

ARTICLE

Coercive population policies, procreative freedom, and morality

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Abstract *I shall briefly evaluate the common claim that ethically acceptable population policies must let individuals to decide freely on the number of their children. I shall ask, first, what exactly is the relation between population policies that we find intuitively appealing, on the one hand, and population policies that maximize procreative freedom, on the other, and second, what is the relation between population policies that we tend to reject on moral grounds, on the one hand, and population policies that use coercive methods such as laws or economic incentives and deterrents, on the other. I shall argue that when changing a population policy, it may be morally desirable to affect people's procreative decisions more rather than less, and that sometimes it may be morally desirable to prefer a population policy that does not maximize procreative freedom to a population policy that does maximize it. I shall also point out that indirect population policies that use incentives and deterrents are not necessarily incompatible with liberal principles. Finally, I try to show what is assumed by those who defend the view that coercive population policies are morally wrong in all circumstances.*

1. Introduction

It is quite clear that we cannot let global population increase forever on a finite planet with finite resources and finite capacity to absorb our pollution.¹ Certainly in the near future, if not already today, population policies are needed to slow the rate of growth and finally make it zero, so that the size of global human population is consistent with the ideals of sustainable development. Coercive population policies may sometimes be the most effective ones. However, there is a wide-spread agreement that reproductive control that is *ethically acceptable* is non-coercive and based on voluntary co-operation that respects the individuals' procreative rights. The eighth principle accepted at the third UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 maintains that "all couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so,"² and the same point has been frequently made in academic literature. Marcel Wissenburg, for instance, writes that "each and every individual capable of procreating should have a universal, absolute and complete liberty to do so," and that we are permitted to strive for demographic goals only "by policies that are non-coercive."³

Similarly, Brian Barry has recently argued that the acceptable population policies are based on “voluntary choices made by individuals,”⁴ and Andrew Dobson, among others, sympathizes with Barry’s view.⁵ From a pro-choice, feminist perspective, procreative rights and “true reproductive choice” have been defended for instance by Betsy Hartmann who also wishes to say “no to population control” as far as “it encourages us to condone coercion.”⁶

In the next few pages, I would like to briefly evaluate the common claim that ethically acceptable population policies must let individuals freely decide on the number of their children. It is not my intention to deny the moral importance of procreative rights and individual freedom, although it is clear that not each and every individual has a moral right to procreation (children do not have it), and that using the right is not merely an individual’s own business (it takes two to tango). But I would like to ask, first, what exactly is the relation between population policies that we find intuitively appealing, on the one hand, and population policies that maximize procreative freedom, on the other, and second, what is the relation between population policies that we tend to reject on moral grounds, on the one hand, and population policies that use methods such as laws or economic incentives and deterrents, on the other. I shall argue that procreative freedom is but one measure that we use when estimating different policies. As the issue of what is actually meant by “coercion” and “freedom” is not a subject of this article,⁷ I shall use these concepts in non-technical, pre-theoretical sense, i.e. my argument is not based on any particular, extraordinary use of these concepts.

Before going into more detailed analysis, however, I would like to distinguish between three methods of changing the constituents of a population policy.

2. Three Methods of Changing Constituents of a Population Policy

For the purposes of the present paper, it is useful to assume that a population policy is a policy of a particular society. Through a population policy, the policy-makers influence people’s procreative decisions. The most important policy-maker is often the government of a state, but there are other actors as well, including governments of other countries, development agencies and organizations, the World Bank, various pressure groups, private agencies and consulting firms, even civil society as a whole.⁸ Thus, a population policy is anything but an intentional strategy formulated by a single policy-maker. Population policy determines the overall environment in which individuals make their procreative choices, and it depends on the content of a population policy whether the individuals decide to have children at all, whether they prefer to have very few children, whether they have some, or whether they decide to have very many children. Because of this, a population policy partly determines whether there are changes in the size of population, whether the size of population increases or diminishes, and whether the change is significant or moderate. Another way to influence these issues is, of course, using immigrant policy or refugee policy.

