The Integrated Aesthetic II: Imagination, Emotion and Knowledge

Indeed, several philosophers have argued that our very experience of the world presupposes imagination. Although I think this may be true, I am not prepared to make a case for it here. What I do claim is that imagination is present in a range of human experiences, and art is only one of them.

If this point is accepted, then one can begin to grasp how imagination may be present in our encounters with the natural environment – and most explicitly in our aesthetic encounters. Both Kant and Hepburn argue that imagination has a significant role in aesthetic appreciation of nature. For Kant, imagination is central in aesthetic judgements of nature. It frees the mind from the constraints of intellectual and practical interests and enables a play of associations and creative reflection in relation to nature’s qualities. Hepburn’s ideas resound Kant’s, but Hepburn also wants to highlight imagination’s power to ‘shift attention flexibly from aspect to aspect of the natural objects before one, to shift focus from close-up to long shot, from textural detail to overall atmospheric haze or radiance; to overcome stereotyped grouping and clichéd ways of seeing’.  

Imagination enables us to adopt several different perspectives, as well as entirely new ones. It gives us ways to reach beyond stereotyped modes of appreciating environments: to come fresh to familiar or everyday environments and to locate previously undiscovered qualities. Heyd makes a similar point when he argues that we can overcome aesthetic boredom or fatigue ‘by increasing the contrast in our perceptual experience, and, generally, by enhancing the possibilities for the play of imagination’, which is partly achieved by integrating various non-scientific stories of the land into appreciation. Essentially, imagination facilitates free play, a creative approach to appreciation that leads to the discovery of aesthetic qualities.

By bringing a range of experience and ideas to bear on perception, imagination contributes to the meaning and context of aesthetic objects, and to situating ourselves in relation to them. It opens up new relations and connections and adds to the context of appreciation. Contrary to Kant’s position, I do not believe that imagination is a necessary condition of aesthetic experience. In some cases aesthetic objects will not evoke imagination, and sometimes we may simply rely on perceptual capacities and just engage the senses. Some imaginations are less developed than others, which is also a factor in limiting its role. But when imagination is active, it opens up the aesthetic horizon and deepens the aesthetic response. As an important component of the integrated aesthetic, it has the potential to encourage a more intimate engagement with our natural surroundings.

What is Imagination?  
Imagination is a notoriously difficult concept for philosophical analysis. Peter Strawson draws on remarks by Hume and Kant when he says that it is the
'concealed art of the soul, a magical faculty, something we shall never fully understand.' Many philosophers have tried to uncover its workings, but in the history of philosophy it is typically cast aside as an unruly, irrational power that creates fictions and misleading representations of reality rather than truth. Because imagination is commonly associated with fancy, fantasy, daydreams and the like, it is treated as a capacity that must be kept in check by reason. Apparently, Descartes gave up reading fables because they 'make one imagine many events possible which in reality are not so.' That view now seems rather old-fashioned, but there is nevertheless some remaining suspicion in recent philosophy. Although the existentialists lauded imagination for its capacity to construct creatively the self (as if a work of art), and to live 'poetically', at the same time they were wary that a life of imagination could become a life of illusion, where we no longer face our responsibilities as free human beings. The work of some contemporary philosophers has contributed to restoring imagination's reputation, but much work has yet to be done. A careful, better understanding is needed of the various activities of imagination.

I cannot tackle such a project here, but I want to make a few clarifications about this distinctive mental power before turning to a discussion of its role in aesthetic appreciation of the environment. My aim is to show that imagination is in fact a very broad concept, fantasy being only one of its many modes of activity. Imagination is not opposed to truth; a proper understanding of its relationship to truth will enable a better grasp of the real value of this mental power.

Theories of imagination typically divide its modes into two categories: sensory imagination and creative imagination. Sensory imagination is the mental power that enables our experience of objects coherent by 'bridging the gap' between concepts and sense perceptions. This category includes imagination's power to bring together past and present perceptions of the same object, and its imaging role in connection to memory and recollection. These modes of imagination have been referred to as 'reproductive imagination' because imagination 'reproduces' past perceptions as images that facilitate the identification of an object of a present perception. This category also includes mental images that do not involve creativity or invention.

The second category, creative imagination, describes the creative power responsible for reaching beyond the ordinary. The most obvious modes which display creativity are those in which we use imagination to entertain possibilities, to be inventive, to solve difficult problems — scientific, moral, artistic or to create fantastic scenarios such as those of make-believe and daydreams. These various activities have been referred to as the 'productive imagination' because imagination's activity is not mimetic, but poetic. Imagination enables us to reach beyond the given by bringing together the elements of experience in novel ways so that we can, for example, imaginatively transform ourselves into a trees swaying in the wind; imagine a better alternative to a harmful practice; or envisage life on a planet without an atmosphere such as earth's.

Dewey recognised that creative imagination spans all experience, aesthetic and non-aesthetic alike. It brings meaning into experience, which emerges from the interaction of live creature with environment. Within experience itself, it presents new possibilities, a departure from the ordinary or habitual. Although imaginative activity is heightened in art and crucial to it, it is a capacity exercised in everyday encounters and in technical invention. In the context of art, Dewey is careful to distinguish between the 'imaginative' and the 'imaginary', where the imaginary is equated with mere fancy, and 'mind and material do not squarely meet and interpenetrate. Mind stays aloof for the most part and toys with material rather than boldly grasping it.'

There is no doubt that imagination's many activities range from the serious to the trivial. Artistic creativity and technical invention lean towards the serious. The imaginative leaps underlying scientific discovery are also serious. Moral philosophers, at least as far back as Hume, have extolled our capacity to imagine what it is like to be in another person's situation in order to determine better one's own course of action. What should not be overlooked, however, is that the creative, inventive and transformative power of creative imagination is behind more trivial activities as well as these more serious ones. The power to reach beyond the given, to bring the not-present together with the present, is also what marks the freedom of mind to imagine oneself on a desert island instead of in the office marking essays. Disclosing the value of creative imagination in aesthetic experience requires not that we condemn its very powers, but that we distinguish between the imaginative and the imaginary, relevant and irrelevant imaginings, and find the right balance between the serious and trivial. I shall say more about this below, when I defend imagination against some of its critics within environmental aesthetics.

