Land, Value, Community

Callicott and Environmental Philosophy

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I begin to write this essay around the Thanksgiving holiday in the last year of the second millennium. I have much to be thankful for, both personally and professionally. For my personal blessings, I will have expressed my thanks privately to family and friends gathered at my home for the holiday. For my professional blessings, I express my thanks here publicly to my colleagues and critics, both to those represented in this volume and those who are not.

My first love in philosophy was that of the ancient Greeks. And among the many legacies that they bequeathed to the subsequent Western tradition was critical engagement. One might go so far as to say that the force driving the rapid development of Greek philosophy from Thales to Aristotle was the critical engagement of each generation of thinkers with one another and with the thought of their predecessors. I still occasionally teach the history of ancient Greek philosophy and always invite my students to marvel at how, for example, the critical philosophy of Zeno challenged Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus to think far more subtly and incisively about the nature of matter and motion than had the Milesians. Nearly one-third of a century ago, I dimly foresaw the possibility of a new environmental philosophy. From the beginning, therefore, I believed (and still believe) that if environmental philosophy was to emerge (and to persist) as a robust field of inquiry, a community of thinkers engaged in vigorous mutual criticism would be essential. Accordingly, I deliberately spoke and wrote boldly, provocatively, hoping to attract critical engagement and doing so has become a lifelong habit. This volume of critical essays is, therefore, especially welcome to me, although some of the criticisms of my work registered here are painful to read. I sincerely thank all my present critics, but I want to thank especially those—Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Holmes Rolston III (both outstanding in this regard), Ernest
Partridge, John Barkdull, Robert P. McIntosh, Bryan G. Norton, Eugene C. Hargrove, Catherine Larrère, Peter Wenz, and Andrew Light—who have the grace to express some appreciation for my work, however wrong-headed they suppose it to be, before expressing their disagreement. And finally I want to thank the editors of this volume, Wayne Ouderkirk and Jim Hill, for their effort and persistence in assembling and introducing the critical (and mostly original) essays of so distinguished and diverse a group of environmental philosophers and for seeing this book through to publication. With some exceptions, my reply to each author follows the order in which they appear in this book. To avoid fragmentation and, to the extent possible, to craft an essay that has a unity of its own, not only have I occasionally considered a criticism out of the order in which it is presented, I occasionally grouped some criticisms by themes other than those identified by the editors. All this for the sake of efficiency, the avoidance of redundancy, and the thematic integrity of this, my own contribution.

OF PARTRIDGE AND BARKDULL AND HUME AND SMITH

The essays by Partridge and Barkdull remind me of one of the earliest scholarly disputes in environmental philosophy. Arne Naess (1977) had grounded his seminal version of Deep Ecology in the philosophy of Spinoza. But Spinoza himself is on record as being unequivocally, even militantly, anthropocentric. Naess’s critics were quick to point this out (Lloyd, 1980). Naess (1980), however, was undaunted. He argued that Spinoza had a great insight about the unity of nature, including human nature, the full moral implications of which Spinoza himself could not have seen, because the prevailing humanism (anthropocentrism) of his times clouded his vision. Had Spinoza lived in the age of environmental crisis, he would surely have been a Deep Ecologist.

About the relative merits of the cases for and against Spinoza as a proto-Deep Ecologist, I offer no comment. But my reply to the critics of my grounding the land ethic ultimately in a theory of moral sentiments, like that articulated by David Hume and Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, is similar to, although not the same as, Naess’s reply to the critics of his appropriation of Spinoza. A theory of moral sentiments provides a moral psychology that makes ethics a matter of the heart as well as the head, a matter of feeling as well as reason. Some such moral psychology is essential for an evolutionary account of the origin and development of ethics, as Darwin clearly recognized. A purely rationalistic theory of ethics puts the cart before the horse.
Reason could not have evolved except in an intensely social circumstance. However, because our prehuman ancestors would have been short on reason—by all accounts one of the most recent and refined human faculties to have evolved—they could have had no ethics, if ethics is grounded exclusively in reason. And if they had no rudimentary ethics, they could not have been members of an intensely social, cooperative community in which reason could have evolved. Thus Darwin drew on the sentiment-based moral philosophies of Hume and Smith in *The Descent of Man*. Aldo Leopold, who probably knew of Hume only as a historian and Smith only as an economist, drew on Darwin in formulating the land ethic. Thus, by the time Hume and Smith informed the land ethic, the particular details of their respective theories are much attenuated. Whether Hume and Smith were or were not hopelessly anthropocentric; whether they believed sympathy to be the most fundamental of the moral sentiments or just one such sentiment among many on a par with, say, patriotism; whether they would or would not have endorsed the land ethic, had they an opportunity to pass judgment on it—all such questions are philosophically interesting and historically relevant, but, in the final analysis, beside the point. The land ethic is grounded in the general approach to ethics that Hume and Smith pioneered. It is not, nor did I ever intend to suggest that it was, a slave to every idiosyncratic nuance of the respective ethical writings of these historical figures. (I return to the issue of selectively borrowing from disparate historical figures in my reply to Hargrove.)

By this I do not essay to demean the splendid contributions of Partridge and Barkdull to this volume. The alternative routes they trace, respectively, to what they consider to be more faithful Humean and Smithian environmental ethics are interesting, and they enrich theoretical and historical research in environmental philosophy. Many of the theoretical problems that Partridge highlights, which a persuasive environmental ethic—Humean or otherwise—must overcome, I have already addressed: the allied problems of symmetry and reciprocity are addressed in my very first published paper in environmental philosophy, "Elements of an Environmental Ethic"; of normative force in "Can a Theory of Moral Sentiments Support a Genuinely Normative Environmental Ethic?"; of fairly balancing (prioritizing) our individualistic duties to members of the various human communities to which we belong with our holistic duties to the various biotic communities of which we are also members (that Barkdull also finds problematic) in "Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism" (about which more in my reply to Shrader-Frechette and Donner). Barkdull argues for a greater separation between the ethics of Smith and Hume than I am wont to recognize. In the course of which, to my pleasant surprise, he shows that Smith himself sup-
ports me, against Partridge, in finding a holistic dimension in Hume’s moral philosophy. Barkdull writes, “Indeed, Smith argues against Hume’s claim that man has a ‘natural love for society, and desires that the union of mankind should be preserved for its own sake, although he himself was to derive no benefit from it.” As we see, Smith attributes to Hume the view that we have a natural love of society per se—a holistically oriented moral sentiment. Interestingly, Barkdull makes his Smith agree with Partridge’s Hume that the proper road to environmental ethics runs first through environmental aesthetics.

OF McINTOSH AND SHRADER-FRECHETTE AND ETHICS AND ECOLOGY

I am especially honored, as well as pleased, to have attracted the critical attention of Robert P. McIntosh, who notes that I have been unusual among ecological philosophers in actually giving serious study to ecology. (How much actual ecology do we find, for example, in Deep Ecology, or in the essay here by Hester, McPherson, Booth, and Cheney who speak loosely about an “emergent ecological order”?) Among those from whom I have learned the most about ecology is McIntosh (1985) whose book Background of Ecology is the closest thing available to a comprehensive and exhaustive history of the discipline through the mid-1980s. But McIntosh is not only a historian of ecology; he is a maker of ecological history as well. That gives him an axe to grind in that fractious field. As a student and colleague of John Curtis, he is a leading figure in the neo-Gleasonian movement that began in the 1950s and has gained strength ever since. It was Henry Gleason (1926), in opposition to his holistic contemporary F. E. Clements (1916), who insisted that what the latter believed to be self-organized ecological wholes were in fact but fortuitous aggregates of species populations adapted to similar “gradients”—of moisture, soil pH, temperature, and other circumstances of a site—that affect their flourishing. Gleason went unheeded in his own day, but Curtis and McIntosh (1951) and R. H. Whittaker (1951) revived and championed his view. So, although of unparalleled value, McIntosh’s history of ideas in ecology, the relevant parts of which his essay for this volume summarizes, is jaundiced. Buyer beware! Golley (1993) and Hagen (1992) provide counterbiased accounts, although far less comprehensive than McIntosh’s.

When I began theorizing about environmental ethics, back in the 1970s, I confess I warmly entertained the idea that, in the course of biogeochemical evolution on Planet Earth, complex self-replicating molecules had evolved to form eukaryotic single-celled organisms, enclosing symbiotic organelles, such
as mitochondria . . . which in turn had formed associations of symbiotic cells . . . which in turn had evolved to form multicelled organisms with well-articulated tissues and organs . . . which in turn had evolved to form tightly integrated biotic communities and superorganisms. We conscious and reflective multicelled organisms no more noticed these superorganisms, than, were they conscious and reflective, the individual cells of our own bodies would notice the multicelled organism of which they were constituents. That is, we did not notice them until (post)modern science disclosed their existence, as well as the existences of many other wonders of nature that were not disclosed until systematically and methodically searched out. The putative existence of transorganismic entities not only tickles one's fancy and whets one's appetite for mystery and enchantment in the world, it provides, more to the point, a direct object of environmental ethical concern. As McIntosh so authoritatively points out, however, the Clementsian superorganism concept has now been eclipsed by the neo-Gleasonian individualistic view. This gradual but steady paradigm shift in ecology has been under way for fully half a century now.

At first, my knowledge of ecology was limited to a casual study of Fundamentals of Ecology, which dominated ecological education well into the 1970s—and its author, Eugene Odum (1971) was a neo-Clementsian, or “systems ecologist” as McIntosh labels it. Then as the 1970s gave way to the 1980s, neo-Gleasonianism began resolutely to over shadow neo-Clementsianism, but I remained at first in ignorance and then in denial. “The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology,” written in the mid-1980s represents my attempt to explore the philosophical potential of neo-Clementsianism, which—who knows?—may someday rise again. In one or another guise, it still holds on in various redoubts of the pluralistic science of ecology, as McIntosh admits. So far, it has not gone the way of phlogiston or the luminiferous aether. However, it is certainly not in fashion—a fact I finally faced. As an ecological philosopher, I have been counseled by the old American adage, “you can’t buck City Hall,” which in our case is ecology. I feel obliged, in accordance with the no-buck-City-Hall principle, to accept the state of the science as it currently exists, however personally unwelcome to me. I am an ecological philosopher, not an ecologist. Who am I to blow against the wind?

