Fact and Fiction in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature

In 1995, the Baltimore Aquarium opened a coral reef exhibition. The curator was interviewed on CNN and said that she believed that if people see how beautiful such ecosystems are they will tend to act in ways that will better protect these and other environments. If it is true that positive aesthetic response leads to care, it is important for us to learn how to generate aesthetic responses. But it is also important for us to learn how to produce the right sort of care—for there is plenty of evidence that some actions that many people interpret as “caring for the landscape” are not sustainable: mowing with small gasoline engines or fertilizing with chemicals that pollute the ground water. What we must aim for is generating aesthetic response that will lead to sustainable care.

Within philosophical aesthetics, a debate has recently arisen concerning appreciation of nature. This debate centers on questions concerning what it is to have an aesthetic experience of nature and when this experience is of the right sort. How does one know that one’s appreciation of a mountain or river or wetland or pine forest is aesthetic? How is it similar to or different from, say, a religious or scientific or economic or artistic experience? And, given that one can tell that one is in fact having an aesthetic experience (and not some other kind), are there any ways of determining whether some aesthetic experiences of nature are “better” than others? Are some aesthetic experiences appropriate and others inappropriate? Some right, some wrong, some good, some bad? Do these distinctions make any sense at all? Does it make sense, for example, to say to someone, “This is the way you ought to experience nature”?

These questions have, of course, been answered in a variety of ways. Here I want to talk about two sides of the debate. On the one hand is what I call the cognitive model of nature appreciation, on the other hand the imaginative model.

The cognitive model has been presented, I believe, in the writings of Allen Carlson. Since appreciation of nature must be directed at nature, Carlson argues that aesthetic appreciation of nature must be directed by knowledge about it. The kind of knowledge necessary is that provided by ecology, namely understanding of different environmental systems and their interactions. In general, he believes, aesthetic experience consists of scrutiny of an object and a response based upon it. In the case of aesthetic appreciation of nature, the scrutiny is based upon and enriched by scientific understanding of the workings of nature; without that one cannot be certain that one’s response is to nature and not to something else.

Many people, even those who greatly admire the contributions Carlson has made to environmental aesthetics, believe that the cognitive model is over-intellectualized. Noé Carroll, for example, objects that Carlson fails to give an adequate role to emotion; Stan Godlovitch objects that Carlson fails to give an adequate role to mystery. Arnold Berleant is concerned that Carlson’s view does not sufficiently provide for what he calls engagement. Cheryl Foster believes that the cognitive model leaves out meditative response that is important in our experiences of nature.

Emily Brady argues that Carlson fails to account for the significance of imagination in our experiences of nature. And it is this last alleged misgiving that I want to discuss. For, I believe, one manifestation of imagination—fiction—plays an enormous role in shaping the way we c
nature perceives and conceives the environment. Myths and legends have shaped attitudes and beliefs about nature and, by implication, about life in general. Nature is a source of revelation—as we are told in the introduction to the Finnish classic, the Kalevala.

There are yet other words too and mysteries learned—snatched from the roadside plucked from the heather torn from the brushwood tugged from the saplings rubbed from a grass-head ripped from a footpath ...

Designers, managers, and theorists must give due attention to ways in which fiction and other art forms shape thought in our efforts to establish successful and sustainable practices. Much great art results from flights of the imagination stimulated by nature; we treasure these artworks but will fail to develop strategies for saving and creating sustainable landscapes if we lack understanding of the role that artistic culture plays in shaping human attitudes toward the environment. How might we connect the cognitive model that Carlson champions and the imagination model that Brady insists upon?

