
7. Pojman rejects (direct) volitionalism
a. He rejects the idea that you can (typically and directly) acquire a belief by willing to have it
b. Choosing is not the natural way we acquire beliefs
c. Perhaps choosing to have a belief is possible in some limited ways
i. But it is psychologically odd and perhaps conceptually incoherent
d. Pojman rejects fully aware, conscious choice of a belief independent of evidence (where evidence does not count in favor of it)
8. Everyday examples seem to count in favor of volitionalism
a. Evidence against a student’s honesty is great but professor decides to trust him
b. Theist who believes in God in spite of insufficient evidence
c. We find that our past beliefs have been acquired in ways that could not have taken the evidence seriously into consideration
9. Beliefs-are-not-chosen argument against volitionalism
a. Our beliefs come involuntarily as response to states of the world
b. Believing is more like seeing than looking, blushing than smiling
i. Belief like perception: Seeing the tree, hearing the noise
c. Like anger, envy, fearing, suspecting, and doubting, believing is involuntary and passive
d. When one believes, the world forces itself upon you
10. Logic-of-belief-argument against volitionalism
a. Incoherent, illogical, contradictory to say:
i. “I believe there is a million dollars in my bank, not because of the evidence, in fact the evidence pretty much rules it out, but because I want it to be true.”
b. Mere wishing that something is true never makes it so
c. Could wishing something is true make one believe it true?
11. MORALITY OF BELIEFS
12. We should not be judged for our beliefs
a. Because beliefs are not actions (voluntary behavior) and we are only responsible for our voluntary behaviors
b. Because ought implies can
c. Not fair to say “You ought to believe X, and since you don’t I’ll punish you,” because believing X is not something you can choose to do
13. Can be judged for acting on your beliefs, or by how well you investigate the evidence for them or how well you paid attention to the reasons or arguments
a. We do frequently judge people for their beliefs and it is not clear that this is necessarily wrong
b. Pojman gives the example of believing that another race/sex is inferior as not something we should morally judge--but perhaps we can?
15. **Beliefs can be obtained indirectly by willing to have them
a. Point drainpipe at neighbors example and convince yourself you did nothing wrong by reminding yourself about all the mean things he did
16. Such manipulation of the mind is prima facie immoral
a. Strong case against such indirect volitionalism
b. But this duty is defeasible: It can be overridden by other stronger moral obligations
17. Two types of arguments for why we should believe based only on the evidence
18. (1) Willing to believe is a kind of cheating or lying to oneself and diminishes our autonomy
a. The best way to get at truth is to have justified beliefs
b. We are freer and more autonomous the more true beliefs we have
c. So when we lie to ourselves we reduce our freedom/autonomy
19. (2) Willing to believe has bad consequences for ourselves and society
a. Successful actions depend on true beliefs
i. Willing yourself to believe that you can do well in a course even though you don’t do readings or attend class will be bad for you
ii. Government officials who convince themselves of the veracity of the evidence because they want it to be true cause great harm
20. Ethics of belief: We have a moral duty to not get our beliefs by willing but to seek the truth impartially
21. **Thus: We ought not obtain our religious beliefs by willing to have them; instead we should follow the best evidence we can get
22. Still, one can hope that god exists w/o believing that He does
23. ANALYSIS OF HOPE
24. Hope requires possibility
a. To hope one must believe in the possibility of what one hopes for; Can’t hope for what one believe impossible (though one can wish it)
i. Need not expect it (or believe it will happen)
25. Hope precludes certainty
a. So faith in God as hope means one is not certain
26. Hope entails desire (a pro-attitude) that is motivational
a. Hope is more than mere wishing
b. Can wish to live forever, but if I don’t think it sufficiently possible, it will not motivate me to act
27. Hope involves a willingness to runs some risk (and to trust?)
28. Hoping (unlike believing) is typically under our direct control
a. I can decide to hope that my son’s team will win, but I can’t decide to believe it will win.
b. It seems to me that frequently one finds oneself hoping w/o making a conscious choice to hope and that stopping hoping for something is not as easy as making a conscious choice not to hope
i. In short, hope is more non-volitional than Pojman suggests here (more like believing)
c. May not be able to give up a hope, but normally am able to alter the degree to which I hope for something
29. Hope can be morally evaluated
a. Like wanting, but unlike believing, we can have morally unacceptable hopes
30. Hope can be ordinary or deep
a. Cases where one is disposed to risk something significant on the possibility of the proposition being true are deep or profound hopes, where it’s of enormous significance, can be desperate hopes
31. Summary of analysis of hope:
a. Hoping, unlike believing, has a strong volitional component, is subject to moral assessment, involves positive desire for what is hoped for, and involves a greater inclination to action than mere wishing.
32. Religious hope can function in the midst of doubt
a. Like putting your trust in a tight-rope walker to carry you across a gorge to save you from attackers
i. A profound hope he can succeed
33. Pojman’s argument for religious hope
a. Tragedy of existence
i. Unless there is a god and life after death, the meaning of live is less than glorious
(1) Death and the extinction of all life in a solar system that will one day be extinguished
b. Just enough evidence to whet one’s appetite, to inspire hope, and a decision to live according to theism or Christianity, but not enough evidence to cause belief
c. Faith as an experimental hypothesis
i. Hoper (person of faith) opts for the better story
ii. Makes the pilgrimage
iii. But keeps his mind open to new evidence that may confirm or disconfirm the decision
d. If there is some evidence for something better, something eternal, some benevolence who rules the universe and will redeem the world from evil and despair
i. Isn’t it worth betting on that worldview?
34. It would be wrong for God to judge (condemn) you for lack of belief (in God)
a. Only proper to judge people on those things they can control, we cannot control our beliefs, so we ought not to be judged because of our beliefs or lack of beliefs
35. We can be judged by how faithful we have been to the light we have
36. People who truly have faith in God are those who live with moral integrity within their lights
a. Some unbelievers will be in heaven and some religious, true believers, who never doubted, will be absent
Questions on Pojman, Faith, Hope, and Doubt
1. Does Pojman think belief in God is necessary for (Christian) religious faith? Why or why not?
2. Does Pojman think doubt is incompatible with religious faith?
3. Explain Pojman’s distinctions between belief, acceptance, and faith and the relations between them. Which are “volitional” (chosen) and which not?
4. What does he mean by “volitionalism?” Does Pojman accept volitionalism? Why or why not? Do you accept it? Can we willingly and directly choose our beliefs?
5. Does Pojman believe we can be judged for our beliefs? Why or why not?
6. Does Pojman think it appropriate for God to judge people based on whether or not they have religious belief? Why or why not?
7. Does Pojman believe we can indirectly will to have certain beliefs? How?
8. Concerning belief, does Pojman agree with Clifford or James? Would Pojman accept Pascal’s wager?
9. According to Pojman, does hope require possibility, allow for certainty, and/or involve motivation? Is hope volitional? Can we morally evaluate each other’s hope’s?
10. According to Pojman, religious faith involves something other than belief in God. What does he think it involves?