vents us from conceiving of 'nature qua nature', that is, without human categories and frameworks. I argued in Chapter 4 that such a stance is either impossible or makes aesthetic appreciation empty. I have established sufficient grounds for understanding how imagination can deepen our engagement and how it can be checked so as not to distort nature. We come to nature with human ways of seeing and human ways of aesthetically encountering the world, but rather than attempt to throw these off entirely, we ought to harness imagination's powers in ways that bring out nature's value.

THE COMMUNICABILITY OF IMAGINATION

Let me conclude my discussion of imagination by explaining how to warrant imaginative activity through a cluster of ideas that relate to the communicability of aesthetic judgements. (I make a general case for the communicability and justification of aesthetic judgements in Chapter 7.)

I pointed out above that Kant was not deeply worried about a wayward imagination, and this is shown also by his argument for the intersubjectivity of aesthetic judgements. The basis for his argument is the sensus communis or 'common sense'. This designates the basis of communicability of aesthetic judgements as grounded in the similar capacities of individual appreciators. With it (and his deduction of pure judgements of taste), Kant wants to show how individual judgements based in feeling nonetheless claim subjective universality. We demand agreement with our judgement because we assume that the conditions for making such judgements (including the free play of imagination and disinterestedness) are met, even if they are not met in actuality. Kant's idea has been influential on other accounts that show how aesthetic judgements, although unlike cognitive judgements, lay some claim to communicability.

Hepburn echoes Kant when he says:

if we share a common environment, the annexed forms [of imagination] can range from the universally intersubjective, through the shareable though not universal, to the highly individual and personal. Basic natural forms are interiorized for the articulating of a common structure of the mind. Through these, the elusively nonspatial is made more readily graspable and communicable.

Although our imaginings are marked by particularity rather than generality, it does not follow that they are idiosyncratic. They are potentially shareable, just as the other elements of the aesthetic response, perception, emotion, cognition, are potentially shareable.

As we have seen, it is a common mistake to assume that imagination is characterised by waywardness. Like emotion, imagination is an individual power shaped by the events and values in any individual life. It is this particularity that gives our imaginings their richness. At the same time, our imaginings are not unrelated to the objective world, indeed, they centre upon it; imaginings are connected to qualities in objects and surrounding beliefs.

So, we can suppose that imagination, too, may be warranted through the communicability of the aesthetic situation. The critical discourse that is part of aesthetic appreciation of art and the natural environment can be part of the actual activity of revising and redressing our aesthetic responses. Just as we are able to discover more aesthetic value by sharing aesthetic experiences, in so far as we believe our judgements ought to be communicable, we discard imaginative descriptions that cannot be reasonably shared by others experiencing the same object, or by a culture or community.

I shall revisit Carlson's discussion to demonstrate my claim here. His criterion for cultural information (nominal descriptions, mythological descriptions, imaginative descriptions and literary descriptions) is that they are required to be culturally embedded, and in this sense they are more 'generally available'. While 'Ship Rock', the proper name of a particular geological feature, is culturally embedded, descriptions of that landscape feature as a 'blue thumb' or as a 'free form gothic cathedral' are not. Carlson thinks that both imaginative and literary descriptions are not relevant because they cannot meet his conditions.

This exclusion of imaginative descriptions is both odd and unnecessary. It is odd because the metaphors we use in our imaginative descriptions depend upon concepts which are part of language in common use. It is unnecessary because such descriptions are actually descriptive and direct our attention to aesthetic qualities. In other words, some imaginative descriptions, not all of them, meet Carlson's criteria of relevance.

I've never seen Ship Rock at first hand, but judging by pictures, it appears to be majestic in character. Two images give us a strong sense of the majesty of Ship Rock: a ship moving with a great wake through the calm sea, or a great cathedral impressive in its proportions. These sorts of comparisons are part of common understanding for many of us. They do not represent highly individualistic associations. The Ship Rock example, as well as others, shows that some imaginative descriptions meet the criterion of cultural embeddedness.

However, although the concepts used in metaphor are commonly known, this is not sufficient to make metaphors work, since the connection made could be bizarre or arbitrary. Imaginative descriptions can be misleading, just as metaphors can be misinterpreted. But this is no reason to exclude them as irrelevant. Determining which imaginative descriptions or metaphorical
descriptions are appropriate or which ones make sense, given the non-
esthetic qualities of a particular landscape, forms a key part of critical
discourse. For example, Ship Rock was also described by Hillerman as
sticking up 'like a blue thumb on the western horizon seventy miles away'.
Although this description might make sense under very specific light and
weather conditions, it is likely that it is so specific as to be of little interest or
importance. I agree with Carlson that highly individualistic descriptions like
this one will have little if any role in appropriate aesthetic appreciation,
because they are unlikely to be easily shared or accessible to others.

Another example cited by Carlson is 'Table Mesa'. Descriptions of flat-
shaped geological features are quite common across the world. These names
are based in local language use, and they emerge from figurative descriptions
that have become used as proper names. This is how they have become
culturally embedded, and Carlson accepts this. However, he rejects Hiller-
man's imaginative description of Table Mesa as 'the ultimate aircraft carrier'
because it is not sufficiently culturally embedded. It is clear that it is not
embedded in the sense of being a proper name, and it is unlikely to become
a proper name, unless of course it makes its way into common use among locals
and Hillerman fans who visit the place.