Brady believes that Carlson is just one in a long line of Western thinkers to overlook or demean the important contribution that imagination plays. Imagination has undoubtedly received a “bad rap” in the history of Western thought. Eurocentric culture with its interest in developing a science that provides for universal intersubjective agreement based on shared methodology and rules of evidence has not given much direct credit to the role of free flights of fancy. There are signs that this is changing. More attention is being given, for example, to the contribution of creative imagination in scientific discovery. Is moral philosophy the role of imagination is increasingly discussed; it is argued that the ability to imagine oneself in another’s shoes is central to moral development, for instance. Brady hopes that she can contribute to an improved status for imagination within the aesthetics of nature.

Aesthetic appreciation of nature, she asserts, is directed at natural objects, and she conceives natural objects as objects that are not products of human creation. In so defining these objects, Brady makes a very common mistake—namely, the mistake of leaving human beings out of nature. Like many writers she seems to think that there is something more “natural” about a beehive than an apartment building. If she were correct, there would be few forests, for example, that would count as natural, for, like more and more landscapes (not to mention cityscapes), human intervention, both lethal and beneficial, has left few that are not to some degree a product of human creation. This mistake does not have much impact on Brady’s discussion. I mention it because I think it is important for theorists in all fields to remind ourselves that humans are natural.

Brady construes imagination broadly—just as for the purposes of this paper I shall construe fiction broadly as referring to objects created by and appealing to the imagination. She interprets imagining not just as making believe, but as visualizing or otherwise coming up with ranges of possibilities. She agrees with Immanuel Kant’s position that central to human aesthetic pleasure is what he called a “free play of imagination.” Aesthetic experiences are marked, he argued, by disinterestedness. We put aside ordinary scientific, ethical, or personal interests and respond to objects as we please. We allow our imaginations full rein. We are free to think of a tree as a person or an animal or a tower or a mountain or whatever. And this freedom gives us, according to Kant, tremendous pleasure. Brady agrees.

Like Carlson, Brady believes that basic distinctions between objects of art and objects of nature generate important distinctions between artistic and natural appreciation. “Various natural objects . . . lack a human maker, an artist, and also an artistic context in respect of the type of artwork.” In artworks, intentional acts of an artist give us cues that direct our attention and thus our imagination. These cues are not present in natural objects. Thus, following Kant, the response is additionally free—free from any concern about what it is intended to express or how it functions as an object. Distinguishing natural from artistic objects as she does, Brady is perhaps correct to point out that human responses to nature do not involve considerations about artistic intentions. But this distinction does not, I think, also entail that information about context is either nonexistent or irrelevant. Indeed, knowledge concerning how natural objects
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function within a particular context is exactly the sort of thing that Carlson and I insist plays a major role in appreciation of nature. It is precisely a failure to understand the proper function of certain kinds of trees or forest soils, for instance, within their specific biosystems (i.e., context) that has led to mismanagement of forests even when providing aesthetic value has been one goal. The concern to protect forests from fires because burned out areas are usually seen as ugly has meant that plants whose growth is stimulated in burned and blackened soil that warms more quickly in the spring sun have become rarer.

Brady herself discusses the role of context. With respect to nature, imagination is required to appreciate fully changeability and context. I agree. One imagines what a forest looked like before the fire and what it will look like through various stages of succession. Thinking about the consequences of destroying the tiny remainder of old growth forests in the northwestern United States surely requires imagination. But it requires informed imagination. I shall say more about this later when I discuss Brady's concept of what she calls "imagining well."

The contextual aspect of our experiences of nature deserves another kind of consideration. In general, one is more immersed in nature than in art, for one literally moves through it. (This is also true of course, of some artworks, e.g., sculptural and architectural artifacts.) And the ways in which people move deserve serious attention. J. B. Jackson has discussed how different aesthetic experiences are from a horse and buggy than from an automobile. Recently Kevin Melchionne has written about the history of "walking." Though people may, of course, always walked, the practice of nature walking has not been the same in all times and all places. What counts as "a good walk" differs even among people reading this paper. For some of us, for instance, it will be much shorter than for others! In certain periods solitary walking has been considered more beneficial than walking with a companion. The former places higher premium on personal therapy, the latter on sociability. Is it better to go from point A to point B and back to point A on the same route or to make a circuit? Should one repeat the same route day after day so that one can notice nuances of change through seasons or strive for the totally unexpected? What is the proper pace? What is the proper pace? To what extent did walking as an aesthetic activity develop only after walking became a leisure, not a necessary, activity? I have American friends who report that on some mountain trails in California one not only meets more and more people, but meets more and more people who all seem to have bought their walking costumes at the same designer shop!