Aldo Leopold formulated the land ethic when systems ecology—a more sophisticated reiteration of Clementsian superorganismism—was in ascendency. However, in “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine the Leopold Land Ethic?” (salient points of which I here summarize shortly), I more or less capitulate and argue, by way of consolation, that even though the philosophically disappointing paradigm shift in ecology that
McIntosh documents has in fact, unfortunately, occurred, with some adjustment and reformulation, the Leopold land ethic is still viable.

In addition to individualism, current thinking in ecology stresses dynamism and disturbance (Pickett & White, 1985). Clements’s brand of ecology was, ironically, sometimes called dynamic ecology, because Clements focused on ecological succession, the replacement of one plant association by a successor (McIntosh, 1985). The irony is that this process of succession—begun by some “exogenous” disturbance—terminated in a “climax” community, which Clements believed would persist indefinitely. That is, the dynamic process of succession ended in the stasis of the putative climax. Currently, ecologists believe that the process of succession can follow many paths to no particular destination, and that disturbances—fire, wind, flood—are themselves intrinsic parts of the process (Pickett & Ostfeld, 1995). Has environmental ethics then any natural norm by means of which to evaluate human environmental behavior? Aldo Leopold thought we should preserve “the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.” But the ontology of biotic communities is problematic in contemporary ecology, so what does it mean to refer to their “integrity”? Certainly such communities lack “stability.” All that remains of Leopold’s dictum is “beauty,” and everyone believes that that is in the eye of the beholder. Accordingly, in “Deconstructive Ecology,” I dared to suggest we emend the “golden rule” of the land ethic thus: “A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”

The editors of this volume have done as well to pair the McIntosh and Shrader-Frechette essays as to pair those by Partridge and Barkdull. For Shrader-Frechette is as serious a student of ecology as I, and she reiterates McIntosh’s attack on the outmoded biotic community concept in ecology. Shrader-Frechette expressly accepts my metaethical principle that, in her words, “the community concept is essential to moral obligation, and that different kinds of communities undergird different moral obligations.” In the “Deconstructive Ecology” essay, I argue that however ill-bounded, open to immigration and emigration, and subject to successional change biotic communities may be, human communities are, in these respects, no different. Human communities are no more “robust” than biotic communities. Thus, if the former engender moral obligations, as Shrader-Frechette explicitly affirms, then why shouldn’t the latter? Other reasons why biotic communities might not engender moral obligations could be advanced, but state-of-the-science arguments to the effect that they lack robustness should not be among them, because, in this respect, biotic and human communities are in the same boat.
In the same essay, as just noted, I argue for replacing the now scientifically suspect concepts of integrity and stability in the summary moral maxim (or "golden rule") of the Leopold land ethic with the poststructuralist concepts of disturbance and spatiotemporal scale. Human disturbances should not exceed the spatial and temporal scales of natural disturbances. Moreover, our moral obligations—engendered by our community memberships, human and biotic—are delimited by a fairly circumscribed temporal scale. The geological temporal scale is not morally meaningful. The last great extinction event, which occurred 65 million years ago, is not reprehensible. Nor does the expectation that in 50 million years biodiversity will have bounced back from the anthropogenic mass extinction event now in progress let us off the ethical hook. We should not fret over the deep past, nor should we exonerate ourselves by contemplating the deep future. Our duty is to preserve the species populations of the biotic communities that exist now. How to define the spacious present indicated by the word now? We must build into it room for change; the world is not static. But if not the geological scale, upon what scale is it appropriate morally to evaluate change? An ecological scale, I suggest, calibrated by such ecological processes as disturbance regimes and succession.

Shrader-Frechette's essay presents a unique problem for readers of this volume because in it we find her original critique of my environmental ethics, her summary of my reply to that critique, and her reply to my reply. And now, I here have the latest (if not last) word, but I despair that the reader can keep this multitiered exchange sorted out and make sense of it. Thus, I will answer one of her general complaints—that the land ethic, as I have interpreted it, lacks normative force—in the same way that I answered Partridge's similar complaint by referring the reader to a whole essay of mine devoted to that problem, "Can a Theory of Moral Sentiments Support a Genuinely Normative Environmental Ethic?" and confine myself to only two further comments.

OF SHRADER-FRECHETTE AND DONNER AND ETHICS AND EVOLUTION

First, Shrader-Frechette accuses me of Humpty-Dumptyism, making the word evolution mean just what I want it to mean in one place and something else in another. She misses the focus of my earlier disclaimer (which she summarizes). It falls on her supposition that I posit an "analogy between evolution and ethics," similar to the way so-called evolutionary epistemologists posit an analogy between genotypes and belief systems. Select memes may be analogous to select genes and survive and flourish in the cultural meme pool.
in a way analogous to the way select genes survive and flourish in the biological gene pool. I don’t know; I have not given the matter enough study to have a well-informed opinion. But I most certainly do not posit a similar analogy between, say, duties and genes. Rather, I posit an evolutionary derivation of ethics, following Darwin’s lead in the *Descent of Man*. To derive one thing from another is not the same as to draw an analogy between one thing and another. I argue that like any other normal human psychological characteristic, say a capacity for feeling fear, natural selection has endowed us with moral sentiments. Fear, further, is an open-ended emotion, the objects of which are not rigidly determined by inheritance; fear can be culturally informed, educated. We can learn to fear many things—ghosts and gamma rays, germs and gremlins. Likewise, the moral sentiments are underdetermined and open-ended. We can learn to respect things today, such as universal human rights and animal rights, our nation-states, and our biotic communities, of which our remote ancestors knew nothing when the human moral sentiments were evolving.

Second, which of our community memberships “has primacy,” Shrader-Frechette wonders; that is, which of our multiple community-generated duties and obligations should take priority when they conflict—as when, say, our duty to respect human rights conflicts with our duty to preserve an endangered species? As we see, this is a question raised by more than one of my critics. As noted, I have also devoted a whole essay to this problem: “Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism,” the heart of which I summarize in my following reply to Wendy Donner.

Donner much better understands and accurately represents my Darwinian evolutionary account of the moral sentiments than does Shrader-Frechette. Furthermore, Donner is right to say that in the absence of “one fundamental principle to resolve conflicts . . . we need principles that set out clearly how we prioritize the interests of or value of these different elements consistently.” In the ecofascism essay to which I just referred, I provide two second-order principles (SOPs) to resolve conflicts between the first-order duties and obligations generated by our multiple community memberships. The first, SOP–1, states that duties and obligations generated by membership in nearer and dearer communities take precedence over those generated by membership in more remote and impersonal communities. For example, I feel a greater obligation to contribute to the care of my aged mother because she and I are members of the most venerable and intimate of all communities, the family, than I do to contribute to the care of Donner’s mother, who is, with me, a member of a more remote and impersonal community, the global village. The second, SOP–2, states that greater interests prevail over lesser interests. For
example, I feel a greater obligation to prevent a murder if I am in a position to do so, than to prevent shoplifting: in the former case, the victim’s strongest possible interest in life is at stake; in the latter, the victim’s lesser interest in a small amount of money is at stake.

These two SOPs are designed to be employed sequentially, such that the indication of the second either reinforces or countermands that of the first. Thus, in the famous case of the endangered spotted owl and its old growth forest habitat versus the individual loggers, mill workers, and timber company owners in the Pacific Northwest, we reason as follows. Applying SOP-1, we should give preference to the interests of the latter because they are our fellow human beings and, for those of us who are citizens of the United States, our fellow Americans. But SOP-2 countermands SOP-1 because the species in question faces irreversible extinction and its habitat wholesale destruction, while the nonvital interests of the individual human beings in a certain kind of work and a certain kind of lifestyle can be compensated and substituted for. Through local, state, and federal governments, we can and should compensate people who lose jobs because of our collective efforts to conserve endangered species and provide those aggrieved with training for other kinds of employment.

OF ROLSTON AND OUDERKIRK AND CULTURE AND NATURE

Rolston’s critique is not only a model of grace—for which I have already expressed my appreciation—it is a model of scholarship and intellectual integrity as well. Unlike some of my critics, Rolston is not content to fasten on to an early essay of mine, quote damagingly from it out of context, and impale a straw man labeled “Callicott” on his well-honed petard. He has been generous in time spent with my work and willing to acknowledge its modifications over a quarter century of reflection and reformulation. Many such modifications, especially on the problem of intrinsic value in nature, I made in the course of a public dialogue with him—which, happily, continues in this volume.

Rolston’s title, “Naturalizing Callicott,” is ironic because he begins by criticizing my claim that human beings—me included, certainly—and human culture exist as a part of nature, not apart from nature. Therefore, I don’t need no naturalizing, thank you very much; I have quite naturalized my own self. My belief that human beings are a part of nature is based on evolutionary considerations. In this belief I follow in the footsteps of both Darwin and Leopold, who notes that:
It is a century now since Darwin gave us the first glimpse of the origin of species. We know now what was unknown to all the preceding caravan of generations: that men are only fellow voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution. . . . Above all we should, in the century since Darwin, have come to know that man, while now captain of the adventuring ship, is hardly the sole object of its quest, and that his prior assumptions to this effect arose from the simple necessity of whistling in the dark.

Only on this basis can Leopold argue that we are “plain members and citizens of the biotic community.” Thus, the evolutionary naturalization of human beings and human culture is foundational and essential to the land ethic. Note that my Darwinian-Leopoldian naturalization of culture is opposite the stance of other postmodern environmental philosophers who culturalize, I suppose we should say, nature (Gare, 1995; Vogel, 1996). They argue that nature is culturally (or socially) constructed, whereas I argue that culture is naturally evolved and remains a part of nature. Rolston hints at this difference here; he is as adamantly opposed to their culturalization of nature as he is to my naturalization of culture (Rolston, 1997). Wayne Ouderkirk in his individual contribution to this volume clearly notes that the nature-culture dichotomy can be reduced in two ways, and that I am guilty of one of them. Following Val Plumwood (1998), he seeks to maintain the dichotomy, but not the dualism—that is, the opposition between them—regarding nature and culture as complementary, like the yin and yang, I suppose, in classical Chinese thought. Rolston, in opposition to every kind of postmodern resolution of the problem, remains a resolute nature-culture dualist. His environmental ethic, thus, is more in the Kantian mode, based on a cold respect for the radical Other, than in the Humean mode, based on love, warm fellowship, and society with our fellow voyagers in the odyssey of evolution, our fellow members of the biotic community.

