Environmental Virtue Ethics (EVE) 2007
2. The green belief: Fairly radical change in way we engage with nature is imperative
3. EVE concerned to defend green belief in virtue ethics terms rather than utilitarian and deontology (Kantian) terms
4. Two strategies
a. Old, familiar virtues applied to new relations with nature
b. New virtues concerned with our relations to nature
5. OLD VIRTUES DEFENSE OF GREEN BELIEF
6. Ecological disasters (virtually all enviros agree) brought on us by these vices
7. Short-sightedness defense of green belief
a. Some of our actions have just been plain short-sighted as far as our own interests
b. Examples; No one welcomes
i. Air pollution in their city
ii. Contaminated shell-fish
iii. Being made sick by local water
c. Typical response is: “Government should do something about it” w/o raising taxes or prohibiting us from doing any of the things we are used to doing
d. Just short-sightedness all over again
8. No quick fix: Can’t turn around pollution w/o forgoing a number of practices/activities we in developed nations think of as enjoyments that are part of ordinary pleasant life
a. For example?
9. Greedy and self-indulgent to want to enjoy ordinary things?
a. Yes says Hursthouse
b. Convincing others and ourselves of truth of green belief involves getting us to see this
c. Contrast with Dale Jamieson (Ethics and Environment 2008, p. 91-92): “While a great deal of env destructive behavior can be denounced as greedy or vicious, much is humdrum and ordinary....many people making small contributions to very large problems....the ‘soccer mom’ driving her kids to school and sporting events”
10. Very small # of people now see their previous enjoyment of small ordinary things as greedy and self-indulgent and have changed their practices.
i. Eating meat
ii. Wearing fur coats
iii. Buying new mahogany furniture
iv. Owning several cars
11. Virtue ethics critique of meat eating
a. Involves vices of greed and self-indulgence
b. Also cruelty and lack of virtue of compassion
i. No need to appeal to animal rights
c. Few deny that there is a great deal of animal suffering in producing cheap meat
d. Once dispel the ignorance that need meat for human health
e. See that animal suffering is gratuitous and our practices are cruel
f. Fact that meat eaters themselves don’t inflict cruelty on chickens, sheep, cows, and pigs may mean they are not cruel
g. But if know about the practices, and continue to eat meat, can’t be called compassionate
i. Like a person can’t be called just if enjoy fruits of slave labor (even if not a slave owner)
12. Vices can aggravate each other and explain inaction on env
a. Pride and vanity make us unwilling to acknowledge our greed, self-indulgence, short-sightedness, and lack of compassion
b. Dishonesty (in form of self-deception) allows us to blind ourselves to relevant facts and arguments, find excuses for not changing
i. E.g., pretending global warming isn’t happening
c. Cowardice makes us unwilling to go out on a limb and risk contempt of our peers by propounding unpopular view
i. E.g., shouldn’t eat meat, drive SUVs, own second homes?
13. Many env problematic practices stem from these familiar vices and env problems might be largely solved if we could “release many humans from grip of these vices”
a. Just as human problems (man’s inhumanity to man) would be solved if get many people to be truly compassionate, benevolent, unselfish, honest, un-materialistic, long-sighted, just, patient.
14. Humility is one other old/familiar virtue needed for change in env. practices:
15. Proper humility
a. Not obsequiousness, false modesty, wimpishness
b. Opposed to vice of arrogance
a. Undue assumption of dignity, authority, power or knowledge
17. We must abandon our arrogance toward nature
a. Darwinism does not show that we are to be dignified as the top species, as many think
i. “We speak of dinosaurs as failures; there will be time enough for that judgment when we have lasted even one tenth as long”
b. Our rationality, rather than being mark of our superiority, may turn out to be a poor strategy in evolutionary terms
c. Our rationality gives us no special authority
d. We do not have “dominion” over rest of nature
i. Aristotle’s (and Bible’s?) claim that plants exist for sake of animals and all other animals exist for sake of humans is false
e. Discovered that our power over nature is much more limited than we supposed when we first got modern science going (as we learn our understanding of the biosphere is in its infancy)
18. EVE strategy: Apply old virtues and vices to env. behavior to help solve env problems
a. Virtues: Prudence, practical wisdom, compassion, proper humility
b. Vices: Greed, self-indulgence, short-sightedness, cruelty, pride. vanity, dishonesty, arrogance
19. WHAT A VIRTUE IS
20. Virtue is an ethical character trait (e.g., honesty) and more
a. Far more than a mere disposition/tendency to act in certain ways (honest ways)
b. Act for certain reasons (not simply because honesty is best policy)
c. Involves feelings/emotions
i. Dispositions to certain emotional reactions, finding certain things enjoyable and others painful/distressing
d. Intellectual, perceptual capacity to recognize when we are about to be dishonest
e. Practical wisdom (ability to reason correctly about what is to be done)
f. All above unified in a way a human can be
g. Cultivate in children: Preliminary versions of this way of being are found in children and need cultivation
21. ONE NEW VIRTUE: WONDER
22. Wonder at nature involves
a. Aesthetic appreciation of it
b. Sense of gratitude toward it (for its beauty and abundance)
e. “How wonderful” or “awesome!