Although imagination's greatest power is its capacity to reach beyond the beliefs and knowledge that we rely upon for day-to-day living, it does not follow that imagination is unrelated to these. Imagination depends upon our beliefs about the world. Putting yourself in someone else's shoes begins with a set of beliefs about that person's situation and proceeds by entertaining beliefs about her or his possible behaviour or state of mind. Imagining a pink polka-dotted elephant begins from the belief that elephants are normally uniformly grey, and the imagining has no meaning unless it is contrasted with what is actually the case. When we imagine p, the pink polka-dotted elephant, we entertain the belief that p, while also having the belief that not-p (that is, the belief that elephants are not actually pink polka-dotted). Having a false belief and accepting it as true are distinct from entertaining a false belief through imagination.
Roger Scruton conceives of imagination as a rational activity that is not reducible to fantasy or whim:

Imagination is not simply producing descriptions of an object which one is unprepared to assert. It involves thinking of these descriptions as appropriate in some way to the primary object. Imagination is a rational activity. The man who imagines is trying to produce an account of something, and is, therefore, trying to relate his thoughts to their subject-matter: he is constructing a narrative, and to do this it is not sufficient merely to go beyond what is already 'given'. It is necessary that he should attempt to bring what he says or thinks into relation with the subject: his thoughts must be entertained because of their 'appropriateness'.

Scruton’s point also emphasises how imagination works along lines of relevance rather than complete arbitrariness.

In cases where imagination operates at an extreme, we lose contact with our beliefs: obsessive fans believe that a rock star is singing about them, rather than just about anyone in love. Sometimes imagination leads to delusion, but such cases are generally exceptional, and rare in our aesthetic encounters. Even when engrossed in a novel or a film we maintain aesthetic distance; imagination enables us to engage with fictional events and characters but we do not believe they are real. This is due to both the conventions of aesthetic appreciation, and the way the qualities of the artwork direct our imaginings.

Although, as a creative power, imagination is distinct from knowledge, some philosophers have argued that it supports our intellectual endeavours. We are already familiar with its role in science, where it allows for the freedom of mind that leads to new insights and discoveries. The constructive and narrative capacities of imagination are highlighted by Collingwood, who makes a fascinating case for the essential role of imaginative re-enactment in the service of historical knowledge. Imagination, distinct from knowledge on the one hand and fancy on the other, ‘does the entire work of historical construction’. In the context of aesthetics, David Novitz argues for ‘romantic realism’, in which imagination is required for the acquisition and growth of knowledge in the most basic sense. It is also essential to the creation of literature and metaphor, which themselves contribute to the acquisition of knowledge.

**IMAGINATION AND NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS**

I now turn to a consideration of imagination’s particular role in aesthetic appreciation of environments. In comparison to other components of the integrated aesthetic, my discussion of imagination is in more depth, but this is not to suggest that it necessarily has a more dominant role. Imaginative activity in aesthetic appreciation admits of degrees. While in most cases imagination (working along relevant lines) enhances appreciation, aesthetic qualities may be appreciated in many cases without using imagination. The degree to which imagination is active depends upon individual appreciate, the nature of the aesthetic object and the aesthetic situation itself. More space is devoted to the topic here because I would like to redress misunderstandings of this important capacity in environmental aesthetics discussion and reply to some criticisms of my position as it was originally set out in my article, ‘Imagination and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature’. Also, although some writers have given it attention, imagination remains a largely unexplored problem in this area of aesthetics. That we use imagination when viewing paintings, listening to music, or reading poetry is undisputed, but even here some aestheticians have disputed the proper role of imagination.

**Kant’s View of Imagination**

Kant’s view of imagination in the aesthetic response, although somewhat vague, provides a starting point for understanding how imagination is active. Although also present in cognitive judgements, ‘productive imagination’ is exercised to its fullest in the judgements of taste that characterise the aesthetic response. In judgements of taste, imagination is engaged in a free, harmonious play with the understanding. In contrast to its activity in cognitive judgements where it submits to the laws of the understanding, in aesthetic judgements imagination is free from these laws. More specifically, imagination does not function to support the understanding in the application of a concept to the object. This description of the relationship between the two powers is one way that Kant shows that there is no cognitive aim in aesthetic judgement.

In its free play, imagination makes connections and associations in relation to the object’s qualities for their own sake. However, imagination does not have an entirely free rein; Kant is not putting forward imagination as ‘fancy’, the power behind fantasy. Although free from the laws of the understanding, imagination operates within a relationship with the understanding and the very basic concepts of cognition. Imagination’s trajectory is constrained by the manifold of the object but not by any determinate concept of it. We could say that imagination’s activity is choreographed to some extent via the perception of qualities in objects.

While the free play of imagination is necessary for aesthetic judgements, imagination is given a less murky role by Kant in the production of ‘aesthetic ideas’.
by an aesthetic idea I mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate] concept, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it.16

In the imaginative expression of aesthetic ideas, it is poetic, metaphorical and symbolic images or associations that give content to our aesthetic reflection. Here, imagination is explicitly creative, as it presents a host of ‘kindred presentations’, and reaches beyond the limits of rational language.17 Here too, although at the height of its productive powers, imagination is not free to do whatever it pleases. In Kemal’s words:

[T]he indeterminate use of concepts sustains a free play of the faculties. These concepts proceed by associations of ideas, metaphor, metonymy, and catachresis, and do not follow causal determinations, ordered into a system of scientific knowledge, as a standard. Rather, we use reason to guide the associations into a theme – an aesthetic idea – which we explore through association of ideas. No exactness according to causal factors or ‘particular rule of cognition’ is at issue here, though we may refine and direct associations of ideas to their theme.18