To his credit, Rolston does not invoke the traditional Judeo-Christian or Greco-Roman grounds—respectively, that human beings are created in the image of God or are exclusively rational—to justify his belief that human culture and its artifacts are sharply distinct from nature and what is so of itself. His grounds are themselves evolutionary. Nature, among human beings, has evolved culture, to be sure; but culture has propelled the species right out of nature’s ambit. This argument turns on the very evolutionary analogy that Shrader-Frechette misattributes to me. Both organic nature and emergent culture reproduce themselves by passing “information” from one generation to the next. In organic nature, information is encoded in inheritable genes; in human culture, it is encoded in communicable memes. Evolutionary change
in organic nature proceeds at a comparatively slow pace, as genes randomly mutate and the environment remorselessly and blindly culls the far more frequent harmful mutations from the rare beneficial ones. Evolutionary change in culture proceeds at a comparatively rapid pace as memes are often deliberately reshaped and reorganized, and passed on to the next generation. Evolutionary change in culture is Lamarckian, and many orders of magnitude faster than in organic nature, where evolutionary change is Darwinian. This discrepancy in speed—in temporal scale—draws the boundary, which is becoming ever sharper as the speed of cultural change accelerates, between organic nature and human culture. Ouderkirk seconds Rolston's claim that culture is "emergent" from nature.

I am drawn to this argument, but remain unconvinced by its conclusion. It is a matter of emphasis. To me it seems that we human beings are thoroughly primate in our anatomy, physiology, and psychology, except for the more language-dependent cognitive and abstract states of consciousness. Our physical lives, certainly, and the largest part of our conscious lives—our feelings of joy and sorrow, anger and remorse, jealousy and rage; our intense social interactions, negotiated mostly by body language, facial expression, and tone of voice; our pervasive sexuality—all, although culturally shaped around the edges, are utterly animal and therefore natural. The dazzling artifacts of culture—skyscrapers, airplanes, bulldozers, and such—powerful although they may be to transform and destroy nature, seem fragile and ephemeral in comparison with the titanic and persistent forces and processes of nature. We are earthy beings, and remain—culturally, as in every other way—earth bound.

Ancillary to the nature-culture question, is the conservation-preservation question. If human beings are a part of nature, then what rationale have we for preserving pristine nature, wilderness, areas unsullied by (now transcendent) human beings and their culture? Ouderkirk raises this question quite explicitly. Without pristine nature (wilderness) as a standard, "then on what basis can we condemn human environmental destruction," he asks. As noted, I have tried to develop an alternative standard in terms of spatiotemporal scale. People should disturb nature only at normal spatial and temporal scales. Bill McKibben (1989) has convincingly argued, in any case, that no pristine nature remains to be preserved, and William Denevan (1992) adds that there has not been any such on a large scale for a long time. Indeed, I do argue that we can effect conservation in a largely humanly inhabited and economically exploited world, measured by the standard of ecosystem health. In a rare lapse of charitable scholarship, Rolston disses the powerful ecosystem-health standard of conservation by suggesting that "cornfields and wheat fields" might measure up to it. Of course they do not. Neither would single-species tree
plantations (or "industrial forests"). A better example of a humanly inhabited and economically exploited healthy ecosystem would be the kind of forestry practiced by the Menominee on their reservation in Wisconsin (Davis, 1999) or the perennial polyculture that Wes Jackson (1980) and his associates are attempting to create at the Land Institute in Salina, Kansas.

Ouderkirk, more thoughtfully and generally, notes that ecosystem health is an ecologically problematic idea. True, but it is certainly no more problematic than the idea of wilderness. Many of our fellow voyagers in the odyssey of evolution, however, do not fit very well into the healthy humanly inhabited and ecologically exploited ecosystems that now exist or may exist in the foreseeable future. Wolves, for example, do not roam the Menominee forest, nor would bison be a welcome part of the Land Institute's perennial polyculture. Such animals, however, need lebensraum—habitat, in a word—free of human interference and conflict of interest. In “Should Wilderness Areas Become Biodiversity Reserves?” I suggest a substitute for the wilderness idea, with which Ouderkirk respectfully disagrees, conservatively preferring to reconfigure the wilderness idea instead. The “biodiversity-reserve” alternative to the wilderness idea provides for the preservation of relatively human-free habitat for those species that need it, without raising the paradoxical matter of the pure “naturalness” or “integrity” of such places. It is also free of the many confounding connotations of the wilderness idea. Wilderness was at first justified—even defined in terms of—virile and manly recreation (Callicott & Nelson, 1998). It was also often venerated, historically, as a resource for human aesthetic and spiritual harvest (Callicott & Nelson, 1998). Are wilderness areas human recreational, spiritual, and aesthetic resources, or are they primarily habitat for nonhuman species? When use of wilderness areas by human backpackers and river runners compromises them as habitat for nonhuman beings, what use takes priority—use by human beings or nonhuman beings? If we call the areas now known as “wilderness” instead “biodiversity reserves,” then the priority question is answered before it is even asked.

**OF ROLSTON AND NORTON AND THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF NATURE**

Despite our real differences on the nature-culture question, Rolston and I differ less on the question of intrinsic value in nature than he supposes. In my most recent essay on the subject, “The Intrinsic Value of Nature: A Metaethical Analysis,” I argue that *value* is first and foremost a verb. To value is an intentional act of a valuing subject. Therefore, something (some object, grammatically speaking) is valuable if and only if it is valued by a valuing sub-
ject. Valuing subjects value things in many ways, among them intrinsically, for their own sakes. But without a valuing subject there would be no valuable objects. Rolston actually agrees with this analysis, but he does so only cryptically. We human beings self-consciously value ourselves, as well as other things, intrinsically. But lemurs, he notes, also demonstrably value themselves intrinsically, although perhaps not self-consciously. You see, what Rolston is doing here is finding in nature a wide spectrum of nonhuman reflexively valuing subjects. He begins with human subjects, then moves on to our close relatives, phylogenetically speaking, and on from there, to subjects more distantly related and arguably less acutely conscious than lemurs and other primates—birds, reptiles, insects—all in some sense self-valuing subjects. Finally, Rolston posits the existence of valuing subjects stripped of all subjectivity: “Trees are also valuable in themselves,” Rolston writes. But why? How? Because, as he explains, they are “able to value themselves.” In what sense? Is Rolston going beyond conventional science and claiming a secret, inner life for plants? Not at all: “Natural selection picks out whatever traits an organism has that are valuable to it, relative to its survival. When natural selection has been at work gathering these traits into an organism, that organism is able to value on the basis of those traits. It is a valuing organism, even if the organism is not a sentient valuer . . .” (emphasis added). So, clearly, although the valuing subject may lack sentience, indeed consciousness of any kind (i.e., the valuing subject may, paradoxically, lack subjectivity) Rolston agrees with me that the value of any object, a valuee, depends, in the last analysis, on the existence of a valuing subject, a valuer.

For Rolston, the ethical payoff of this analysis is characteristically Kantian. Kant (1959) writes, “Man necessarily thinks of his existence this way [i.e., as an end-in-itself, something of intrinsic value] thus far, it is a subjective principle of human action” (p. 47). Kant is intellectually honest; he is fully aware that value is not objective, in the same sense as a rock is objective, something existing independently of the intentional act of a valuing subject. He goes on, however: “Also every other rational creature thinks of his own existence by means of the same rational ground which holds also for myself, thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will” (Kant, 1959, p. 47). Rolston’s environmental ethic follows this Kantian pattern, but broadens the “subjective principle” to the maximum extent possible. Reflexive self-valuing is not confined to “man,” nor to “rational creatures,” nor even to sentient or conscious creatures, but to any and all evolved creatures. And, just as Kant, Rolston argues that because they value themselves intrinsically, we should value them intrinsically as well. That makes the principle “objective,” but in a
different sense of the word, which neither Kant nor Rolston marks. The
meaning of objective, in the above-quoted fragment from Kant, is "unbiased,"
not "existing independently of the intentional act of a valuing subject." (Norton
here calls it "epistemological" as opposed to "ontological" objectivity.) Each
organism should be an unconditional end for all moral agents because for
itself it is an unconditional end-in-itself. The problem with basing
an environmental ethic on Rolston's particular subjectivist theory of intrinsic
value is the same problem vitiating Paul Taylor's environmental ethic: respect
for nature is limited to respect for individual organisms. Unlike Taylor,
 Rolston, however, is not content with an exclusively individualistic environ-
mental ethic. He therefore supplements his theory of intrinsic value in nature
with complementary theories of "systemic value" and "projective value" that
are more holistic. For me here to discuss critically these supplementary value
theories would not be appropriate because Rolston does not mention them in
his contribution to this volume.

Bryan Norton takes Rolston at face value and believes that Rolston is de-
defending the view that values in nature are ontologically objective, that is, that
they exist independently of a valuing subject. My analysis indicates that
Rolston is actually defending, albeit cryptically, a subjectivist theory of intrin-
sic value in nature. Norton is, however, quite alive to the distinction I just
drew in reference to Kant between ontological objectivity and epistemologi-
cal objectivity, pointing out that the former is not a necessary condition for
the latter. Unfortunately, Norton, like most self-styled pragmatists in envi-
ronmental philosophy, seems to spend his energies critiquing "foundational-
ist" approaches to environmental ethics, such as mine and Rolston's, then
calling for a new post-Cartesian epistemology, and leaving it at that. Norton
notes that I have myself actually tried to develop a postmodern value the-
ory—based on epistemological extrapolations from the new physics—that
tries to break free of the subject-object bifurcation at the heart of modern
philosophy (which is more than he offers us here). But in his judgment, my
ventures into a postmodern worldview do not do the trick; they are still con-
 fined by the "Cartesian structure" (in a way analogous to the way that
Ouderkirk thinks my attempt to overcome the dualism of the wilderness idea
is still confined by dualist thinking). All this would seem to lead up to
Norton's own stab at "creating a new, post-Cartesian worldview," but alas, all
we find is a call for one, along with a call for "breaking down barriers among
disciplines."