Any population policy consists of different parts that can be called the constituents of the population policy. Constituents can, for instance, be laws and regulations, education programmes and moral arguments. One should note that a particular constituent of a population policy may increase the tendency to have very many children, although the population policy as a whole diminishes such tendency. To change a particular population policy in an *effective way*, means to considerably change many constituents that are sufficiently *strong*, so that people have a different number of children than they would have otherwise had. To change a particular constituent of a

population policy, however, means to change either (1) social factors or (2) beliefs concerning social factors or (3) beliefs about what the relevant reasons for procreative decisions are. Thus, one can talk about three methods of changing constituents of a population policy. Consider an example of each.

- (1) *The Method of Changing Social Factors.* Suppose that there exists a law which prohibits having more than one child, and that people know that there is such a law. Presumably, this would give them a very strong reason not to have more than one child. By changing the law that limits the individuals' right to decide freely on the number of their children (a social factor), a policy-maker can change the constituent.
- (2) *The Method of Changing Beliefs Concerning Social Factors.* Suppose that contraceptive methods are available, but that people do not know that such methods are available since they are not familiar with contraceptives. This is why they do not use contraceptive methods. By giving them more information (a belief concerning a social factor), a policy-maker can change the constituent.
- (3) *The Method of Changing Beliefs About What the Relevant Reasons for Procreative Decisions Are.* Suppose that setting up a big family increases global population, and that people know pretty well that this is so. Suppose further that, on the whole, they do not consider this as a sufficient reason for not setting up big families. By changing this attitude (a belief about what the relevant reasons for procreative decisions are), a policy-maker can change the constituent.

The above-mentioned method, the method of changing beliefs about what the relevant reasons for procreative decisions are, constitutes a complicated method in practice, since it is often very difficult to change peoples minds in these matters. Moral arguments do not always work, nor do arguments that refer to self-interest. The problem is that there is no obvious answer to the question what the "right" reasons for procreative decisions are. If a person knows that the Bible commands people to have many children, and he or she believes that this is a good enough reason when making procreative decisions, then how to *prove* that he or she is wrong? If one's beliefs are induced by manipulation or indoctrination, this, as such, does not show that the beliefs are not true.

The second method, the method of changing beliefs concerning social factors, is relatively often used when the constituents of population policies are changed. The United Nations emphasizes the role of information, education and family planning programmes in population policies, and so do many scholars in the academic literature.⁹ Sex education in schools is relatively widely spread, and media campaigns for the so-called responsible sex are common. It is important to note, however, that this method can be turned the other way round. A policy-maker may change or aim to change justified and true beliefs into unjustified and untrue beliefs—for instance because of religious reasons, or because the agent has noticed that sometimes untrue beliefs are rather useful and have desirable consequences in practice. In short, the method of changing beliefs concerning social factors can be used even if there are no beliefs that are untrue, and a policy-maker may decide not to use the method even if he realizes that the beliefs are untrue.

The method of changing social factors themselves is the most common method when an agent aims to change a constituent of a population policy. It is evident that this method is also the most important one in formulating a particular constituent of a population policy, and ultimately the whole population policy. When a policy-maker changes social factors—such as laws and regulations—it usually changes people's beliefs

concerning social factors as well, for people are normally relatively well informed about social factors. Passing laws that directly aim to govern procreation, however, is only one particular way to change social factors. There are many other ways as well. For instance, a policy-maker may formulate or reformulate deterrents and incentives that aim to affect procreative decisions indirectly. A policy-maker may also try to reduce the social-economic constraints that affect people's behavior, or try to influence cultural customs and practices that have an effect on people's procreative decisions. An important constituent of any population policy is a law that *unintentionally* has an effect on procreative decisions. For instance, when a government makes decisions concerning the taxation of families, it may do so because of reasons of justice, not because of a particular demographic purpose. As far as these decisions have an impact on procreative behavior, they remain part of population policy, as we understand the notion here.

3. The Significance of Procreative Freedom

Is a population policy that maximizes procreative freedom the best one from an ethical point of view? I shall argue that it is not, not always at least, but first I would like to point out that, when changing population policy, it may be morally desirable to influence people's procreative decisions more rather than less.