Kant’s discussion of aesthetic ideas is primarily in the realm of fine art and genius, specifically poetry, but aesthetic ideas are also expressed in relation to natural beauty.19 In the same discussion where he claims that natural beauty has superiority over art, he says that we may find in ‘the beautiful in nature . . . a voluptuousness for the mind in a train of thought that we can never fully unravel’.20 Natural beauty is a symbol of morality (through nature’s moral purposiveness), but although he gives several examples, he does not elaborate on the ways that nature expresses aesthetic ideas.21

Thus a lily’s white color seems to ativate the mind to ideas of innocence, and the seven colors [of the spectrum], from red to violet, [similarly seem to ativate it, respectively, to the ideas of] (1) sublimity, (2) courage, (3) candor, (4) friendliness, (5) modesty, (6) constancy, and (7) tenderness.22

. . . beautiful objects of nature or of art are often called names that seem to presuppose that we are judging [these objects] morally. We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, or landscapes cheerful and gay; even colors are called innocent, humble, or tender because they arouse sensations in us that are somehow analogous to

the consciousness we have in the mental state produced by moral judgments.23

These examples have been interpreted as moral-aesthetic images but aside from this they are clearly products of imagination. They are the sorts of imaginative associations we might be inclined to make when perceiving expressive qualities in natural objects or landscapes.

Metaphorical Imagination

Kant’s discussion of aesthetic ideas is suggestive not only of associative imagination, but also metaphorical imagination. The metaphorical imagining underlying metaphors involves bringing together two different things in novel ways – an aesthetic object or aspect of it is fused with some image that is not an image of that object nor an image of another instance of that object.24 Working with language (and not necessarily with mental images), imagination creates a novel connection between the different semantic relations that constitute a metaphor. To borrow Carlson’s example of a geological feature in the American South-west (mentioned in Tony Hillemann’s mystery novels), if we say, ‘Ship Rock is a free form gothic cathedral,’ we speak metaphorically.25 We are not, of course, saying that a cathedral actually exists there, just as in our nominal description we are not saying that a ship actually exists in the desert. In using imagination to make a novel connection, we work from our experience of the qualities of one thing and work towards a creative comparison to another thing. ‘Ship Rock is a free form gothic cathedral’ is a metaphorical expression used to capture the character of a massive protuberance of complex forms which rises towards the sky out of the flat desert. The jagged forms are reminiscent of the pointy parts of towers and detail in Gothic cathedrals.

The metaphorical connection made here is not arbitrary. The two objects’ forms resemble one another, and the sheer scale of Ship Rock is reminiscent of the scale of a great cathedral which dwarfs buildings around it. More importantly, the imaginative description, when we read it in a novel or when someone says it while in the landscape itself, accentuates and draws attention to the perceptual qualities of the object. We pick out the pointiness more clearly, or begin to notice the contrast between the rounded end section and the taller, pointier sections of the shape. Metaphorical descriptions are used readily in our aesthetic responses; they help us to make sense of what we see. Not only do they direct appreciation, but they also succeed in offering images of other things for comparison, and work both to refine and enrich our apprehension of aesthetic qualities.
Exploratory Imagination

Besides the novel connections and relations made through associative and metaphorical imagination, I identify four additional modes of imaginative activity in relation to nature: exploratory, projective, ambiative and revelatory imagination.26 There is some overlap between Kant’s ideas on imagination, the activity of metaphorical imagining and the variety of modes I set out below. Also, I should point out that we use none, some, or all of these modes in appreciation, as our responses range from imaginatively thin to imaginatively thick, depending on the aesthetic object and the imagination of the appreciator.

Exploratory imagination is the most deeply tied to perception of the various modes we use. Here, imagination follows the lead of perception and explores the various perceptual qualities and relationships between qualities as we attend to the aesthetic object. While perception does much of the work in simply taking in the various features of the object and cordonning it off in our perceptual field, imagination reaches beyond this in a free contemplation of the object. As imagination brings meanings to bear on perceptual qualities, we identify aesthetic qualities and broaden our grasp of the object. In this way exploratory imagination helps the appreciator to make an initial discovery of aesthetic qualities. For example, in contemplating the bark of a locust tree, visually, I see the deep cleits between the thick ridges of the bark. Images of mountains and valleys come to mind, and I think of the age of the tree, given the thickness of the ridges and how they are spaced apart. I walk around the tree, feeling the wide circumference of the bark. The image of a seasoned old man comes to mind, with deep wrinkles from age. These imaginings lead to an aesthetic judgement of the tree as stalwart, and I respect it as I might a wise old sage. My interpretation of the locust tree is tied to its non-aesthetic qualities, such as the texture of the bark, and the associations spawned by perceptual qualities.

Another feature of the exploratory mode is that imagination sometimes undeliberately searches for unity in a scene where perception is unequal to the task. Imagination may struggle to bring together the various aspects of a moor which stretch beyond sight by supplying missing detail or filling in what is not seen, such as images of the landscape beyond the horizon. (Although I am specifying an environmental context, this activity is also common in the appreciation of naturalistic paintings, when we imaginatively ‘fill in’ the space beyond the edges of the canvas.)

Projective Imagination

Projective imagination draws on imagination’s projective powers. Projection involves imagining ‘on to’ what is perceived, such that what is actually there is somehow replaced with or overlaid by a projected image. In this way projective imagination is associated with deliberate ‘seeing as’, where we intentionally, not mistakenly, see something as another thing. We put ‘seeing as’ to work in order to try out new perspectives on objects by projecting images on to them.

In visually exploring the stars at night, imaginative activity overlays perception in attempting to unify the various forms traced by individual stars, perhaps by naturally projecting geometrical shapes on to them. Sometimes we take the further imaginative leap of projecting ourselves into natural objects and ‘scenes’. For example, to appreciate the aesthetic qualities of an alpine flower, I might somatically imagine what it is like to live and grow under harsh conditions. Without imagining such conditions I might be unable to appreciate the remarkable strength hidden so beautifully in the delicate quality of the flower. Both of these examples show how imagination provides a more intimate aesthetic experience, allowing the exploration of aesthetic qualities more deeply than through perception alone.