Norton has conducted a career-long campaign against the idea of intrinsic
value of nature. At first, he seems to have believed it simply would not play in
Peoria (i.e., it would not be useful to environmental activists and policymakers)
and that, therefore, “weak anthropocentrism” would represent a more effective approach to environmental ethics (Norton, 1984). As time has gone on, his anti-intrinsic-value-in-nature campaign seems to have become an obsession with a life of its own (Norton, 1995). The idea that nature possesses intrinsic value has, however, become a staple of mainstream environmentalism out in the real world, as Christopher Preston (1998) massively documents. My own evidence is anecdotal but powerful. Following are three representative anecdotes:

1. Under the leadership of Steven Rockefeller, a proposed United Nations “Earth Charter” has undergone a “consultation” process among a host of constituencies all over the world and has been reiterated in countless drafts. The penultimate draft read, “1. Respect Earth and all life, recognizing the interdependence and intrinsic value of all beings, affirming respect for the inherent dignity of every person and faith in the intellectual, ethical, and spiritual potential of humanity” (Earth Council, 1999, emphasis added; Sturm, 1999). The Earth Charter Commission iterated a final version of it in March 2000. The term intrinsic value, unfortunately, did not survive the often intensely political consultation process to appear in the final draft. But the concept remains: “1. Respect Earth and all life in its diversity. a. Recognize that all beings are interdependent and every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human beings” (Earth Charter Launch, 2000, emphasis added). Norton did not anticipate the capacity of people to embrace the idea of intrinsic value in nature, I believe, precisely because he has underestimated “the intellectual, ethical, and spiritual potential of humanity” to reach beyond anthropocentrism, both strong and weak, for more expansive and inspiring values.

2. I was part of an interdisciplinary research team sponsored by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission charged to chart a course for fishery management in the Great Lakes for the twenty-first century, an example of actual, as opposed to called-for, interdisciplinary work. Part of my task was to discover the values really at play among stakeholders in the Great Lakes. Several stakeholder-generated documents that I assayed for value statements, expressed the intrinsic value of the lakes and their fishes, among them a fishery management plan for the waters of Lake Superior under their jurisdiction crafted by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (Callicott et al., 1998). The idea that nature possesses intrinsic value has, as this instance shows, trickled all the way down into a conservative, pedestrian state bureaucracy.

3. Environmental activist par excellence Dave Foreman (1991) notes that “During the 1970s, philosophy professors . . . started
looking at environmental ethics as a worthy focus for discussion.” And he goes on to point out that “by the end of the ‘80s, few conservation-group staff members or volunteer activists were unaware of the Deep Ecology–Shallow Environmentalism distinction [the anthropocentric-nonanthropocentric distinction, in other words] or of the general discussion about ethics and ecology. At the heart of the discussion was the question of whether other species possessed intrinsic value or had value solely because of their use to humans” (p. 8, emphasis added).

Foreman’s remarks reward close scrutiny. What we environmental “philosophy professors” did was create a useful new discourse first for environmental activists, and eventually for environmental professionals. As the “discussion” spilled out of the “ivory towers” and “dusty academic journals” only its general topic and core issue entered popular awareness and discourse (Foreman, 1991, p. 8). The finer points of theory—Rolstonian objectivism, Callicottian subjectivism, whatever—were filtered out. What remains is the basic idea: nature somehow possesses “intrinsic value.” Nor, furthermore, do the finer points of theory make any difference to the pragmatic implications—the power—of the idea. Compare human rights. The discourse of human rights was unknown in the ancient and medieval eras. Early modern philosophers, such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, started “discussing” human rights and speculated about how we came by them—a grant either from God or from nature. Thomas Jefferson and other eighteenth-century statespersons institutionalized the new rights discourse in such political documents as the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights. By now, rights talk is as common as talk of tables and chairs, birds and trees. Few philosophers today, however, believe that human beings possess human rights in the same way that we possess shoes, teeth, kidneys, and thoughts. Rights are, rather, usually theoretically reduced to “justified claims” in contemporary philosophy (Nickel, 1992). However, the fact that most contemporary rights theorists reject an objective God-given or natural rights theory undermines the considerable practical efficacy of rights discourse not one iota. Similarly, the fact that I (and, albeit cryptically, Rolston as well) reject the ontological objectivity of intrinsic value in nature undermines the practical efficacy of the new intrinsic-value-in-nature discourse not one iota.

Comparison of the idea of intrinsic value in nature with the idea of human rights brings us back to the importance of the Earth Charter. The adoption in 1948 of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations represented no international law or treaty binding on member states (Brownlee, 1981). But over the half century since its adoption, the declaration has in-
creasingly set a standard by reference to which member states are criticized and sometimes sanctioned. The efficacy of the Earth Charter is similarly symbolic and rhetorical. After its adoption by the United Nations, we may hope—and, I dare say, expect—that the environmental behavior of member states will also be criticized and sanctioned by reference to its principles, the first of which affirms the intrinsic value of nature. Bryan Norton is one my closest friends in the community of environmental philosophers. He has done some excellent work (which I greatly admire) unrelated to the intrinsic-value-in-nature debate, but, unfortunately, he risks being remembered fifty years after the United Nations adopted the Earth Charter as a naysaying, reactionary twentieth-century anthropocentrist, a self-styled pragmatist who failed to see the pragmatic potential of a grand new idea and the intellectual, ethical, and spiritual potential of humanity to embrace it.

Eugene C. Hargrove, I fear, will share a similar fate, for he too believes that “an emphasis on the revisionary at the expense of the descriptive will . . . simply make environmental ethics completely esoteric and unusable.” Quite the contrary, in my opinion; people, especially now in our fast-paced culture, are oriented more to the future than to the past and are receptive to—indeed, have a strong appetite for—new, inspiring ideas. Without providing a scrap of evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, to back his claim, Hargrove flatly asserts as plain fact “the rejection of nonanthropocentric intrinsic value by the general public.” The evidence I have offered here, not to mention that which Preston has assembled (1998), indicates just the opposite, a snowballing embrace of the idea by the general public.

OF HARGROVE, LARRÈRE, AND PALMER AND ECOQUANTUM METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS

As to Hargrove’s charge that I really do not have a metaphysics, not even a metaphysics of morals, as he has rather narrowly defined the terms, I offer no rebuttal. Instead I refer readers to the essays of Catherine Larrère and Clare Palmer to judge for themselves. More important are Hargrove’s droll comments on philosophical eclecticism.

Can contemporary environmental philosophers borrow selectively from a wide variety of past philosophical systems in crafting their own? Hargrove interprets me to claim that we cannot; and accuses me of doing so, nevertheless, myself. Certainly I do borrow from earlier philosophers, Hume for example; and quite selectively, accepting Hume’s theory of moral sentiments, but ignoring his theory of impressions and ideas, which I would reject were I ac-
tively to consider it. I think that selectively borrowing is appropriate, but only if the parts ignored or rejected are not necessary conditions or implications of the part appropriated. I do not think, to continue with the present example, that Hume’s theory of impressions and ideas is a necessary condition of his (or any) theory of moral of sentiments, nor does the latter entail the former.

Furthermore, I think that to stitch bits of one philosopher’s views together with those of another is appropriate, provided the bits are mutually consistent, even though other, logically independent bits, of the views of the philosophers in question may be mutually inconsistent. Thus, I think that it is appropriate to stitch together Hume’s theory of moral sentiments with Darwin’s account of the origin of ethics because they are mutually consistent, even though Hume’s skepticism about cause-and-effect relationships may be inconsistent with Darwin’s attempt to assign causes for differences among species. What I oppose is the attempt to stitch together bits borrowed from one philosopher with bits borrowed from another, when the appropriated bits from disparate sources are mutually inconsistent or rest on mutually inconsistent necessary conditions, assumptions, or implications. Therefore, contrary, it seems, to Angus Taylor, I think that linking animal liberation, à la Peter Singer, with the Leopold land ethic is not appropriate because animal liberation and the land ethic rest on mutually inconsistent assumptions: in the former, the assumption that we have duties only to sentient beings, regardless of their relationship to us; in the latter, the assumption that duties are generated by and oriented to community, regardless of sentience. A better fit with the Leopold land ethic, I think, is Mary Midgley’s animal welfare ethic, a key concept of which is the “mixed” human-animal community, because it too rests on a kind of communitarianism (Midgley, 1984).

Larrère’s essay is a masterpiece of erudition and penetrating insight, leavened by “the decadent perversity of postmodern [French] philosophy,” a vice in which she is happy to indulge. I only wish all my critics combined her virtues—in addition to erudition and insight, a thorough familiarity with the work she is criticizing and generosity of spirit in its interpretation—with so charming (albeit frustrating) a vice. Contrary to Hargrove, Larrère believes that my “main contribution” to environmental ethics is to show that this new field of philosophy “not only require[s] a metaethics, but a metaphysics,” and she discusses quite a bit of my work that would tend to support that judgment. I find much in Larrère’s discussion illuminating, especially the similarities and differences she sketches between my critique of modernity together with my version of postmodernity and those of such contemporary European “poststructuralist” philosophers as Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, René Thom, and Michel Serres.
I might not have fully appreciated Larrère’s most general critical point had I not come to a similar realization on my own. In her words, it comes to this: “actual sciences are not identical to natural philosophy.” I am—she is right, I admit—wont to conflate “science” and “natural philosophy,” as well as to confuse the latter with a “philosophy of nature.” I can explain this terminological error, which is responsible for more painful misunderstandings than one might suppose, if not excuse it. As I noted at the beginning of this essay, my first intellectual love and scholarly training was in ancient Greek philosophy. For that reason, I habitually take a rather long perspective, temporally speaking, on intellectual history in the West. From that perspective, science as we know it today, is a rather recent phenomenon that ultimately grew out of Greek natural philosophy. Moreover, the founders of modern science—Galileo, Descartes, Newton—did not call themselves “scientists,” nor did they call their work “science”; they called themselves “natural philosophers” or sometimes “natural theologians” (Burtt, 1952). The word science did not enter the English language in its contemporary sense until the mid-nineteenth century (Whewell, 1840). Hence science, as we know it, has emerged as something distinct from natural philosophy for only a century and a half. Finally, the work of some of the most celebrated scientists of the twentieth century—such as Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, and Eugene Odum—is indistinguishable from natural philosophy.