Consider three alternative population policies A, B and C. Citizens who live in a society that follows policy A, have on average two children. The explanation for this has to do with complex economic, social and cultural factors. Given all the laws and regulations that determine issues such as education, taxation, transportation, day care, marriage and pricing of products meant for children, it is economically reasonable to have two children. Considering cultural practices, it is uncommon to have less or much more than two children. However, those who decide not to have two children are free to do so, and the undesirable consequences of their decision are minor. Thus, the citizens have genuine procreative rights. Although people's procreative behavior can be explained by social factors—as, indeed, can any behavior—the social factors in question are *just*: there are no *unjust* constituents of population policy that would explain why people behave as they do.

Policy B does not have much in common with policy A. Citizens who live in a society that follows policy B have on average four children. Again, the explanation for this has to do with complex economic, social and cultural factors, but in the case of B, the social factors in question are not just. Therefore, people have to make their procreative decisions on the basis of unfair social factors. Furthermore, those who make unusual procreative decisions, i.e. those who do not have four children, receive “social penalties” that may be quite considerable. Perhaps, for instance, they lose all means of support in their old days, if they do not have four children.

Policy C is similar to policy B, but is still a step further. Citizens who live in a society that follows policy C, tend to have six children. An explanation for this are extremely unjust social, economic and cultural circumstances. People are compelled to have many children for purely practical purposes: if they do not have numerous children, they will encounter serious economic trouble. Children can be used in workplaces to earn money for their families. There is no compulsory school system and parents do not have to spend money on their children's education. Families with few children are not socially approved. The infant mortality rate is high. There are no jobs outside home for young girls. Contraceptives are not available. Without the help of their children, senior citizens may face a dismal existence, even death.




Figure 1. *Changes in population policy.*

Would it be ethically more desirable to move from policy C to policy B, or rather to policy A? It would certainly be more desirable to move to policy A than to policy B. Policy A is better than B in terms of justice: citizens who live in a society that follows policy A do not make their decisions because of unjust social factors. Policy A is better than B also in terms of procreative freedom: citizens who live in a society that follows policy B, receive heavier “social penalties” for making unusual procreative decisions than citizens who live in a society that follows A. However, to move from C to A is to affect people’s procreative behavior *more* than to move from C to B. The difference between C and B is two children, whilst the difference between C and A is four children. But of course, this does not matter. It is thus evident that when changing the population policy, it may be morally desirable to affect people’s procreative decisions more rather than less. This result should be intuitively clear.

However, the next point I would like to make has not been generally accepted. Quite a few theorists have suggested that we should estimate population policies simply on the basis of how fully they respect the individuals’ procreative rights and maximize procreative freedom. Betsy Hartmann, for instance, writes that all “population policies should be consistent” with “individual freedom,” and although she primarily argues against cruel, coercive population policies, her idea seems to be that the more freedom there is, the better the policy.¹⁰ I shall argue, however, that sometimes it is morally desirable to prefer the population policy that does not maximize procreative freedom to population policy that does maximize it.

Consider population policy D. Citizens who live in a society that follows D have on average four children. This is mainly because having children does not involve any costs for parents. Education is free. Toys are free. Day care, transportation, health care, junior sport facilities and musical instruments are all free. In short, any imaginable costs that having children may bring, are absent in policy D. Needless to say, laws and regulations in a society that follows D are unjust: surely it is not fair that those who do not have

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 80% have 2 children • Just economic and social conditions • No coercive laws • No incentives or deterrents • Unusual procreative decisions involve minor costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 80% have 4 children • Unjust economic and social conditions • No coercive laws • No incentives or deterrents • Unusual procreative decisions involve no costs at all
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POLICY A

POLICY D

Figure 2. Procreative freedom and population policy.

children and those who have twelve, must cover an equal share of expenses caused by children.¹¹ On the other hand, procreative freedom is maximized. From an economic, social and cultural point of view, it really does not matter whether you have or do not have children, or whether you have one or twelve children.

Compare now policies A and D.