23. Wonder helps proper humility avoid being crushing or dispiriting
a. Humans and all our works are insignificant and fleeting part of great unfolding of nature is ameliorated by joyous thought we are part of something glorious
24. Correct orientation of the emotion of wonder is a kind of virtue
i. Like being rightly disposed with respect to emotion of fear is a virtue (namely courage)
b. Being disposed to feel wonder the right way, toward right objects for right reasons, to right degree, on right occasions in right manner
25. Some objects proper objects of emotion of wonder and some not
a. Nature and its works are
26. Getting this emotion in harmony with reason really matters morally and for env
a. Trouble if we think and feel
i. Not that nature is wondrous, but that Disneyland is
ii. That other animals are not, but we are
iii. That seas are not, but swimming pools on 20th floor of luxury hotels are
b. Act accordingly, then we will act wrongly
c. Just as when we fear pain to ourselves and not others, or are angered by justified criticism and not getting our own way, but not angered at injustice to our fellow humans, we act wrongly
27. Wonder not only concerned with nature
a. Might be aimed properly at art or the great works of philosophy
b. Or (more problematically?) at New York City and its sky scrapers (only problematic if not also at nature?)
28. ANOTHER NEW VIRTUE: “RESPECT FOR NATURE” OR “BEING RIGHTLY ORIENTED TO NATURE”
29. Paul Taylor recommended respect for nature as an “ultimate moral attitude”
30. If see it as a virtue, avoid three problems with Taylor’s account
31. One: Not easy to adopting such a fundamental attitude (as respect for nature) and we want actions and emotions consistent with the attitude
a. Thinking of respect for nature as virtue accounts for the difficulty in developing such attitude and disposition to act in accordance
32. Two: Taylor relies on concept of “inherent worth” (=IW) which is highly problematic and doesn’t add anything to the practices of respect involved
i. E.g., degrees or not? Humans same IW or not?
b. From EVE perspective, positing controversial notion of IW is not necessary
c. This can be built into a virtue.
d. All that matters is that we are accept as reasons for actions the attempt not to harm other living things
i. Tell children who rip at bushes, flowers, “don’t do that you’ll harm or kill it”
e. Don’t need anything (spooky) to underlie these practices
f. If Hursthouse is right, then similar ascriptions of inherent worth to humans would also not be needed to ground an ethic of proper treatment of humans
i. Why not drive your parents car? You’ll harm or kill someone.
33. Three: Taylor’s respect for nature is really only respect for individual living things but more of nature needs to be respected
a. But abiotic/inanimate nature (the moon, the seas, atmosphere) can also be mistreated
b. There is appropriate and inappropriate behavior toward the planet’s geology as well as its biology
i. E.g., blowing up the moon to prevent high tides is horrifying
ii. E.g., destroying spider webs or sea shells inappropriate
c. Respect for nature as a virtue (set of reasons for action and feeling inculcated in moral education) need make no sharp distinction between animate and inanimate nature
34. Hursthouse thinks the appeal to “intrinsic value” of natural entities does not help (p. 167)
a. Grounding our multiple reasons for acting appropriately toward nature in the intrinsic value of those entities tell us nothing more
b. Be content with these multiple reasons for acting certain ways towards nature
c. *Virtue ethicists seem content to stop the reason giving at places that other (environmental) ethicists are not happy stopping at*
35. WHAT TO DO?
36. Objection: Virtue ethics does not tell us enough about what we should do
a. Except obvious prohibitions on wanton, gratuitous, selfish, maternalistic and short-sited consumption, harm and despoliation
b. Reply: Other env. ethics do no better
37. EVE will recommend that with env problems we act as the virtuous person would act
a. But we have few exemplars of what an environmentally virtuous person would act like
b. Certainly can’t look to env. philosophers who lead lives of standard Western materialistic comfort, drive to shop at supermarkets, but new clothes, listen to opera on CD players, dine in restaurants, write books/articles on computers, jet to international conferences, teach students in large land-occupying buildings
i. Not that they are hypocritical, but that sincerely holding to ethical beliefs is far short of being virtuous, including practical wisdom about how to act in particular circumstances
c. Can’t look to native peoples, because what is virtuous depends on context; humans are socially and historically situated beings and what is virtuous for a 20th century city-dweller is not going to manifest itself in same ways as native peoples