In a relatively brief time, however, most normal science has emerged as something quite distinct from natural philosophy. And the word science has acquired connotations very different from, even opposed to, the connotations of “natural philosophy.” The rigorous, formal (not to say ritualized) hypothetical-deductive-experimental method of science has wed it to manipulative technology. Thus the distinction that is so clear between natural philosophy and technology is not so clear between science and technology. Science, moreover, is not only inherently reductive, as scientific “knowledge” proliferates, science becomes ever more specialized, divided into more finely and sharply partitioned disciplines—various subfields of physics, chemistry, biology, geology—while natural philosophy is synoptic, synthetic, and integrative. Finally, science has become a huge social institution commanding great sums of money, prestige, and power. (Needless to say, natural philosophy has not.) Because of the social status of science, there has also emerged something that Larrère labels “scientism”—a kind of reverence for science, a naive trust in its pronouncements—which is antithetical to the provisional nature of science itself and the falsification-oriented epistemology of the scientific method. Therefore, when I write about the way science informs ethics, no wonder there is confusion, worse frustration, and worse still, irritation,
and anger (expressed here especially by Hester et al.)! What I should have all along written about is the way changes in science—the emergence of quantum theory and relativity in physics, of systems theory and later neo-Gleasonianism in ecology—have induced changes in natural philosophy, which in turn informs ethics. Larrère's conclusion is worth repeating, nor do I wish to gainsay it: "We must not forget that in 'natural philosophy' there is 'philosophy,' not just science."

Perhaps the distinction between science and natural philosophy that Larrère insists on, and that I now warmly endorse, will serve to deflect Clare Palmer's criticisms that center on my claims about the existence of a "scientific worldview," and especially about the emergence of a new postmodern scientific worldview. I might not be in such trouble with Palmer had I claimed that a mainstream, prevailing, or predominant natural philosophy exists—classical mechanics—and that a postmodern natural philosophy is emerging in its place. Nonetheless, I fear I would still be guilty, in Palmer's opinion, by association with certain figures of New Age notoriety (Fritjof Capra and Rupert Sheldrake are fingered by Palmer) and certain Deep Ecologists (who remain unidentified, but I suspect the culprit Palmer has in mind is Warwick Fox). On this particular point Larrère provides more particular support:

To argue his thesis of the "metaphysical implications" of contemporary science [that is, as he now better understands, contemporary natural philosophy], Callicott presents the "general conceptual notions" that can be "abstracted" from ecology and what he calls the "new physics" (relativity and quantum theory). Three of them are especially notable:

1. Quantum physics, and more especially Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty, undermines the subject-object dichotomy, which is at the core of modern metaphysics (from Descartes to Kant).
2. Contemporary ontology is relational, "relations are 'prior' to the things related" and entities are not independent objects, but internally related, "knots in the web of life."
3. Contemporary ontology is holistic. It is "not possible to conceive of an entity in isolation from its milieu."

Thus summarized, these are the basic assumptions of any constructive alternative to modernity, based on contemporary science. Merleau-Ponty, Serres, Thom, Prigogine, Stengers everybody agrees that nature can no longer be seen, as it was in the modern era, as made of "partes extra partes," discrete entities connected by external relations. The emphasis is on internality, upon the interactions between the entities and their milieu. Prigogine and Stengers speak of "entities intrinsically constituted by their irreversible interaction with
the world,” Serres criticizes the archaism of those who think that sciences deal with objects, or substances, when relations or interactions prevail.

Are “Merleau-Ponty, Serres, Thom, Prigogine, Stengers everybody” who is anybody in Larrère’s estimation, dismissible as New Agers or Deep Ecologists? Are we to prefer the extraordinary archaism of one John Dupre, cited by Palmer, who assumes that the world is such that he can intelligibly speak of its “contents,” as if it were a miscellaneous assortment of things in a Euclidian container, partes extra partes? Larrère writes from a point of view that is self-consciously French, whereas Palmer seems to exhibit, without noticing it, a bias that seems to me to be characteristically British. Call it the bias of partes extra partes. In American English, we say Congress has enacted a law, or SUNY Press has published this book; in British English, one says Parliament have enacted a law or SUNY Press have published this book. The very syntax of American English is holistic; governmental bodies and publishing houses are consortiums composed of individual persons, to be sure, but such persons collectively constitute an emergent entity through their relationships with one another and a wider circle of other persons. At least that is the American assumption as revealed in the way subject and verb are conjoined: a singular subject is conjoined with a singular verb. Although Parliament and SUNY Press are singular proper names, British English, to the contrary, insists on conjoining them with a plural verb. It is as if Parliament were nothing but an aggregate of MPs that do, severally, enact laws (each doing his or her bit by independently casting his or her vote, or so the syntax seems to suggest) and SUNY Press an aggregate of editors who do (each individually the British syntax insists) publish books.

Further to a national difference, contemporary French philosophers are typically also historians of ideas, whereas twentieth-century British philosophy—I am thinking of the ordinary language and analytic schools here—has (or should I say “have”?) tended to break continuity with the past. The rather long view of the emergence of modern science from Greek and eventually modern European natural philosophy and the continuing importance of natural philosophy that I assume may well be unintelligible from an ahistorical perspective on science in which “the fragmentation and specialisation within many scientific disciplines” may loom overwhelmingly large. From a long historical perspective, however, fragmentation and specialization in science is a very recent phenomenon, the emergence of which has not—not yet anyway—compromised the historical unity of science and therefore the possibility of distilling from it some characteristic natural philosophy.
Palmer reiterates a criticism Rolston (1989) leveled at me some time ago and which I answered shortly thereafter in “Rolston on Intrinsic Value: A Deconstruction”—that ontological peculiarities at the quantum scale have nothing to do with the middling scale at which we directly experience the world in which we live. Apparently she is unaware of this exchange. I am not suggesting, in any case, that the uncertainty and indeterminacy at the quantum scale cause something similar at the mesoscale of human experience. Rather, there is an interesting historical correlation—in the fifth century B.C.E. and the seventeenth century C.E.—between the waxing of atomism in natural philosophy and the waxing of egoism and individualism in moral philosophy and in society. In the past, the atomic and mechanical model of nature was, in fact, transposed to moral philosophy and society analogically. Individuals are, as it were, social atoms. History then suggests that the contemporary waning of atomism in natural philosophy might be followed by the waning of egoism and individualism in moral philosophy, and indeed in society. Complementing this retort, Larrère adds one of her own: “To Rolston’s objection that the implications of quantum theory are relevant only for the microscopic . . . level, but not for the middle-level,” one may reply that, “in both cases, the observer is part of the situation [s]he is observing. With it, [s]he has an internal relationship that knowledge actualizes.” Larrère clearly appreciates the relevance of quantum theory to ecological ethics. The science at the basis of the hierarchy of sciences, quantum theory, and the science at the apex, ecology, each reinforce the holism of the other.

Palmer, however, notes that quantum theory is amenable to a wide variety of interpretations—some of which support my natural philosophical conclusions, whereas some do not—and I am not very clear on the one I endorse. Indeed, I am not; I am not even, I confess, familiar with all the available interpretations of quantum theory; it is a very arcane and immense subject of study. But at least this I think we can say with confidence: as science explores the structure of matter ever more finely, we can no longer believe that matter is picturable as ultimately composed of very tiny, solid, externally related substances (like miniature marbles or BBs) extended in Euclidian space, as atomists from Democritus to Newton seem to have supposed; nor can we believe that we are essentially cogitos observing without affecting a world so constituted. From these postmodern features of postmodern natural philosophy, the widely shared conclusions enumerated by Larrère follow. We can also be confident, furthermore, that the dissipation of the modern classical Cartesian-Newtonian natural philosophy will have a ripple effect throughout the rest of philosophy, moral philosophy included, if history is any guide. What that effect will be, I have offered my speculations—tinged, to be sure, with my hopes—nothing more.
OF WENZ, LIGHT, AND BRATTON AND THE MORAL PLURALISM CONTROVERSY

The controversy swirling around my critique of moral pluralism can perhaps also be best illuminated by reference to the long history of Western philosophy to which I have always regarded my work as a contemporary contribution. I think that moral philosophy has provided an enormous service to society. Sustaining that service into the contemporary period, requires, in my opinion, a certain loyalty to the methods of our predecessors in the tradition, which have proved to be so fruitful. It also requires, I further opine, establishing continuity with their doctrines, even as we go beyond them, pressing on into new domains of inquiry, such as environmental ethics. Thus I have tried to establish continuity between the novel Leopold land ethic and the moral philosophies of Hume and Smith. In the context of the moral monism versus pluralism debate, however, I am more concerned with methodological than with substantive continuity in the tradition.

The moral philosophers of the past did their damnedest to provide a coherent and comprehensive moral philosophy and sell it, as it were, in a market place of ideas, on its merits in comparison with competing systems. (Doubtless some critics will pounce on this economic simile and my comparison of moral philosophy to competitive sports in the paragraph after next as proof that Callicott uncritically embraces degenerate modern institutions; but these are only similes, and I recognize dissimilarities as well; nor should anyone suppose that I hereby endorse uncritically free-market economics or competitive sports.)