Would it be ethically desirable to move from policy A to policy D? Certainly not. Although policy D maximizes procreative freedom in a way policy A does not, a society that follows D is undesirable, because it is *unjust*. Therefore, it may be morally desirable to prefer a population policy that does not maximize procreative freedom to population policy that is doing that. Among *just* population policies, one should perhaps always prefer a policy that maximizes procreative freedom. But it is unclear whether just population policies differ greatly as for how much procreative freedom they imply.

Now, one might object that policy D does not really maximize procreative freedom: to make everything free for children compels individuals to have children. This claim, however, is plainly false. Suppose that we make travelling on buses in a city completely free (by using general tax payments). Would that compel those who have not used buses so far to use them now? Of course not. There would probably be more people travelling on buses after the arrangement than there were before, but surely they were not compelled to take a bus. They would be still free to walk or ride a bicycle, take a train or drive their own car. Some of those who do not use the bus service would complain that the bus arrangement is clearly *unfair*, but no-one would complain about loss of freedom.

4. On the Ethics of Coercive Population Policies

Should we always prefer non-coercive population policies to coercive ones? According to many writers, coercive population policies are always wrong, and they should not be

used under any circumstances. Marcel Wissenburg, for instance, writes that “indirect policies that use incentives and deterrents” are “less controversial” than laws that directly aim to determine procreation, but that “both types of policy” are morally wrong since they are “incompatible with stringent conditions of liberal democracy.”¹²

It is obvious that whether or not an indirect policy is “less controversial” than a direct policy, depends on the *content* of such policies. Suppose that there is a law (direct policy) that prohibits having more than two children, but that nothing really happens if one has more than two children. Compare this law to an economic deterrent (indirect policy) that in practice makes it impossible/inadvisable to have more than two children. Obviously, in this case the direct policy is less controversial than the indirect policy. Consider another example. Suppose there is a law (direct policy) that prohibits having more than twelve children, and that acting against this law implies heavy penalties. Compare this policy to an economic incentive (indirect policy) that in practice makes it impossible to have more than one child. Again, the direct policy is less controversial than the indirect policy. Compare now a law that restricts the number of children in families (direct policy), and an economic incentive that makes it impossible for poor people to have children and encourages rich people to have them (indirect policy). At least from the point of view of equality, once again the direct policy is less controversial. In short, the moral status of a population policy does not necessarily depend on whether it uses indirect or direct coercion.

Let us now look more closely at indirect policies. Are indirect policies that use “incentives and deterrents” necessarily incompatible with liberal principles? I shall argue that they are not. Consider policy E. Citizens who live in a society that follows policy E have on average two children. Beyond cultural reasons, an explanation for this is a set of complex economic and social arrangements: tax system, education system, market arrangements, and so on. Part of these arrangements are made *just because of a demographic purpose*. Thus, policy E includes economic incentives, and a policy-maker wishes people to have two children on average. However, the economic and social arrangements are perfectly *just*. Compare now policies A, E and C.





Figure 3. *Incentives and population policy.*

There are no differences between policy A and policy E, except that the intentions of the policy-makers are different. In a society that follows policy E, just and fair laws and regulations are partly made with a demographic goal in mind. We have already found out that policy A is ethically more desirable than policy C. Does it not follow that policy E, too, is ethically more desirable than policy C? Citizens who live in a society that follows C have unjust social circumstances and their procreative rights are seriously violated. A society that follows E, is certainly better than a society that follows C, although economic incentives are used in E (while they are not used in C). Thus, it may be morally desirable to prefer a policy that uses incentives to a policy that does not use them. A policy that uses incentives may be consistent with the important liberal ideals: justice and procreative freedom. (Using incentives in *unjust* circumstances is reprehensible. For example, a policy-maker acts in a reprehensible way when he offers money to a starving person if he or she consents to have himself or herself sterilized.)

Now, a difficult question is whether liberal ideals should be disregarded in certain circumstances. Before I conclude my discussion, I would like to briefly consider the presumptions made by those who emphasize the individuals' procreative rights and argue that there are no circumstances in which direct coercion would be morally justified.