Brady is primarily interested in the special ways in which immersion stimulates imagination, for imagination "intensifies" experience. It plays exploratory, projective, amplitative, and revelatory roles, according to Brady. Surely she is right about this. There are, admittedly, many positive roles that imagination can play in aesthetic appreciation of nature. Many ecologists describe the aesthetic experiences that drew them to their work in the first place. Many of these undoubtedly involved imaginings—thinking of a tree as a castle or a clearing as fort. I well remember what was, when I was a child, probably a very small thicket (I still think of it as quite large, of course) that served as the jungle where we midwestern Americans fought off a variety of foreign enemies. What harm could there have been in thinking that a rabbit was a rabbit under the blackberry bushes? Or that not only an enemy soldier but a tiger might at any moment spring from behind the elm tree? Who really cares that tigers and elm trees do not share the same biotic patches?

And surely rich imagination is just what is needed if we are to develop new metaphors for designing sustainable landscapes. The clichés that we have inherited from romantic visions of the picturesque no longer work; indeed, they often work against development of ecologically sound landscape designs. New visions are required, and this in turn requires creative imagination.

So what do I have against imagination or fiction in the appreciation of forests? Let me begin to explain my concern by quoting a couple of examples of Brady's own imaginative flights.

In contemplating the bark of a locust tree, visually, I see the deep clefts between the thick ridges of the bark. Images of mountains and valleys come to mind, and I think of the age of the tree given the thickness of the ridges and how they are spaced apart. I walk around the tree, feeling the wide circumference of the
bark. The image of a seasoned old man comes to mind, with deep wrinkles from age. These imaginings lead to an aesthetic judgment of the tree as stalwart, and I respect it as I might a wise old sage. My interpretation of the locust tree is tied to its nonaesthetic qualities, such as the texture of the bark, as well as the associations spawned by perceptual qualities.

And a second example:

A quick glance at a lamb reveals little except an acknowledgment of its sweetness. But the fuller participation of perception and imagination can lead to a truth about innocence. Contemplating the fresh whiteness of a lamb and its small, fragile stature evokes images of purity and naiveté. It is through dwelling aesthetically and imaginatively on such natural things that we achieve new insight.

Brady, we see, believes that aesthetic experience, interpreted in terms of imagination, provides us, as she puts it, with "insight" into the tree and the lamb. The cognitive model of aesthetic appreciation of nature in its restrictivelessness precludes access to the richness of imaginative insight, she fears. These insights amount to what she calls "aesthetic truths," but she fails adequately to explain these. Furthermore, if there are aesthetic truths, there should also be aesthetic falsities. Brady does not give examples of these. She does, however, maintain that some imaginative responses are "appropriate," so perhaps aesthetic falsity is related to responses that are inappropriate. As an example of an inappropriate response she points to actions that are "self-indulgent." Appropriate responses involve what she calls "imagine well." Imagining well, she says, "involves spotting aesthetic potential, having a sense of what to look for, and knowing when to clip the wings of imagination. This last skill involves preventing the irrelevance of shallow, naive, and sentimental imaginative responses which might impoverish rather than enrich appreciation."

But let us go back to her own examples. Is responding to a little white lamb by reflections on innocence or to a tree as a stalwart man or haggard witch appropriate? Are these responses such that they indicate a sense of what to look for? Do they avoid being shallow or naive? I see no way of answering these questions without relying on the kind of cognitive model that Carlson insists upon. Knowledge does not simply deepen the experiences that imagination provides, it directs them, or should direct them if we hope to preserve and design sustainable landscapes. Concepts such as imagining well make no sense unless one knows what the object is that one is talking about, something (in fact, as much as possible) about the object, and something (in fact, as much as possible) about the context in which the object is found.