Consider especially the work of two of our greatest predecessors, Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant. Both exhibited the merits of his system in its best light and portrayed the inadequacy of alternative systems in their worst. Bentham (1823, chap. 2, sec. 2) grouped the systems of Hume and Kant under the “principle of sympathy and antipathy,” which, in his opinion, was antithetical to the one, true principle of utility. About Hume, he writes, “One man says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong: and that is called a moral sense; and then he goes to work at his ease, and says, such a thing is right and such a thing is wrong—why? ‘because my moral sense tells me it is’” (Bentham, 1823, chap. 2, sec. 15, note 7). About Kant he writes, “Another man comes, and says, that as to a moral sense indeed, he cannot find that he has such a thing: that however he has an understanding, which will do quite as well. This understanding, he says, is the standard of right and wrong: it tells him so and so. All good and wise men understand as he does: if other men’s understandings differ in any point from his, so much the worse for them: it is a sure sign they are either defective or
corrupt" (Bentham, 1823, chap. 2, sec. 15, note 7). These characterizations are caricatures, of course. My point is that Bentham, founder of the enormously influential utilitarian school, was not a moral pluralist. He constructed a system of ethics that he believed to be comprehensive and contended that his was the best going. Kant (1959, p. 60), of course, was just as antipluralistic, and equally heavy handed in classifying all the alternatives to his categorical-imperative system under the "principle of heteronomy." And, as we might expect, he reserves his harshest condemnation for utilitarianism: the standard of "happiness is the most objectionable of all ... for it puts the motives to virtue and those to vice in the same class, teaching us only to make a better calculation while obliterating the specific difference between them" (Kant, 1959, 61).

This is what I thought (and still think) moral philosophers should do. The adversarial, dialectical debate about the "true" nature of morality and the one best system of ethics is (and should be) ongoing. It is like a competitive sport with no end, no last inning, no final buzzer, no Super-Bowl winner. By now the players know that no one, least of all they themselves, will have the final word; no one supposes that everyone will become a Singerian, a Rolstonian, or a Callicottian. But the contestants must play their parts as if there were an end game, a winner; they must give it their best shot. Because in doing so they are making a most valuable social contribution. One aspect of this contribution, I have already mentioned. Moral philosophers create, shape, and infuse powerful ethical discourses: Hobbes and Locke, the discourse of human rights; Bentham and Mill, the discourse of utility; Kant, of duty; Singer, of sentience; Rolston, of intrinsic value in nature. It detracts little from the social services that moral philosophers render that the majority of people who benefit from their services—who, say, insist on their right to drive a car or pursue happiness in a shopping mall—have never heard of any of these philosophers. Louis Pasteur, Thomas Edison, Booker T. Washington, Rachel Carson, and hundreds of other people who have, in one way or another, shaped the cultural environment in which we live are unknown to most of us. "If you asked people worldwide if they are Christian . . . vast numbers would answer in the affirmative," Susan Bratton observes, but "if you asked them if they are Kantian, probably a fraction of 1% (primarily well-educated Westerners) would say 'yes.'" A property-rights zealot defending his acres against the threat of phantom United Nations black helicopters may well call himself a Christian defending Christian values, but property rights, at least as far as I recall, is not an important biblical concern. His worldview is more Hobbesean and Lockean than Christian, although he may never have heard of Thomas Hobbes or John Locke, nor, certainly, identify himself as a "Hobbesean" or "Lockean."
To push the envelope of ethics, in response to new moral problems, and to continually add to and enrich ethical theory is another social contribution of monistic moral philosophers. Ironically, moral pluralism frustrates this process of growth and enrichment. Rather than struggling to construct a system powerful enough to embrace all our expanding interpersonal, inter-species, and environmental moral problems, the moral pluralist throws in the towel and proposes to deal with each ethical domain piecemeal—utilitarianism for this problem, deontology for that, and so forth. We have theory enough, the pluralists seem to suggest; we can deal with any problem by deploying one or another of those already available.

My stance toward pluralism, I admit, is ambiguous for two reasons. The first is that the environmental ethics I construct identifies multiple duties and obligations, generated by our multiple community memberships. In that sense, at what Peter Wenz calls the “level of principle,” it is pluralistic. But in another sense, at the level of theory, the system I construct and advocate is monistic, because all our duties and obligations are generated by community membership. Our multiple (pluralistic) duties and obligations are, that is, united by a (monistic) communitarian theory of ethics. Furthermore, I have, in response to pressure from my critics, recently added two second-order principles, as already discussed, to prioritize among the multiple duties and obligations, generated by our multiple community memberships. The second reason that my stance toward pluralism is ambiguous is that I am at once a moral philosopher and a plain member and citizen of various communities. As a moral philosopher, I am, for the reasons just elaborated, committed to monism. I am a part of the Western tradition of moral philosophy, and what moral philosophers traditionally do is construct comprehensive ethical theories and defend the merits of those theories in comparison with the available alternatives; it is our job. But as a plain member and citizen, I am a pluralist. I have just lauded the social value of having a contentious bunch of moral philosophers advancing the front of ethical theory through mutually critical, dialectical discussion, and, in the process, creating a rich diversity of powerful new discourses as instruments of social change.

Andrew Light seems to want to substitute for this social service a much more modest one: we might call it “values reconciliation and conflict resolution.” So, it seems, does Susan Bratton who asks rhetorically, “are we searching for ‘an ethic’?—the Holy Grail of the environment. Or should we be investigating ways to facilitate environmental problem solving and sensitivity within existing ethical systems?” To which I respond with another rhetorical question: Why not both? And why must I be faulted for pursuing the former, for surely I do not fault anyone for pursuing the latter? I’m an intradiscipli-
nary pluralist; Norton, Bratton, and Light seem to be intradisciplinary monists. If cognitive social work is what they believe to be the best use of their time and energy, so be it. I do not think that it is the best use of mine. I have no objection to their doing the work they think is the most fruitful. Why do they object to me doing mine?

Warming to her theme, Bratton asks, "Is it the task of environmental ethicists to dictate norms, or is it their task to facilitate the greater society's development of norms or values?" Certainly our task is not "to dictate" norms; Plato's dream of philosopher kings (philosopher dictators) has, fortunately, never been realized. As I just tried to explain, for those of us who make it our own, our task is, rather, to propose, theoretically to justify, and to defend new norms, such as the intrinsic value of nature. And the fulfillment of that task contributes profoundly, albeit indirectly, to the task of facilitating "the greater society's development of norms or values." (Once again, I call attention to the Earth Charter as a case in point.) In addition to environmental social science and social work, Bratton also suggests that we need to develop "historic, sociological, or anthropological information" in order better "to relate schools of thought and specific cultural groups to their actions and lifestyles." Certainly I would agree. Environmental philosophy, I repeat, renders an enormous service to society, but it is not the only one to be rendered and may not be the most important. Are philosophers, such as I, however, the best people to develop "historic, sociological, and anthropological information," which would, I am the first to testify, be of great value? Would such information not, however, be better generated by historians, sociologists, and anthropologists? Bratton goes on to enumerate seven sociological criteria for "judging the viability of religious ethical responses to environmental problems." All of them seem reasonable to me; but I am not a sociologist, so I am not in a position authoritatively to evaluate them. Maybe there is just no use for environmental philosophers doing environmental ethics that is continuous with the ethics done by philosophers for 2,500 years, off and on, in the Western tradition. Perhaps we live in a brave, new world that, although a product of that tradition, has no need of those furthering it—except as whipping boys—in the postmodern future. Perhaps, we methodologically old fashioned environmental philosophers should either retrain as historians, sociologists, anthropologists, or pragmatic facilitators, or, better, just retire and fade away into the sunset of the twentieth century. Of course, I vigorously disagree.
OF GRUEN AND TAYLOR AND FURTHER TO THE MORAL PLURALISM CONTROVERSY

Lori Gruen's essay continues the conversation about monism and pluralism from an ecofeminist perspective. I am afraid that the ambiguity just noted in my stance toward the issue has led Gruen to interpret my opposition to intrapersonal pluralism as an opposition to interpersonal pluralism. She quotes me as affirming "that we human beings deeply need and mightily strive for consistency, coherency, and closure in our personal and shared outlooks on the world and on ourselves in relationship to the world and to one another . . . [and that] we feel (or at least I feel), that we must maintain a coherent sense of self and world, a unified moral worldview." But my unified moral worldview may be different from that of hers, yours, and a host of others—quite obviously, if the opposition to it variously expressed here is any indication. Both individual diversity and cultural diversity exist. And that is good, for all the reasons I have just enumerated and doubtless for many other reasons as well. But part of the process that refines and enriches that diversity—and above all makes it dynamic—is mutual engagement, debate, and criticism. Thus, although respecting and valuing the way others try to organize their moral experience into a consistent, coherent whole, my social responsibility, as a moral philosopher, is to try to show how my way is better. My responsibility is also to attend to criticisms of my way offered by others, which is precisely what I am doing here, and change my way, which I have done many times (once right before your eyes in my response to Larrère), if I am persuaded that some other way of organizing experience into a comprehensive, self-consistent, and coherent whole is better.

Another misinterpretation that Gruen joins Bratton in making (and, of course, Hester et al.) is that a monist moral philosopher such as I would impose my own moral worldview on others. Perhaps Plato and Karl Marx would impose their personal unified moral worldview on others, if they had the chance, by force of arms or by undemocratic political power, but certainly I would not impose my views on others by any coercive means. Rather, I would hope to win the agreement of others by the persuasive force of argument.

What is especially striking—and, from my point of view, especially welcome—about Gruen’s contribution to this volume is her frank and intellectually honest exposition of the monism-pluralism (universalism-multiculturalism) dilemma within ecofeminism. Gruen quotes Isaiah Berlin’s particularly strong, unambiguous, and unqualified affirmation of the existence of "true" and "correct" beliefs in the moral and social realm (similar to those he supposes exist in the natural realm) and that ethics should be as certain as scien-
tism supposes science to be. As I read on, I was steeling myself for Gruen’s attribution of such views to me, only to be relieved that that was not her purpose in quoting Berlin. For I think that the best we can attain in both the moral and natural domains are not true beliefs, but only more comprehensive, consistent, and coherent beliefs. And I hold out as an ideal but never attainable goal, more or less following Jurgen Habermas (1970), that we could all come to provisional agreement about the best available—not the absolutely truest—set of beliefs, if, as persons of both intellectual and moral good will, we took the time to argue through our differences (Sosa, 1996).