Stephanie Ross has identified an interesting use of imagination in gardens which seems to involve projective (and perhaps also exploratory) imagination, where we project ourselves into an environment:

In some cases imagination is a natural prelude to action, for instance, when we deliberate and then choose to walk along a particular path. In other cases, we are for practical reasons restricted to imagination alone. Thus, while viewing an extensive prospect . . . I can imagine ascending a craggy peak or following a road to the horizon when either task is clearly beyond my physical abilities. In sum, a central feature of our enjoyment of gardens, and of other natural landscapes as well, is imagining ourselves performing some sort of action in that landscape, or in response to it, coupled with the possibility of actually going on and doing one or all of these things. Let me call this feature of gardens invitation.27

Many other features of gardens are designed to capture imagination. Grottos and winding paths create the quality of mystery and invite us to explore them. The romantic, lake ruins built into grand gardens are rich in suggestion, encouraging us to ‘imaginatively live for a moment in the irretrievable past while simultaneously aware of the power of time to negate the present’.28 Although gardeners intentionally create opportunities for imagination, in more natural landscapes, natural qualities invite us to explore them in similar ways. Openings in forests and rocky scrambles are common examples of natural invitation.

Projective imagination is especially interesting due to its participatory
character. Through imagination, we attempt to gain access to nature’s ways, to explore its otherness. This type of imaginative activity also facilitates a sympathetic or empathetic identification with nature. As R. K. Elliott puts it:

Empathy, which is attributed to imagination, is the capacity for entering imaginatively into the situation of another person or animal, and assuming its expression; or into the situation and expression of some quasi-person, such as a literary character; or of entering into and assuming the anthropomorphized expression of some plant or inanimate object.  

Such explorations are related more to moral concern and care rather than an aesthetic perspective but imaginative identification often begins in the imaginative exploration of aesthetic qualities, drawing the appreciator more deeply into the situation.

**Ampliative Imagination**

The third mode of imaginative activity, ampliative imagination, involves the *inventive* powers of imagination, and need not make use of images. It is marked by heightened creative powers and a special curiosity in its response to natural objects. Here, imagination amplifies what is given in perception, thereby reaching beyond the mere projection of images on to objects. This activity is therefore more penetrative, resulting in a deeper imaginative treatment of the object. It is imagination in its most active mode in aesthetic experience.

This use of imagination involves both visualising and the leaps of imagination that enable us to approach natural objects from entirely new standpoints. In contemplating the smoothness of a sea pebble, I visualise the relentless surging of the ocean as it has shaped the pebble into its worn form. I might also imagine how it looked before it became so smooth, this image contributing to my wonder and delight in the object. Merely thinking about the pebble does not vivify the silky smoothness that is emphasised by contrasting its feel with an image of its pre-worn state. Ampliative imagination enables us to expand upon what we perceive by placing or contextualising the aesthetic object with narrative images. Andrew Wyeth illustrates this with another example from the sea, ‘A white mussel shell on a gravel bank in Maine is thrilling to me because it’s all the sea – the gull that brought it there, the rain, the sun that bleached it there by a stand of spruce woods.’

Ampliative imagination also accounts for a non-visualising activity in which we try out novel ways to appreciate aesthetically some object. Calling on imagination in this way facilitates the perspective of experiencing a valley as lush and green, imbued with tranquillity, or, by contrast, perceiving the valley’s shape as carved out by icy glacial forms.

This narrative imagination has a special use in relation to the transitory quality of natural objects. Many natural phenomena come and go, changing from moment to moment. Saito discusses how this plays out in Japanese aesthetics, in the writings of Yoshida Kenkō:

As in a love affair between a man and a woman, ‘in all things, it is the beginnings and the ends that are interesting’ because such stages of the phenomena are more stimulating to one’s imagination. In particular, we appreciate the exquisite contrast between the present condition and the imagined condition of the previous or following stage. Even when an object is at the peak of its beauty, the appreciation is deepened by pathos based upon the apparent contrast between its present appearance and what it will become later on.

This shows how imagination may be sensitive to the temporal qualities of natural objects and environments.

**Revelatory Imagination**

Where ampliative imagination leads to disclosure, I call this imaginative activity *revelatory*. In this mode, invention stretches the power of imagination to its limits, and this often gives way to new ideas and meanings; revelation in the non-religious sense. When my alternative contemplation of the valley, glaciers and all, reveals the tremendous power of the earth to me, a new understanding emerges through a distinctively aesthetic experience.

This new understanding is not gained through intellectual endeavour. It is not sought out. Revelatory imagination is part of an aesthetic experience, and in this respect the revelation that occurs is not an extra-aesthetic truth that is disclosed. Rather, an idea, belief or value is crystallised through heightened aesthetic experience, where perceptual and imaginative engagement with nature facilitates the kind of close attention that leads to revelation. A quick glance at a lamb reveals little except an acknowledgement of its sweetness. But the fuller participation of perception and imagination brings about a stronger grasp of the nature of innocence. Contemplating the fresh whiteness of a lamb and its small, fragile stature evokes images of purity and naivey. It is through dwelling aesthetically and imaginatively on natural phenomena that we may achieve new ways of seeing.

Revelatory imagination is reminiscent of the poetic apprehension conveyed through Kant’s aesthetic ideas, where imaginative devices – symbolic images, metaphor – open out new meanings beyond the limitations of literal language.
reflection on the seashell is guided by attention to perceptual qualities of the aesthetic object and its immediate environment of the seashore.

In some cases our imaginings will be only tentatively tied to perceptual qualities of the object, so we cannot rely solely on the connection between imagination and perception to pinpoint relevant imaginings. For example, when coming upon Beachy Head, a high cliff on the south coast of England, one is awestruck by the dramatic, sheer drop to the sea, and this feeling is heightened by the knowledge that this is a favourite suicide spot. Imagining the feeling of jumping off the cliff, and the fear of someone standing at the top of it, accentuates the sublimity of the place. But this train of images would become irrelevant to aesthetic appreciation of the cliff if one then imagined, vividly and rather gruesomely, the fallen body at the bottom of the cliff and the specific kinds of wounds that the cliff face might have inflicted on the body. As we focus our attention on thoughts about the body and its particular set of wounds, our imaginings become distanced from qualities of the cliff.