On the face of it, of course, it seems quite harmless, even charming, to think about trees in terms of human faces or lambs in terms of purity. But, in fact, imaginative fancies—often directed by fictional creations—can and do lead to harmful actions. Fiction, for example, has played an important role in shaping the attitudes, images, and metaphors with which we approach nature. Perhaps the most striking example of the way in which art informs responses to nature is Bambi—a book written in 1923 by the Austrian writer Felix Salten. The Walt Disney film version is, of course, a classic. Both the book and movie contain much that is beautiful and in other ways valuable. Many passages and images make it easy to understand why the literary classic has achieved such worldwide popularity that it is hard for anyone to look at a deer and not see Bambi. It has also made it incredibly difficult to look at a deer in terms that are true to it as an object on its own and even more difficult to respond to it in terms appropriate to the role that it increasingly plays in the ecological system which it has come to dominate. In the United States, most states’ departments of natural resources have had as a primary goal preserving and providing deer in sufficient numbers to satisfy hunters. Landscape architects have tended to exacerbate the situation with their preference for defined edges, and have thus also contributed to an increase in forest edge. Such planning has been carried out with a great deal of disregard for organisms other than game animals and birds. The result has been an explosion in the deer population and a decrease in the population of several songbirds and tree species. We are told, in fact, that in some areas deer have become vermin. But how can one look at a deer or a picture of a deer and not imagine it as the innocent, noble creature that Salten depicts? We tend to respond as the fictional account directs us to respond. In the book we are given the fol-
lowing episode, for example. Bambi and his mother see a ferret kill a mouse. Frightened by the violence, Bambi asks his mother if they will kill a mouse.

“No,” replied his mother.
“Never?” asked Bambi.
“Never,” came the answer.
“Why not?” asked Bambi, relieved.
“Because we never kill anything,” said his mother. 13

This is valuable if one wants to teach children not to be violent, but totally false if one wants to teach children about the actual effect of overpopulation of deer in the forest.

The prose of the story is often beautiful and does, as Brady hopes, heighten insight about the forest. There are beautiful inventories—ones in which vivid images and metaphors certainly help children learn to observe details and connect individual species into an organic whole. But Salten contrasts the gentle deer with the vulgar species that fight for food. Deer we are told, never fight for food, because there is enough for all. We are seduced into a sentimental image that is hard to shake. Even in the presence of trees ravaged by deer who in their own way do indeed fight for food we continue to think of all deer as Bambis, the consequence being that forest managers find it difficult to convince the public that their numbers should be severely decreased in some areas. 14

In fiction there is often a tendency to sentimentalize. There is also a tendency to demonize. Both result in misconceptions. Just as there are lots of deceptively innocent creatures in literature and the other arts, so are there lots of monsters. One reason that it is hard to get people to appreciate wetlands is that they have so often been conceptualized as “swamps” inhabited by various kinds of slime monsters. 15 Death by drowning in quicksand was a common fear even for those of us who grew up in the heart of the U.S. cornbelt. Should lions flourish in numbers great enough to threaten the environment, a hard sell will be required for the generation that watches The Lion King several times a year. In his recent book, Land Mosaics, Richard Pownall discusses the importance of protecting “keystone” species—species that play a central role in an ecosystem. 16 One keystone species that he describes is the Cassowary bird. He writes:

This territorial bird, as tall as and able to rip the guts out of a man, is believed to be the only seed disperser for more than one hundred species of woody tropical rainforest plants in Queensland, Australia. The bird normally inhabits large forests. Logging and fragmentation have eliminated the bird from several areas where only small remnants remain. Consequently, a progressive and massive loss of trees and other woody species can now be expected, unless the big bird can adapt or adjust its behavior. 17

Although I do not yet know this for certain, I would guess that the regional fiction depicts the Cassowary bird as a terrible monster. If so, it will be harder to save this bird.