To my relief (and for this I am grateful) Gruen does not join Hester et al. in saddling me with Berlin’s absolutistic universalism, but to my astonishment, she goes to admit that to her there “is much appeal to such a view.” It would obviate claims that feminists and animal liberationists were trying to impose their culturally spawned values on those members of other cultures for whom the subordination of women and use of animals is culturally institutionalized. (And I think that impose here is the right word because animal liberationists and feminists would coercively prevent, if they could, any and all people from engaging in blood sports such as bull fighting, “circumcising” their daughters, and perpetuating other practices that animal liberationists and feminists especially abhor and condemn, although I have no desire to force people against their will to accept the Leopold land ethic, which Bratton as well as Hester et al. falsely accuse me of trying to impose on others or dictate to them.) Gruen joins me, I am happy to note, in finding a middle path between absolutistic universalism and cultural relativism. Although parallel, our middle paths, however, do not seem to be exactly the same.

I certainly agree with Angus Taylor’s conclusion that “an alliance of the animal-liberation and environmental movements is not only possible but imperative.” His difference with me lies primarily in the theoretical starting point for this project. Do we start with the Leopold land ethic, as I suggest, and try to reach animal liberation through the concept of “mixed” human-domestic animal communities that Midgley (1984) articulates? Or do we start with utilitarianism and deontology as Peter Singer and Tom Regan respectively recommend? Taylor opts for the latter strategy.

With his concluding point (3)—“an end to factory farming of animals”—I not only agree, but add that no policy would be more environment-friendly than a total elimination of industrial animal agriculture. Even environmentalists who are wholly indifferent to animal suffering and think that the idea of animal rights is nonsense on stilts should support a policy of universal vegetarianism. Taylor mentions the reason why: industrial animal agriculture contributes to “habitat destruction.” I wish he had elaborated a bit. The removal
of cattle, sheep, and other domestic animals from the arid range land in the western United States would return millions of acres to native wildlife (Weurthner, 1992). Much of the plow land in the midwestern United States is devoted to feed crops, such as corn and soybeans, most of which are eaten not by human beings, but fed to factory-farmed cows, pigs, and chickens (Lappé & Collins, 1979). Animals burn about 90 percent of the food they eat and convert the rest (only 10 percent at best) to meat, so Americans would need only about 10 percent of the land now under cultivation to grow food if we consumed grains and legumes directly and altogether eliminated mass-produced meat from our diets (Lappé & Collins 1979). The elimination of industrial animal agriculture would, therefore, make millions of acres available for prairie restoration on a truly grand scale. (The potential for retirement of farmland in parts of the world where people eat less meat would, of course, be more modest.)

Therefore, environmentalists should be even more keen to support policies aimed at the total elimination of industrial animal agriculture than animal liberationists. Why? Because the elimination of industrial animal agriculture would be tantamount to the elimination of all but a few museum specimens of the animals that such policies, from an animal-liberation point of view, are designed to benefit. The environmental benefits of such policies are unambiguous, but the animal-liberation benefits are paradoxical. In saving the millions of specimens of cows, pigs, chickens, and other domestic animals from suffering or having their rights violated, by calling a halt to industrial animal agriculture, their future populations would be reduced to scattered remnants here and there on hobby farms and in zoos. I hope that Taylor and other animal liberationists do not entertain the environmentally destructive alternative of releasing the legions of domestic animals now confined in factory farms into the wild. Feral populations of domestic animals—mustangs, burrows, razorbacks—are already a scourge in various native wildlife habitats of North America; simply opening the doors of factory farms and literally liberating the inmates would be an environmental disaster.

I do not think that Taylor would support the literal liberation into the environment of the domesticated victims of industrial animal agriculture because he makes a welcome concession to environmental concerns by acknowledging the occasional necessity of “harming individual animals”—the necessity, for example, of reducing irrupting deer populations by lethal means—for the sake of “preserving the integrity of ecosystems.” Large populations of feral animals would certainly diminish the integrity of ecosystems. In his concluding point (1), Taylor once again acknowledges that “compelling reasons” of an environmental kind might dictate hunting certain
species of wildlife in certain circumstances. He then adds another exception to his proposed “hands-off policy toward wildlife”: hunting and fishing are justified when “necessary for subsistence.” I can only guess that this is a concession to certain contemporary indigenous peoples, who traditionally subsisted by hunting and fishing (as well as by “gathering” or foraging, we may also suppose). But much turns on the strength of “necessary.” In today’s global village, few groups of people are so isolated that hunting and fishing are absolutely necessary to live. Rather, for many peoples, hunting and fishing are necessary to maintain continuity with the past and cultural identity. The question arises then, what about the cultural identity of the rural British gentry, which depends, they may claim by parity of reasoning, on maintaining the tradition of fox hunting; what about the cultural identity of American rednecks, among whom blood sports, such as cock fighting, are traditional; and so on and so on? A newsmagazine wag once wrote (I cannot remember who or where I read it) that “multiculturalism ends where feminism begins.” Taylor seems to suggest that animal liberation ends where multiculturalism begins. And I ask, if so, how broadly should concessions to cultural identity extend, and by what criterion are legitimate cultural exceptions to be distinguished from illegitimate ones? These are the questions that Gruen confronts directly, but only hints at the way she would answer them.

**OF HESTER, MCPHERSON, BOOTH, AND CHENEY AND MULTICULTURAL ECOLOGICAL ETHICS**

Lee Hester, Dennis McPherson, Annie Booth, and Jim Cheney (hereafter Hester et al.) critique *Earth’s Insights*—and, from all one can tell by what they write, the book focuses on capital “I” Indigenous traditions of thought and little else. Most of my book, however, discusses Judeo-Christian cosmogony; Greco-Roman mythology and philosophy; Islam; Hinduism; Jainism; Theravada, Hua-yen, Tendai, Shingon, and Zen Buddhism; Taoism; and Confucianism, as partly witnessed by Bratton. In addition, a number of indigenous traditions of thought are discussed—those of Polynesia, Africa, and Australia, as well as of North and South America. In short, although purportedly a critique of *Earth’s Insights*, the essay by Hester et al. touches only on a small portion of the book. Moreover, their habit of capitalizing Indigenous essentializes and totalizes the diversity of thought comprehended by the term; it erases the differences internal to indigenous traditions of thought; and permits the self-identified “Indigenous” spokespersons among Hester et al. to speak with a self-conferred authority for all Indigenous traditions of thought. As soon as
the particulars of capital “I” Indigenous thought come up, however, the authors narrow their indigenous spatiotemporal horizons to “the North American continent prior to European contact.” Are we to believe that what is (allegedly) true of North American indigenous thought is true of all indigenous thought—South American, Polynesian, African, Australian, Asian, European?

In the second endnote, however, Hester et al. write: “This essay was shaped by Western problematics in environmental ethics. Indigenous coauthors [Hester and McPherson] provided some Indigenous content, but the problem is Western and in most ways so is the voice of this essay” (emphasis added). By process of elimination, that means, in plain English, that Booth and Cheney (or perhaps just one of these two) supplied most of the indigenous content and wrote most of the Hester et al. essay. Surely then, there is some irony in Hester et al.’s charge that “Indigenous thought provides color commentary in the local vernacular” for my project in Earth’s Insights. In the Hester et al. broadcast studio, apparently Cheney and Booth are calling the game play by play, whereas Hester and McPherson are providing color commentary. We are therefore compelled to wonder on what grounds we are supposed to accept Hester et al.’s pontifications—so confidently asserted—about the indigenous attitudes and values respecting the environing “world” prevailing “on the North American continent prior to European contact.” No historical sources are cited for these putative Indigenous “world”-oriented postures of “respect.” The justification we are supposed to accept for this appears to be as follows. Two of the coauthors self-identify as indigenous. The approach to ethics, the values, and the epistemological commitments asserted by the other two “Western voices” (or perhaps by just one of them) are, therefore, the same as those of all indigenous peoples everywhere, past as well as present. Apparently, that is, we are supposed to accept undocumented assertions about capital “I” Indigenous thought by the Western voices among Hester et al. because their “indigenous” coauthors provide some of the content and endorse the rest.

We might suspect that Hester et al.’s idyllic and wholly undocumented claims about the environmental attitudes and values indigenous to “the North American continent prior to European contact” are little more than conventional romantic fantasy. They are, rather, projections into the past of the authors’ own attitudes and values. Two of the authors do, after all, self-identify as Indigenous. Thus, to know what the attitudes and values of Indigenous peoples on the North American continent were before European contact, all that is necessary is to consult their own attitudes and values and those of their Indigenous friends and relatives. Accordingly, we learn that pre-
Columbian Indigenous North American peoples were "pluralists" just like the authors: they did not fight over "monistic ideologies," but rather lived harmoniously in an "emergent ecological order." I repeat: No historical evidence whatever for this claim is offered; and the evidence that does exist supports an opposite conclusion.

Consider more reliable (that is, actual historical) information about two of the peoples Hester et al. invoke. First, one nineteenth-century Ojibwa author offered this authoritative account of the origins of the name other indigenous peoples called his people: "The word is composed of O-jib, 'pucker up,' and ub-way, 'to roast,' and it means, 'To roast 'til puffed up.'" As this indigenous author goes on to explain, "because of uncontrolled feeling incited by aggravated wrong," the Ojibwa were widely renowned for the way they "tortured by fire in various ways" their Indigenous enemies (Warren, 1970, p. 36). The name the Ojibwa called themselves, An-ish-in-aub-ag, according to the same authority, may be translated as "original man" (Warren, 1970, p. 56). Other indigenous peoples, by implication, are not "original man," that is, not human, at all. Second, Hester et al.'s invocation of both Navaho and Hopi cultural material to illustrate pluralism and harmony among all North American peoples (prior to the corrosive effects of European conquest, that is), is especially ironic. The bitter ethnic conflict, lasting to this day, between the Navajos and the Hopis antedates European contact. Pre-Columbian Hopis called the Navajo "Tusavutah (tu-person; savutah-to pound), because they killed or captured an enemy by pounding his head with a rock" (Waters, 1963, p. 312). The Navajo were, from the Hopi point of view, the Head-Pounding people. The horticultural Hopi felt preyed upon by the nomadic Navajo, who wandered into their world about 1,000 years ago, and whom the Hopi regarded as barbarous murderers and thieves (Kluckhohn & Leighton, 1962; Waters, 1963). The name the Navajos call themselves, Diné, means "The People" (Kluckhohn & Leighton, 1962). If you are not Diné (i.e., a person among The People) then who (or what) are you? Diné connotes the same ethnocentric attitude as An-ish-in-aub-ag.