Furthermore, although many images evoked by an object are obviously connected to its perceptual properties, some imaginings do not emerge through attention to perceptual properties alone. Aldo Leopold’s appreciation of a mountain as wild and majestic is achieved through ‘thinking like a mountain’, or an empathetic, imaginative identification with the mountain. Leopold may have tried to project himself into the mountain, and sensory images would help, but it might also just involve an attempt to identify with the feeling of height and mass and the sublime feeling that might accompany it.

Perception directs imaginings in many cases but other forms of guidance may be needed. Disinterestedness characterises aesthetic appreciation as non-practical and non-instrumental. Adherence to this guideline eliminates the danger of self-indulgence by the imaginative subject. As I have argued, there is no tension between the active engagement of the subject’s imagination and the detachment typically associated with disinterestedness. Properly understood, it is the active detachment of disinterestedness that clears the ground for the free activity of imagination, but it is also what helps to keep it in check, preventing self-indulgent responses. In freeing the mind from self-interested and instrumental concerns, imagination can underpin appropriate appreciation of the aesthetic object. Disinterestedness functions to check thoughts or imaginings that stray from an aesthetic focus in my appreciation of a seascape, such as fantasising about the abundance of shells I might collect if the waves weren’t so big.

Disinterestedness specifically addresses the concern that the use of imagination leads to self-indulgence, while the second guideline has more to do with training imagination, as a skill, where we try to keep imagination in line with relevant features of the object. It requires a more active role by the appreciator.
in that she or he is expected to 'imagine well'. Just as keen rather than slack perception enables the discovery of aesthetic value in a dull landscape, imagination can be used effectively or ineffectively in the context of aesthetic appreciation.

An analogy to virtue is helpful for explaining how to imagine well. For Aristotle, virtue is not a natural capacity, but rather it is learned and acquired through practice. We reach a comfortable point where we exercise a virtue as a matter of habit. Imagination, too, is developed through practice, and it gains a habitual footing just like virtue. We can begin to see how an effective use of imagination might develop, but how exactly would such a use sort relevant from irrelevant imaginings? An important aspect of virtue provides an answer to this question. The proper assessment of the context or situation of a moral problem (using practical reason), as well as practice, provides the foundation of the appropriate virtue. In the aesthetic context, imagination is mobilised and exercised according to the demands of the aesthetic object, so that we become able to determine the irrelevance of, for example, some of the Beachy Head imaginings. Imagining well means spotting aesthetic potential, having a sense of what to look for, and knowing when to clip the wings of imagination. This last skill involves preventing the irrelevance of shallow, naive and sentimental imaginative responses which impoverish rather than enrich appreciation. Imagining a lamb dressed up in baby clothes might underline the aesthetic truth of innocence, but it is sentimental and shallow, and it fails to direct an appreciation appropriately. Such discriminations are not always easy to make nor by any means clear-cut, but through practice it is possible to develop the skill of keeping imaginings on track.

Despite the fact that I intend only to draw an analogy between imagination and Aristotelian virtue, the comparison suggests that the exercise of imagination involves choices that could be described as normative. As Scruton remarks:

we often distinguish among the activities of the imagination between those which are really imagination and those which are merely fantasy and whim. This is not a genuine distinction between imagination and something else, but it is an instance of a derivative use of 'imagine': it marks a distinction based on our own sense of what is appropriate in describing an absent thing.

Elliott agrees with this observation when he argues against the aesthetic objectivist’s belief that imaginative activity could leave the aesthetic object behind altogether or lead to chaos. If we are attending to the aesthetic object, then we should expect imaginative activity to be related to the work:

[Imagination] seems to have a double movement: an expansive moving out from the work along lines of relevance, and a turning back upon the work which concentrates the additional ideas or images around it like a nimbus. One might add that Imagination obeys not only a rule of relevance but a rule of decorum, for the rapt state would be at an end if a thought or image which was felt to belittle the work obtruded into it.35

Although Scruton’s and Elliott’s claims are directed at art, they are relevant to nature too. Neither philosopher’s argument depends upon a relationship between the artist’s intention and imagination. Their views share with mine an insistence on the kind of capacity imagination really is: imaginative activity is tied to qualities of the aesthetic object broadly conceived; and our ability to make choices to direct our imaginings in appropriate ways. Imagination sometimes functions in the mode of fantasy, but it is more accurate to say that in our aesthetic encounters, it operates rationally and appropriately according to the demands of the object.

Directing imagination in appropriate ways is not only in the interest of valuing the object for its own sake. Developing effective imaginative ability is desirable outside of aesthetic contexts too. Fantasy may be entertaining, but it does not serve us well in life, except very occasionally as a psychological release. Instead, by drawing on imagination’s most effective modes, and giving them some practice, we achieve the focus required to use it in positive ways. Developing imaginative skill in order to relate better to others, make moral choices, decide how to live one’s life, be creative, make discoveries and so on, is unquestionably a good thing.36

Criticisms of Imagination

Above, I remarked on imagination’s bad reputation in the history of philosophy. A few environmental aestheticians are also suspicious, and their scepticism also rests on problems concerning imagination’s relationship to truth. Imagination, it is argued, is not concerned with truth but rather with entertaining possibilities (and, worse, falsity), and when it comes to aesthetic appreciation of nature, truth is the bottom line. But this is where they make a crucial mistake: the failure to grasp that imagination is not reducible to ‘fantasy’. It is a much broader concept, involving several valuable modes of engagement with the natural environment. Imagination’s opponents come mainly from the cognitivist camp, so their criticisms arise out of a common theoretical basis, the objective epistemology of science. Aesthetic objectivism relies on an objective framework for appreciating, interpreting and evaluating aesthetic objects. In the context of art, for example, the aesthetic objectivist
fears that imaginative activity in appreciation is prone to subjective flights of fantasy that leave the artwork and its qualities behind, replacing them with an individual, arbitrary fantasy. In environmental aesthetics, the same objection is raised, and it is argued that appreciation must be guided by knowledge provided by the sciences.