As I have already said, I do not want to claim that there is no positive role for fiction—for imagination in general—in developing a sound nature aesthetic. I do insist that it must be based upon, tempered by, directed and enriched by solid ecological knowledge. As I have acknowledged, there are indeed many benefits accruing to creative imagination. Judith H. Heerwage and Gordon H. Orians have described what they believe are three stages in the examination of unfamiliar landscapes: 18

1. One decides whether to explore or move on.
2. If one decides to stay and explore, one then begins to gather information.
3. Finally one decides whether to stay longer or move on.

It may very well be that flights of imagination—seeing an old man’s face in the bark of a tree, for example—is an important factor at the first stage. Even being intrigued deceptively by a man-eating bird may be what leads one to learn more about the Cassowary.

Furthermore, developing imagination is probably essential in producing people who are able to envision new and more successful ways of designing and maintaining environments. Many ecologists have called for new metaphors that will generate more effective management strategies. Edward O. Wilson, in The Biophilia Hypothesis, asserts that humans are genetically inclined to respond positively to nonthreatening nature. Developing this theme, Roger Ehrich describes studies that have shown that patients and prisoners are calmer (e.g., have lower blood pressure) when they are given a view of nature.
He thinks this has an evolutionary basis. Relief from stress enables us to rest and regroup, so there may be genetic reasons that we prefer savannas to wetlands. Education, therefore, will be required to make people see that the latter are also valuable. A good exercise to give to ourselves and our students would be suggesting and designing ways of providing information about the Cassowary that would create and stimulate imaginative images that would help to protect it. Forman believes that different species respond to different scales. We have, of course, designed and managed for the human scale response, often at the disservice of other species. A vivid imagination may be necessary to enable humans to expand the scales to which they respond aesthetically.

Our attitudes toward nature are largely determined by the metaphors with which we conceptualize it; many of these have come to us from literature and the other arts. We have the tree, the spring, the seed, the waters of life. We categorize in terms of light and dark, sun and moon, heaven and earth. We are warned not to lose the forest for the trees. We strive to reach rock bottom or to get at the root of the problem in order for ideas to blossom. Imaginatively developing new metaphors may indeed allow us, at it has sometimes been put, to "think outside of the box." Fiction is of great use here. But this does not mean that there should be no restrictions on the imagination. As we have seen, fiction can sentimentalize and demonize, with serious harm resulting. If sustainable environments are the goal, then fiction must be at the service of fact.

Some may object that there are sustainable environments in which what we think of as scientific knowledge seems to have played no role. I am willing to admit that the priority of the cognitive model is not universally required for an adequate nature aesthetic. Aesthetic planning, like ecological planning, will always be site specific. There are societies that work quite well in the absence of technological societies' way of doing science. Colin Turnbull tells of his own foolish tendency to read all responses to nature with his own Western eyes. Once while in the Congo he heard a strange noise at night and went to explore.

There in a tiny clearing, splashed with silver, was the sophisticated Kenge, clad in black cloth, adorned with leaves, with a flower tucked into his hair. He was all alone, dancing around and singing softly to himself as he gazed up at the treetops. Now Kenge was the biggest flirt for miles, so, after watching a while, I asked, jokingly why he was dancing alone. He stopped, turned slowly around, and looked at me as though I was the biggest fool he had ever seen; and he was plainly surprised by my stupidity. "But I'm not dancing alone," he said. "I'm dancing with the forest, dancing with the moon." Then, with the utmost unconcern, he ignored me and continued his dance of love and life.

I am not worried about the precedence of imagination in such cultural aesthetic responses to nature. But where stewardship is viewed almost exclusively in terms of developing adequate technologies, I see no choice but to insist that fancy take off from a solid knowledge base.