Hester et al. insinuate, again and again, that I believe that there exists "One Truth," that is, that there is one true worldview—that discovered by science—and all the others are false. I do not. In Earth's Insights I carefully and assiduously avoid truth claims for the (ever changing) scientific worldview. Indeed, I agree completely with the Carol-Geddes anecdote, quoted by Hester et al., about the Indigenous Ms. Ned who insightfully observed that the scientists she listened to all one day just "tell different stories than we do." All human cognitive constructs are stories, narratives, but all are subject to mutual criticism, as Gruen so forcefully argues. Some stories, I suggest in
Earth's Insights, are more “tenable”—not truer, not even more believable—than others; that is, they may stand up to criticism better than others because they are more comprehensive, consistent, coherent, pragmatic, beautiful, and spiritually inspiring—all qualities I would argue that are exhibited by the new grand narrative of postmodern natural philosophy. Surely this is a modest epistemological claim. For example, I think that the “epic of evolution” is more tenable than Hesiod’s epic, the Theogony. (I hope this will not outrage any indigenous Greeks.) But when stories from different times and places resonate well with the new grand narrative of postmodern natural philosophy, the two are mutually validated. I thought that some such account as this would lend credibility to the wide variety of such indigenous narratives as those of the pre-Cookian Hawaiians and pre-Columbian Ojibwa, narratives that are usually dismissed as “myth” and “superstition.” But Hester, et al. seem to think that we should bring the contemporary scientific narrative to the test of these premodern indigenous narratives. In that they appear to agree in principle with school-board fundamentalists who would bring contemporary natural philosophy to the test of the premodern biblical narrative and prohibit the telling of the scientific story to schoolchildren if it were contradicted by the biblical story. Which indigenous narrative, in other words, do we select to be the standard against which the scientific narrative will be validated? As the Ms.-Ned anecdote testifies, and as Hester et al. remind us, indigenous narratives are quite diverse, and, I add, often mutually inconsistent.

Not only do we learn from Hester et al. that all past as well as present Indigenous peoples were peaceful and tolerant pluralists, just like the contemporary Indigenous coauthors among Hester et al., we also learn that they all subscribe(d) to a form of environmental “respect” just like the one recently developed by Tom Birch (1993) and then publicly endorsed by one of the non-Indigenous authors, namely Cheney (1998). All Indigenous people manifest(ed) “universal consideration,” that is, they respect(ed) absolutely everything (except me). This is so, we are informed, because they tell stories and do not theorize. No Indigenous people have an ethic, we learn, environmental or otherwise, nor do they have a metaphysics (such things belong only to Western culture) but they do have an epistemology. It too is exactly like that recently developed by Birch (1993) and Cheney (1998). No less than the scientific method, which places a premium on falsification of hypotheses, the epistemology of Indigenous peoples, we are told, is, and always was, self-critical. We should know this is so because, in the experience of the self-identifying Indigenous authors among Hester et al., when contemporary Indigenous people from different groups get together with one another they “swap stories and come to understand each other better and understand the various
ways of understanding the subject matter of the stories better.” Because all contemporary Indigenous people, in the experience of the self-identifying Indigenous authors among Hester et al., are so friendly with one another and curious about one another’s stories, the accounts of violent and horrible ethnic conflict among some Indigenous peoples, prior to the European conquest of North America, by the nineteenth-century Indigenous historian of the Ojibwa, is a vicious slander, I suppose we must conclude.

The scientific method is infected throughout with Baconian designs on the control of nature and any natural philosophy or worldview informed by science must also be similarly infected, Hester et al. tell us. But they also tell us that Indigenous thought, in sharp contrast to postmodern natural philosophy, is genuinely, “ecological.” The seeming paradox generated by the fact that ecology is a Western science, and must therefore itself be inherently Baconian, as we are told elsewhere in the essay, should, however, not trouble us. This and a number of other contradictions in the Hester et al. essay does not undermine its credibility, they inform us in an endnote, because the criterion of noncontradiction is a local concern of Western philosophy, inapplicable to Indigenous thought. Hester et al. thus join Bratton in expressing doubts about the usefulness of the noncontradiction criterion in deciding what is tenable and what is not.

As with Lee Hester and many other contemporary Americans, I too have indigenous as well as European ancestry. Heretofore, I have made no public declaration of it because I did not want to exploit something I consider irrelevant to sound scholarship. I do not, that is, think that my indigenous ancestry provides me with any special access whatever to how all Indigenous people—past and present, here, there, and yonder—think. Because Catherine Larrère is French, does that alone qualify her, in the absence of careful study of relevant materials, to pontificate on, say, the fifteenth-century worldview of the French? Furthermore, must one be French to be able to understand and credibly characterize the fifteenth-century French worldview? My attempt to characterize the traditions of thought of various, and very different, indigenous peoples in *Earth’s Insights* was based on a careful study of a wide variety of cultural materials. In the case of the Polynesian tradition, for example, I relied in part on the *Kumulipo*, a seventeenth-century royal Hawaiian genealogical chant; in that of the Ojibwa, I relied in part on a body of narratives collected and roughly translated by William Jones, an anthropologist of indigenous ancestry, and recorded in the original language. Hester et al. challenge my interpretation of indigenous traditions globally, that is, without respect to the differences among them and with no reference whatever to any sources, except their own, apparently innate knowledge of things Indigenous.
Frankly, I do not know to defend myself against such papal bull, except to baldly state its preposterous assumptions.

And when I say, “defend myself,” I choose my words carefully because, unlike all the other authors in this volume, Hester et al. mount a mean-spirited personal attack on me. Their title rhetorically associates me with George Armstrong Custer. I consider this to be as tasteless and offensive as if they titled their essay “Callicott’s Mein Kampf.” The essay is full of the rhetoric of political violence. I am accused of an “attempted intellectual coup d’état of Indigenous thought”; of employing an “imperialist conquest model” of “heart(less)” analysis. They call me “arrogant,” “misguided,” out to “export” and “impose” the Leopold land ethic throughout the world. (Actually, in *Earth’s Insights*, I find only one indigenous ecological ethic to be similar to the Leopold land ethic; others are more or less “ecological” in different ways.) They accuse me of hubris. This is not only disheartening, it defies understanding. In a document coauthored by one of the indigenous coauthors of the Hester et al. essay, McPherson, the same account of the Ojibwa land ethic that Hester et al. characterize as “distorted” is warmly endorsed for including an analysis of the very thing it is now accused of failing to appreciate, namely, Indigenous respect for things natural:

One of the conclusions which Callicott reaches which has particular importance for The Native Philosophy Project here in Northwestern Ontario is, for example, that “the Ojibwa regarded animals, plants, and assorted other natural things and phenomena as persons with whom it was possible to enter into complex social intercourse.” . . . In Callicott’s original research on the Ojibwa narrative-tradition, . . . he came to realize that “Ojibwa narratives consistently represent the natural world as a world of other-than-human persons organized into congeries of societies.” . . . This concept of “other-than-human persons” is an extremely important one in moral philosophy. A person indeed is someone who has our respect. (Rabb & McPherson 1994, p. 5)

What Hester et al. reject with particular disdain, Rabb and McPherson (1994, p. 7) go on warmly to endorse: “Callicott and others have suggested that the North American Indian attitude to nature constitutes a land ethic very close to that proposed by the famous American environmentalist Aldo Leopold, [who] argues that what is important in making decisions affecting the environment is not the right of the individual, human or otherwise, but the good of the biotic community.” In many other passages in the same document, my work is extensively cited as a precedent for taking indigenous
thought seriously as philosophy, as a study in “ethno-metaphysics.” Furthermore, the material upon which I base my interpretation of an Ojibwa worldview (i.e., the narratives collected by Jones) is, in the opinion of Rabb and McPherson (1994, p. 10), so authentic that “many of our [indigenous] students have found these narratives very familiar and are able to tell the entire story with astonishing accuracy after reading only the first few sentences.” As of this writing, McPherson still uses the text I coauthored and that he and Rabb cite, Clothed-in-Fur and Other Tales: An Introduction to an Ojibwa World View, in his courses. And Rabb and McPherson warmly endorse my methods of ethno-metaphysical analysis. How are we to account for this reversal of judgment? Is this more evidence that the principal nonindigenous coauthor is using the indigenous identity of two of his collaborators as a mantle to hide his own naked speculations and otherwise groundless assertions? As noted, Hester et al. claim that consistency is not a concern in Indigenous thought. Neither, it seems, is gratitude to a fellow philosopher for work that helped make an academic program in Indigenous philosophy at Lakehead University possible.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude “My Reply” by returning to the point with which I began—thanksgiving. By way of transition from the immediately preceding discussion, I am grateful that the two versions of the attack on Earth’s Insights (and its author) by Hester et al. are both accompanied by my retort—here and, and more fully, in Environmental Ethics (the journal). Again, I thank all the authors represented in this volume for their engagement with my work, and the great majority of them for the graceful and appreciative way in which they do it. Reading these essays and mounting a reply has been both an exhilarating and humbling experience. I wish I could have devoted a reply of equal length to each (as I did to that by Hester et al. in the pages of Environmental Ethics). Short of that, my first challenge was to select the central points in each of their essays and reply to those. The second challenge was to craft a reply that had a unity and integrity of its own. It is a Herculean task, to which only a true philosophical Hercules would be adequate. A mere mortal, I have here done the best I could.