Apart from Carlson, the cognitive camp recognises that imagination may have some positive role but they insist that it should be constrained by the necessary condition of scientific knowledge. Eaton, who supports imagination informed by scientific knowledge, is nonetheless critical of many of its uses. These objections are raised in her response to my original article on this subject. In particular, she objects to my examples of having the mental image of the wrinkled face of an old man when perceiving the deeply textured tree bark, and the truth of innocence revealed through the aesthetic experience of the lamb, on the grounds that knowledge is required to ensure that imaginings are appropriately directed:

Knowledge does not simply deepen the experiences that imagination provides, it directs them, or should direct them if we hope to preserve and design sustainable landscapes. Concepts such as imagining well make no sense unless one knows what the object is that one is talking about, something (in fact, as much as possible) about the object, and something (in fact, as much as possible) about the context in which the object is found.

As I have indicated, knowledge plays some role in the form of basic concepts and everyday knowledge, and so is likely to be present in many of our aesthetic experiences (and to this extent some basic concepts and beliefs will be presupposed in our imaginings). But the more specialised demands of scientific knowledge, and in-depth knowledge of this kind, present problems if made a necessary condition. The way Eaton puts the matter here puts unrealistic and unacceptable intellectual demands on appreciators in order to have 'correct' appreciation. What does she mean by 'as much as possible'? Are we required to read up in the nature centre before we head out? Many people will possess basic concepts of what they appreciate, but is it fair to expect each of us to try to find out as much as possible about the ecology, geology and so on of the environments aesthetically appreciate? I do not want to deny that aesthetic appreciation can be accompanied by the pursuit of knowledge if so desired, but it is unreasonable to expect every appreciator to find out as much as possible in the context of aesthetic valuing.

As I have indicated, there are other ways to ensure that imagination is put to the best use possible, rather than stipulating a necessary condition. Eaton does not engage very deeply with my discussion of constraints on imagination.

When describing my agreement with Kant’s views of aesthetic imagination, she writes, ‘Aesthetic experience is marked, he [Kant] argued, by disinterestedness. We put aside ordinary scientific, ethical, or personal interests and respond to objects as we please. We allow imagination full rein. But disinterestedness operates both negatively and positively, and in the former sense, we do not respond as we please; disinterestedness constrains self-interested appreciation. Furthermore, Kant’s free play of imagination is not unbridled. Without assuming some direction to imagination in line with qualities of the aesthetic object, he would have had to contend with the subjective flights of fancy of which an entirely free imagination is, in some modes, susceptible.

Ronald Moore is also critical of the role given to imagination, but, unlike Eaton, he is equally critical of the role given to scientific knowledge. Moore urges a 'syncretic aesthetics' that combines knowledge and imagination. Like Eaton, however, he misconceives my position by assuming that a free imagination is an imagination without limits. He is generally critical of non-cognitivist approaches put forward by Berleant, Carroll and me because he believes that:

[The fundamental problem with these views and all other non-conceptualist approaches is the inherent limitlessness of the non-conceptual. If, as between understanding and imagination, nature is committed to the unrestricted province of the latter, there can be no bounds on what we make of it.]

This is a difficult claim to support. First, although non-cognitive views do not give knowledge a central place or make it a necessary condition, they do give it some role. They do not emphasise knowledge but they are also not subjectivist in the extreme sense supposed by Moore. If the non-conceptual were limitless, then we would have only facts on the one hand and nonsense or complete arbitrariness on the other. Moore’s portrayal is strikingly similar to Carlson’s, where the debate is put in terms of two stark alternatives with no subtle or careful distinctions concerning positions lying in between.

Second, Moore overlooks possible ways, other than knowledge, to guide and warrant imaginative activity, and, interestingly, he makes a similar mistake in relation to his criticisms of Carroll’s arousal theory. Carroll makes a strong case for grounding emotional responses to nature through a cognitive theory of emotions. Recall my discussion in Chapter 4 concerning the way in which emotional responses are anchored in the object and beliefs surrounding it. Moore ignores the thrust of Carroll’s argument and portrays him as a subjectivist. When addressing my position, Moore does not engage with or even acknowledge my case for guiding imagination. If he thinks that attempts
to warrant emotional and imaginative activity fail, then he needs to present an argument for why this is so.

Robert Fudge has also argued that scientific knowledge provides the appropriate backing for giving a limited role to imagination in aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment. In particular, he argues that science is a necessary condition for appreciation of unsenic nature, which we often find difficult to appreciate compared to scenic landscapes (he concedes that scenic nature may be appropriately appreciated without scientific knowledge). Fudge makes some persuasive points in relation to how knowledge can enable appreciation of the unsenic, as opposed to unreflective revulsion, but he does not succeed in his attempt to bring together science and imagination in appreciation, and his claims against some imaginative responses are unconvincing.

His strategy is to show that, ultimately, science is needed to back up our imaginative (aesthetic) responses to nature; imaginings not backed by science threaten to downgrade appreciation. However, in the end he succeeds only in making a weak case for the role of science. Despite arguing that science and imagination working together reveal the unsenic as aesthetically delightful, his account of how the two come together is underdeveloped, and his case is largely based on an interpretation of my examples. Without a positive account of how imagination—as an inventive capacity that amplifies or reveals—works with scientific facts, imagination gets buried under the weight of knowledge. The effect is to reduce imaginative engagement to a type of cognitive engagement.

Fudge presents a case specifically against exploratory and projective imagination, but his objections are unconvincing. In respect of exploratory imagination, he questions whether seeing the tree bark as the wrinkled face of an old man is an appropriate imaginings and concludes that, 'Though seeing the bark as the skin of an old man may lead to our noting previously ignored aesthetic properties of the bark, it may also mislead our appreciation, as wrinkled skin and tree bark are only incidentally related.' Science provides the standard of appropriateness by giving us knowledge of trees that we then transform into appropriate images through imagination.