The view that coercive population policies are always wrong is very common among both the politicians and academic theorists, but it is not uncontroversial. Robin Attfield, for instance, writes that if there is no other way to slow the population growth than to use directly coercive laws, such laws are morally justified. According to Attfield, "considerably greater understanding should be shown towards a coercive population policy than was shown at Cairo" in 1994, and he explicitly defends the "Chinese population policy."¹³ Thus, the question is whether we should prefer the coercive population policy—let us call it policy F—to a policy that allows rapid population growth, namely policy C.



POLICY F

POLICY C

Figure 4. Coercion and population policy.

Policies F and C are both morally undesirable, but either of them may be better than the other. Because of unjust social circumstances, citizens who live in a society that follows policy F would like to have very many children, but since there is a law that prohibits having more than one child, they tend to have only one child. Acting against the law would involve considerable costs. From a point of view of procreative freedom, and given the somewhat shady history of coercive population policies, policy C is preferable to policy F.¹⁴ However, from a consequentialist point of view, F seems clearly preferable to C. Contrary to policy C, policy F slows the population growth very efficiently, and presumably this is at least in some cases morally desirable. Population growth may increase poverty.¹⁵ Population growth may be inconsistent with the ideals of sustainable development.¹⁶ Population growth may significantly contribute to environmental and ecological problems.¹⁷

Those who defend absolute procreative rights have three ways how to answer the theorists such as Attfield. Let us briefly consider each alternative.

First, the friends of absolute procreative rights may deny that a choice between F and C must be made. They may deny that there are circumstances where coercive policy is the only feasible strategy to slow the rate of population growth. They may claim that countries where new policies are needed will quite soon receive huge subsidies from affluent countries in order to build up their social security and education systems and health care services that are going to reduce the population numbers without any coercion. Perhaps a radical reform of international distributive structures is near. Or they may argue that relatively inexpensive policies like family planning programmes and nice talk will soon be effective and nothing else is needed. Perhaps extreme poverty is not the root cause of population growth at all, although it is generally presumed that it is.

Second, the friends of absolute procreative rights may deny the claims that population growth causes poverty and environmental problems and is incompatible with the ideals of sustainable development. Perhaps the population growth is completely acceptable from an ecological, environmental and social point of view, at least at the moment. Perhaps those who claim that population growth increases the number of poor people in the short run and contributes to erosion and pollution problems, are simply mistaken. After all, there is much scientific uncertainty here.

Finally, the friends of absolute procreative rights may argue that, morally speaking, it is more important to respect the individuals' procreative rights than to take care of environment or to avoid poverty and its social consequences such as high infant mortality rate and diseases. Perhaps we should prefer policy C to policy F, although there is only little more procreative freedom in a society that follows C than in a society that follows F, and despite the fact that policy C may have undesirable environmental, ecological and social consequences.

It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate these three alternative ways to defend the view that there are no circumstances in which direct coercion could be morally justified. For the present purposes it is enough to see what is presumed when such a position is taken.

5. Concluding Remarks

I have tried to show that the common view that the population policies should be compatible with the procreative freedom of individuals, and should not be based on coercion, is partly ambiguous. I have argued that when changing the population policy,

it may be morally desirable to affect people's procreative decisions more rather than less, and that sometimes it may be morally desirable to prefer a population policy that does *not* maximize procreative freedom to a population policy that does maximize it. I have also pointed out that indirect population policies that use incentives and deterrents are not necessarily incompatible with liberal principles. Finally, I have argued that those who think that coercive population policies are morally wrong in all circumstances, are simultaneously claiming that either there are no circumstances where coercive policy is the only feasible strategy to slow the rate of population growth, or that population growth does not cause poverty nor environmental problems, or that a little addition of procreative freedom is more important than taking care of environment or avoiding extreme poverty.