38. OBJECTION: IS VIRTUE ETHICS HUMAN CENTERED, PUTTING HUMAN WELL BEING AS THE TOP VALUE?
39. Thomas Hill’s appeal to virtue is inappropriately human-centered
a. Hill’s argument
i. Neither utilitarianism nor deontology can explain why wantonly destroying a living thing such as a tree is wrong
ii. Because trees neither have feelings nor rights
iii. Hill explains its wrongness in virtue ethics terms: It is wrong because it shows arrogance and lack of proper humility
b. Hill argues that what is wrong with lack of humility regarding nature is that it has a dangerous tendency to lead person to treat other people disrespectfully
c. This is like Kant’s inadequate explanation of why it is wrong to be cruel to animals, namely that it will make one cruel to people. But:
i. Not clear people cruel to animals more likely to be cruel to people
ii. Ignores that animals suffering matters for its own sake and inflicting it pointlessly is cruel and deplorable whether or not it makes one cruel to people
40. Hill’s account misses point that killing a tree matters and it is arrogant to wantonly destroy living things whether or not this is likely to make me act arrogantly toward humans (a dubious empirical claim, in any case)
41. Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics needn’t explain why virtues are good and vices bad in terms of their affects on (other?) people (in way Hill does).
42. True: virtue ethics holds that virtues benefit their possessor
a. Virtues necessary and, with luck, sufficient for “eudaimonia” = living well as a human being (human flourishing)
b. Does this mean that human well-being is only thing that really matters morally?
i. That human well-being is the top value, ranked above any other in a human chauvinistic way?
43. No: Top value for virtue ethics is acting virtuously (rather than human well-being, which can–but need not--come from acting virtuously)
a. So the justification for being virtuous is not that human flourishing requires this (?)
b. It does require this (virtue is necessary for human flourishing) but that’s not the reason to be virtuous
i. There is no reason (needed)
c. And in any case, being virtuous is no guarantee of flourishing
i. Virtue might require behavior that undermines flourishing
44. No guarantee that acting virtuously will lead to human well-being
a. If live under evil tyrants, then eudaimonia may not be possible (they force you to act contrary to virtue or be tortured)
45. Whatever blocks virtue, blocks eudaimonia (living well as a human being)
a. Virtue is necessary for human flourishing, but not sufficient for it, no guarantee of flourishing
b. Does virtue ethics say we should be virtuous because it is our best chance for fulfillment?
i. If so, isn’t human or individual fulfillment the top value?
ii. So I don’t think Hursthouse can (does?) say this
46. HURSTHOUSE’S PESSIMISM ABOUT BEING VIRTUOUS TOWARD NATURE AND FLOURISHING
47. Because there are many virtues, Hursthouse worries that living as we should toward nature will be inconsistent with other virtues and this will undermine the possibility of human flourishing
48. If we are born into a world whose societies so predicated on despoiling nature that their very existence depends on continuing to despoil nature
a. Might be able to live in accordance with virtue of being rightly oriented toward nature if you leave society
b. But then will have cut myself off from exercise of most other virtues
c. So eudaimonia is beyond grasp
d. It is possible that we have made such a mess of things that we may not be able to live well as part of nature for many generations
49. Pessimistic possibility that nothing we do can get us out of our mess virtuously
a. Growth may go against virtue of being rightly oriented to nature
b. But justice (another virtue) might require growth to lift up the poor
50. Hursthouse has optimistic hope that the coming generation will embody these virtues (and already is to some extent) and help us see how we should live rightly with nature
Study Questions Hursthouse EVE
1. What is “the green belief?” Do you accept this idea?
2. Briefly explain the difference between a utilitarian, a deontology (Kantian–respect for individual rights), and a virtue ethics approach to ethics.
3. Identify and illustrate some of the vices that Hursthouse thinks have led to env problems.
4. Do you agree that to solve env problems we should start seeing many ordinary enjoyments as greedy and self indulgent? Give examples. What does Dale Jamieson think about this claim?
5. How are pride, vanity, dishonesty and cowardice vices that contribute to env problems?
6. Explain the virtue of humility and identify the opposite vice. How are these two related to environmental problems?
7. Explain what a virtue is (don’t just give examples).
8. Explain how the virtue of wonder is an environmental virtue according to Hursthouse.
9. According to Hursthouse, do emotions (like wonder) have proper and improper objects (can they be assessed as rational or unjustified)? Why or why not? What do you think? Give her examples of how wonder might go astray in an env unhealthy way.
10. According to virtue ethics (or environmental virtue ethics=EVE), how should we act? Is this helpful recommendation? Are env philosophers or native people’s good models?
11. According to Hursthouse, what is wrong with Hill’s virtue ethics account of why it is wrong to needlessly destroy trees and with Kant’s account of why it is wrong to needlessly harm animals?
12. Explain the objection that claims EVE is unjustifiably anthropocentric. How does Hursthouse respond to this claim? What is the “top value” for virtue ethics? Human flourishing? Being virtuous?
13. What is the relationship between being virtuous and flourishing according to Hursthouse? Is being virtuous necessary for flourishing? Is it sufficient? What about the case of the tyrant who requires immoral behavior to avoid torture?
14. What are Hursthouse’s reasons for suggesting the pessimistic possibility that we will not be able to solve our env problems virtuously, that to live rightly oriented with nature we will have to do things that conflict with other virtues