In his discussion of this example, Fudge appears to rely on my own point concerning the way perceptual qualities guide our imaginings. The deep crannies of the bark are like the wrinkles of an old man. This could be the only way that the relevant relationship is formed which leads to 'noting' new aesthetic qualities. Yet, Fudge then expresses concern that the tree and the man are only 'incidentally related.' He never explains why or how this imagining misleads appreciation. In any case, more than an incidental relationship exists in my original example. The connection is established through the resemblance between the perceptual qualities in the bark and the face, coupled with the recognition of the tree as old. This contributes to evoking the image of an old man (rather than a young one with a smooth face). The example was used to illustrate exploratory imagination, which is the most closely tied to perception of the various modes.

Fudge cites a second example, his own, which he assumes would be acceptable on my account. He does not think that 'aesthetic appreciation of a mountain is enhanced when we project onto it an image of an upside-down ice cream cone' because 'seeing the mountain as an ice cream cone brings in a way of thinking about the mountain entirely unrelated to it.' In this example, there is clearly a problem surrounding the relationship between the mountain and the projection of the ice-cream-cone image. I agree with Fudge, although I'm not sure if I understand correctly what he has in mind. If his example intends to bring together an upside-down ice-cream cone and a mountain covered in snow two-thirds of the way up, with a brown or grey rocky, pointed top, then the connection is too tenuous to be relevant. Snow is cold, so is ice cream, but our associations with the shapes might be too strained to arrive at such an imagining. There is not sufficient resemblance, in my view, to evoke this imagining, and if there were, I doubt it would be shareable. Given these points, we could conclude that not only is it irrelevant, but it is rather trivial. Its triviality is partly due to its not being easily shareable, and as just the result of whim.

My account of imagination clearly recognises that a relevant connection must exist between the aesthetic object and our imaginative activity, so there is agreement on this point. But there is a problem with Fudge's description of imagination's capacities. In his view, imagination's primary activity is 'thinking in facts, but surely this move reduces imagination to intellectual thought. 'Thinking in' describes what we do when we feed knowledge into aesthetic experience. Imagination, like knowledge in some cases, functions to open up new aesthetic qualities or deepen engagement with qualities already perceived. Its activity, although related to thought, makes a creative break from facts and knowledge given in experience, and makes novel connections. In this respect imagination is a transformative power in relation to given experience.

Fudge's next move is to argue that ampliative and revelatory imagination depend upon scientific knowledge. My examples of the worn sea pebble and the glacial valley are interpreted to show how imagination works together with scientific knowledge to give the pebble's narrative and to reveal truth about the valley's geological history. The problem for all cognitive theories arises again in relation to Fudge's argument. How exactly are common sense and scientific knowledge distinguished, especially given the diversity of appreciative communities? In the sea-pebble case, the narrative is an imagined one, but it is plainly connected to common sense beliefs about the sorts of things one finds on beaches: it is common sense that most objects found on beaches have spent time in the sea. The glacial valley is a more promising example for
Fudge's case, but even here the example as set out illustrates how imagination tries out different perspectives on the valley — as lush and green or then as icy. When the latter imagining leads to revelation, the basis of the information is speculative. Our imaginative activity is not directed at perceiving the valley according to actual geological facts about the place, but rather to entertain a narrative related to the forms of the valley, where the narrative gives meaning to the place. The activity involves imaginative interpretation (along lines of relevance) rather than a straightforward application of scientific knowledge. Imaginative attention opens up relevant, new meanings and enhances our present perception through an image of the valley's long-past glacial state, but without the scientific-epistemological condition of verification.

It is possible that there is little disagreement between our accounts, but to determine that, Fudge, like Carlson, needs to specify exactly what degree of scientific knowledge is required, how this knowledge differs from common sense, and what our expectations should be with regard to knowledge possessed by appreciators. Fudge gives an example of a rotted elk carcass (drawing on Rolston's discussion of this type of case), which suggests that knowledge of ecological processes is required to perceive aesthetic qualities in this example of the unsenic. In any case, I have presented arguments to show how imagination is tied to the aesthetic object, and how it is not necessarily divorced from basic concepts. Later in this chapter, I discuss the difference between commonsense beliefs and scientific knowledge.

By limiting his discussion to an interpretation of my examples to show how imagination and science work together, another problem arises for Fudge's account. His ultimate aim is to show that science and imagination reveal aesthetic value in the unsenic, but my examples are not directed at this category of environments, and, as he acknowledges, my overall position is not specifically aimed at the unsenic. Earlier in his article he discusses interesting examples of the unsenic and the role of science in aesthetic appreciation (including the elk carcass). But Fudge does not return to the unsenic after his discussion of imagination and science, and therefore he gives no explicit treatment of how imagination enables aesthetic valuation of the unsenic. Generally, Fudge's preoccupation with defending the role of science is at the expense of adding anything substantial to accounts of imagination's role in aesthetic appreciation. We are told that imagination opens up new ways of seeing that which we otherwise avoid, but Fudge does not provide any content or any specific discussion of how imagination is imaginative.

Defending Imagination

Many of the criticisms against my position on imagination do not specifically tackle the actual examples I give to support my position but, instead, rely on extreme examples to make a case. For example, Eaton never says why the old man and innocent lamb examples, as they stand, represent irrelevant imaginings. Instead, she turns to Felix Salten's Bambi to show that fiction and imagination may have such a strong cultural influence that we become unable to appreciate deer on their own terms, seeing them only through Bambi's cultural spectacles. This type of strategy makes two logical errors. First, it sets up a straw person by presenting more extreme cases than my own. Second, it relies on a slippery slope in the sort of claim made against imagination: if imagination has freedom in cases like the tree and the lamb, isn't it also in danger of leading to the problems apparent in seeing all deer as Bambi, or projecting whatever we please on to nature's forms?

I point to the use of cases/examples because of the general difficulty in distinguishing relevant from irrelevant imaginings. Defending imagination must be done largely on a case-by-case basis. Arguing against it, that is, that it has a role but also that it can lead to harmful fantasy, must also rely on distinguishing between sound and unsound uses of imagination. Both arguments are not easy. It is also worrying that many of the objections to imagination do not recognise our ability to check flights of fancy.