Now, it is sometimes suggested that fertility and procreation decisions are so private a matter that they should not be the subject of public policy and should not be discussed in public at all. David Heyd, for instance, writes that matters relating to the future people's "existence, number and identity" lie "beyond the scope of moral reasoning," unless there are external effects associated with reproductive decisions (e.g. that a couple's decision to have a child can harm others by increasing the extent of crowding).¹⁸ This view is quite often defended in economic literature as well.¹⁹ The problem in the claim that issues of optimum population violate privacy, however, is that it is extremely difficult to imagine circumstances where procreative decisions do *not* have any relevant external effects. Obviously, reproductive decisions have always some social, economic or cultural consequences. Fortunately, these consequences are usually so minor that it is clear that they do not justify interfering in the procreative freedom of individuals. But they certainly justify public discussion and moral evaluation.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Jussi Haukioja, Tiina Laats, Martin Schönfeld and the anonymous referees of *Philosophy & Geography* for helpful discussion and written comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2. Robin Attfield, *The Ethics of the Global Environment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 124.
3. Marcel Wissenburg, "The Rapid Reproducers Paradox: Population Control and Individual Procreative Rights," *Environmental Politics*, 7 (1998): 86, 97. Cf. Marcel Wissenburg, *Green Liberalism: The Free and Green Society* (London: UCL Press, 1999), 157.
4. Brian Barry, 'Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice' in *Fairness and Futurity*, ed. A. Dobson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 93–117, esp. 109.
5. Dobson, *Justice and the Environment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 118.
6. Betsy Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs* (Boston: South End Press, 1995), 309. Cf. Corinne Packer, *The Right to Reproductive Choice* (Turku: Åbo Akademi Press, 1996).
7. For a discussion, see e.g. Alan S. Rosenbaum, *Coercion and Autonomy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Timo Airaksinen, *Ethics of Coercion and Authority* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988); Robert Nozick, *Socratic Puzzles* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
8. Cf. Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs*, 113–24.
9. See e.g. Claudia Mills, "The Ethics of Reproductive Control," *The Philosophical Forum*, 30 (1999): 43–57, esp. 43; Barry, 'Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice', 109; Wissenburg, "The Rapid Reproducers Paradox: Population Control and Individual Procreative Rights," 97. In the Third World, contraceptive methods are not well known, and many women have more children than they would actually want.
10. Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs*, xix, cf. 309. See also Wissenburg, *Green Liberalism: The Free and Green Society*, 157.
11. There are both Marxist and ecological theories according to which expenses caused by children *should* be distributed equally. These theories have some plausibility, perhaps more than first appears.
12. Wissenburg, "The Rapid Reproducers Paradox: Population Control and Individual Procreative Rights," 79.
13. Attfield, *The Ethics of the Global Environment*, 129. See also Alan Carter, "Moral Theory and Global

- Population,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 99 (1999), 289–313, esp. 312; Juha Räikkä, “Problems in Population Theory,” *Journal of Social Philosophy*, December 2000.
14. Of course, this depends on what kind of consequentialist moral theory you have.
 15. See e.g. Valeria Menza and John R. Lupien, “World Population and Nutritional Well-Being,” in *Population and Global Security*, ed. N. Polunin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 157–71, 165. Dennis A. Ahlburg, “Population Growth and Poverty,” in *Population and Development: Old Debates, New Conclusions*, R. Cassen et al (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 127–47, 127; Tom Tietenberg, *Environmental and Natural Resources Economics* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992).
 16. Bryan G. Norton, *Toward Unity among Environmentalists* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 112–13; Andrew Dobson, *Justice and the Environment*, 102–31; Nigel Dower, *World Ethics: The New Agenda* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), esp. 159; Wilfred Beckerman, “Sustainable Development and Our Obligations to Future Generations,” in *Fairness and Futurity*, ed. A. Dobson, 71–92.
 17. Norman Myers, “Global Population and Emergent Pressures,” in *Population and Global Security*, ed. N. Polunin, 17–46, 27; cf. Koss Neefjes, “Ecological Degradation: A Cause for Conflict, a Concern for Survival,” in *Fairness and Futurity*, ed. A. Dobson, 249–78, 250.
 18. David Heyd, “Procreation and Value: Can Ethics Deal with Futurity Problems?” *Philosophia*, 18 (1988): 151–70, esp. 152.
 19. See Robert Barro and Gary Becker, “Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth,” *Econometrica*, 57 (1989): 481–501; cf. Partha Dasgupta, “Savings and Fertility: Ethical Issues,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 23 (1994): 99–127, esp. 100.

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