It is often objected that insisting upon a scientific basis for appreciation of nature "takes all the fun out of it." The ecologist Evile Gorham has complained to me that he does not want to be told a lot about Jane Austen's life or special literary techniques—he just wants to read her books. Many people feel this way about nature. As Emily Dickinson put it, "We murder to dissect."

I confess that I simply do not believe that knowledge kills aesthetic pleasure. Looking closely, for instance, is not detrimental to aesthetic experience, it increases it. Elsewhere I have argued that aesthetic interest is not separate from our other interests as human beings.

We go back and forth, as it were, between contemplating the object of attention and thinking about other things. I look at a pine bog, think about the way the water is being drained, remember my grandmother's cranberry sauce, delight in the shades of green. Knowledge of the variety of species is likely to draw one's attention to the variety of colors, not detract from them. Sometimes a sense of wonder, even mystery, comes only when we have knowledge, for example, learn that the Minnesota trout lily grows only in two Minnesota counties and nowhere else on earth. Even knowing the names of different flowers may lead one to see the flowers. As Edward Abbey writes:

Through naming comes knowing: we grasp an object mentally by giving it a name—hension, prehension,
apprehension. And thus through language we create a whole world, corresponding to the other world out there.22

In learning what to look for, we achieve the very possibility of seeing—and seeing is surely essential to an aesthetic experience. Seeing something is more likely if we look for it, and we look for it only if we know where and what to look for. John Tester gives the following vivid example.

Lowland hardwood forests occur through Minnesota on sites where the soil is periodically saturated. These forests are dominated by American elm and black ash. Slippery elm, rock elm, basswood, burr oak, hackberry, yellow birch, green ash, aspen, balsam poplar, and paper birch may also be present. Fire is rare in these forests, and wind-through and flooding occur occasionally. They are considered late-successional communities.23

If I know that a forest area has been free of disturbances, I may start looking for a yellow birch. And looking, I may find and enjoy the face in the bark.

Even if it were true that knowledge takes some of the fun out, it would be worth the price. For only with knowledge will sustainable practices develop. Without legislating against fiction—indeed in full recognition of the benefits of imagination—one must constantly be aware of its possible harm. I certainly do not advocate that we stop reading or watching Bambi. I do advocate that when we do so we remind ourselves and others that it is just a story and that it needs to be balanced with an understanding of the relation between an increasing deer population and a decreasing songbird population.

Finally, we must ask whether the cognitive model deprives the aesthetic of something distinctive. Brady worries that too great a reliance on knowledge will not "provide a framework that is clearly aesthetic and which, in the practical context, makes aesthetic value distinguishable from other environmental values, e.g., ecological, historical, and cultural."24 I do not think the cognitive model gives away the store to any of these other values. I have elsewhere characterized the aesthetic as attention to intrinsic properties of objects or events (and I would include natural objects and events) that are considered worthy of that attention within a particular culture. As long as knowledge directs perception and reflection upon such intrinsic properties, the experience will be recognizably aesthetic. At the same time, I have also urged that we not try to carve out a unique niche for the aesthetic. Human valuations are holistic; we rarely experience something purely aesthetically or purely ethically or purely religiously or purely scientifically, etc.25 Thus I am far less worried than Brady is that knowledge will get in the way of aesthetic experiences.

The task for all of us is to develop ways of using the delight that human beings take in flights of imagination, connect it to solid cognitive understanding of what makes for sustainable environments, and thus produce the kind of attitudes and preferences that will generate the kind of care we hope for.

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6. Ibid., p. 139.
10. Ibid., p. 144.
11. Ibid., p. 145.
12. Ibid., p. 146.
15. Philip Terry, American Culture Studies Program, Bowling Green University, unpublished paper, "The Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Swamp: Getting the Humanities Into Environmental Studies."
17. Ibid., p. 47.
24. Brady, p. 146.