I have already discussed a few examples to indicate irrelevant or otherwise problematic imaginings, but further discussion is needed to clarify my position. In her critique, Eaton says I do not clearly show cases where imaginative activity falsifies nature. Above, I presented the case of a lamb dressed up in baby clothes, a clear sentimentalisation of nature (or more accurately, a domesticated animal), which describes a falsification of it. However, I am concerned about relying on an explicit standard of truth or falsity. Imagination engages in entertaining beliefs and propositions, not in ascertaining facts. But as I pointed out above, imagination is also not opposed to belief or reducible to fantasy. Apart from delusions, imagining is accompanied by an awareness of the relationship between an imagining and the beliefs that surround it. Consider a boy who sees a hill as a giant's head: he sees a huge, looming hill, shaped somewhat like a head, with a bumpy bit that suggests a nose, so he imagines a giant's head. Compare this to the experience of a geologist and imagine the two sharing each other's experiences. The child's response can be characterised as more playful, and it brings attention to the great scale of the hill and its distinctive shape and form through the identification of imaginative qualities. The boy does not run away frightened, because he doesn't really think that the hill is a giant's head, he only imagines it to be like that and he is aware of his imagining. The geologist tells the child about the rock that constitutes this great natural phenomenon, and the geologist sees the aesthetic qualities of solid bulk and sublimity too, but as grounded in her knowledge of geology. Is one response more legitimate than the other as an aesthetic response?
In distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant imaginings or more and less reasonable ones, the standard ought not be fixed by truth and falsity in the strict sense but rather by determining relevance based on the guidelines I have set out. Although I referred earlier to the serious and trivial scale in other contexts concerning appreciation of nature, I shall not use it here. Trivial imaginings there are, and they have no role in my account, but I am not inclined to describe imaginings as ‘serious’ either. Some perfectly reasonable and acceptable imaginings will be playful, and this does not fit very well with describing them as ‘serious’. The serious/trivial scale fits better with Hepburn’s original use, where serious represents science-based appreciation and trivial represents arbitrary or falsifying appreciation. As an alternative, I suggest that we work with a scale of relevant versus irrelevant, with irrelevant imaginings thrown out.

Irrelevant imaginings are those that do not meet the condition of disinterestedness and those that can be shown to have no relationship (or only a very tentative one) to the qualities of the aesthetic object. In this respect, imaginings are object-directed while also shaped to some degree by the particularity of the appreciator. Imaginings must relate to the aesthetic object in specifiable ways that enhance appreciation and are consistent with the practical guideline of imagining well. In relation to practice, imagination in many cases operates naturally along lines of relevance, so my guidelines are intended to operate as an encouragement for appreciators to develop a skillful imagination.

There is more to be said about the relevance of specific examples of imaginings. Moore’s argument against my account of imagination presents a set of more outlandish cases, which I assume he believes are acceptable on my account. Three fanciful examples are given, but in fact each one would be excluded by my guidelines: (1) Seeing a river as a bookmark. This is strange, as there is no apparent relationship between perceptual qualities in this case, or any way in which one image illuminates the other. Rivers are never straight like the sides of a bookmark (canals might be), and they’re usually rippled from the wind and current. (2) Taking a star to be a good luck charm. It’s not clear how this activity relates to perceiving aesthetic qualities, unless one related the brightness and shine to the positive qualities of good luck. In any case, this does not meet the condition of disinterestedness either, since one wants to use the star to bring about one’s own good fortune. (3) Seeing a raven as a writing desk is offered as an example of unbridled imagination. This is a clear case of fancy and just bizarre. There is no connection through cultural associations nor any remote similarities in perceptual qualities that would be shareable (ravens don’t have flat surfaces, which writing desks have when folded down, and black desks are uncommon). One association might be a black quill pen made from feathers, but this is rather remote, at least because it refers to a pen and not the desk. If upon seeing a raven, lines from Edgar Allen Poe’s poem, ‘The Raven’ come to mind, this literary association would be relevant, even if shareable only by the appreciative community familiar with this famous poem.

The Poe example raises the problem of imaginings that could be argued to bring human culture too strongly into our responses to nature, and therefore threaten to negate nature’s qualities through anthropomorphism of the worst kind, or just by hindering our ability to recognise that some part of an environment has both cultural and natural value.

Saito objects to one way in which we invoke associations in relation to nature, although it is not always clear whether these are aesthetic uses of imagination. Recall her concern that some cultural associations overly humanise landscapes, preventing appreciation of their natural value (see Chapter 3). She worries that tourists appreciate some landscapes in human rather than natural terms, and imaginative associations are part of the problem. The reduction of a landscape to a cultural association is, in the absence of recognition of natural qualities, problematic but there are a couple of points that help to defend some associations.

Many landscapes are cultural in the sense that humans have shaped the land or events that have taken place there. This is especially the case with Saito’s example of the Gettysburg battlefield. Such landscapes are not entirely natural, but lie somewhere along the natural/cultural scale. It should therefore be possible to value a landscape as both a cultural symbol and a natural place, indeed, many cultural landscapes have this character. Although she seems to recognise this, she claims that ‘for associationist appreciation, the specific sensuous features of the object remain irrelevant’.

This is not the case for all cultural, associationist appreciation, because quite often it is the play between natural and cultural qualities that creates aesthetic and other types of values. The landscape in and around Gettysburg, where the battle took place, features rolling hills, forests, farmlands and the town itself. In experiencing this pleasant, semi-rural place today, a visitor imagines the same landscape covered with thousands upon thousands of dead and wounded soldiers. The contrast of the present with the past brings home the poignant feeling of the place. Similarly, imagining the terrible battle at Culloden in the Scottish Highlands is connected to perceiving the qualities of the heather-covered, windswept moor, and the heavy weather that can affect such a place. It is possible to distinguish between overly humanising imaginative responses and imaginative responses that work legitimately with both cultural and natural aspects of a place.

Godlovitch raises stronger objections to imagination on the grounds that it does not value nature on its own terms. Like emotion, science and indeed any human framework, imaginative activity necessarily distorts nature, and pre-read through p. 172 in Brady emotion PDF