However, the description, also a metaphor, draws on ordinary or com-
monsense concepts. Tables are a part of our daily lives, aircraft carriers are
not. But this is why the metaphor works so well. It makes a creative link to a
concept which suggests not only flatness, but massive bulk beneath it as well.
It is a description that may be less ordinary but is certainly more suggestive of
the aesthetic qualities that exist. Cultural embeddedness is a reasonable
condition of relevance, but it ought to be broad enough to include imaginative
descriptions which get their impact and novelty by starting from the ordinary
and reaching beyond in ways that are still comprehensible. Not to accept
this would be to limit unacceptably the scope of poetic language in landscape
descriptions.

The inventiveness characteristic of imagination does not always lead to
positive value, but to put imagination aside altogether or to be too wary of its
powers is not the answer. This strategy suppresses an aesthetic tool that has
great potential for enabling both the discovery of aesthetic qualities and a
creative engagement with nature.

Stop reading Imagination. Start reading emotion

EMOTION, EXPRESSIVE QUALITIES AND NATURE

I looked up dizzily, and beheld a wide expanse of ocean, whose
waters wore so inky a hue as to bring at once to my mind the
Nubian geographer's account of the Mare Tenebrarum. A panorama

more deplorably desolate no human imagination can conceive. To
the right and left, as far as the eye could reach, there lay
outstretched, like ramparts of the world, lines of horridly black and
beetling cliff, whose character of gloom was but the more forcibly
illustrated by the surf which reared high up against it its white and
ghastly crest, howling and shrieking for ever.

The affective dimension of environmental appreciation, as illustrated by these
lines from Edgar Allen Poe's 'A Descent into the Maelström', is common to
our aesthetic experiences of nature. In some responses there is felt emotion, as
when we feel exhilarated when taking a morning walk through a forest. In
other responses we may not feel any particular emotion, but rather we just
find expressive qualities in what we experience, such as a landscape that is
bleak and forbidding.

In this section my primary concern is how to make sense of and justify
attributions of expressive qualities to the natural environment. In relation to
the question of our emotional responses, where we actually feel moved in some
way by nature, I rely mainly on the argument already provided by Carroll's
arousal theory (discussed in Chapter 4). Of course, appreciation is often
characterised by experiencing expressive qualities and emotions at the same
time, but for the purposes of my explanation, I treat them separately. Both
types of experiences have a place in the integrated aesthetic, and together they
define the affective component therein.

Emotions and the Environment

Like imagination, emotion is a valuable resource in aesthetic appreciation but
it too suffers from caricature; it is commonly viewed as too subjective and
arbitrary to pin down as a legitimate part of appreciation. Any discussion of it
needs to show not only how nature can evoke emotion and be expressive, but
also give some assurance that emotion will not lead to wayward or distorting
responses.

Carlro addresses the specific problem of justifying emotional responses to
nature, that is, the particular emotions we feel when we experience great
waterfalls, richly textured mosses, or tiny spiders. He adopts a cognitive
theory of emotions and sets out to show how emotion can be an appropriate
response to nature. An emotional response is appropriate or inappropriate
according to its object and aspects of the subject having the emotion,
including particular beliefs surrounding the object. In Carroll's view, justifying
the feeling of excitement from the grandeur of a waterfall depends upon
the qualities of the waterfall and the beliefs and thoughts that underlie the
response. The thoughts and beliefs cannot be subjective, but rather must be
reasonably shared by other people. Using this strategy, he shows how emotional responses are not subjective projections onto the landscape and how they relate to the whole aesthetic situation — subject, object and context.

Carroll makes a strong case for warranting our emotional responses, and I am inclined simply to support it as the best account available. I would just add two points of clarification. First, Carroll is quite clear that the beliefs that support our emotive responses are not based on scientific knowledge. They are not specialist beliefs, but rather serve as background, commonsense beliefs that cohere with other people’s beliefs. Although Carroll relies on a cognitive theory of emotions, his arousal theory is intended as an alternative to Carlson’s natural environmental model, with its necessary condition of scientific knowledge. That model does not capture the common experience of being moved by nature.

Second, while beliefs are relevant to warranting emotion, they do not provide the fullest account of the grounds for our emotions. Some recent theories of emotion in philosophy argue that emotions may also rest on imaginings or thoughts that are merely entertained. Carroll has picked up on this discussion, and in his more recent work he revises his cognitive theory of emotions by adding that our emotional responses may also be legitimized grounded in thoughts, or propositions that are merely entertained:

I may view a cloud formation — entertaining the metaphor that it is a mountain range — and that belief-like state (that imagining) may engender emotions of awe in me, calling my attention to the massive, powerful shapes in the sky. Nor need this imagining on my part be idiosyncratically subjective. Everyone else can see why I see it as a mountain range and can agree that my metaphor is apposite. . . . But I do not believe that the cloud is a mountain. I merely entertain the thought in a way that raises an emotional response in me, which, in turn, enables me to organize my perception of . . . some of its features.

I welcome these new ideas because they enrich his theory by recognizing that our affective responses reach beyond beliefs for their grounding and context. They also suggest a way that imagination and emotion are linked in aesthetic appreciation. Overall, Carroll provides a useful explanation and justification of our emotional responses to the natural world.

Nature’s Moods

I give special attention to the problem of expressive qualities in nature because there has not been much discussion of it in environmental aesthetics. Various writers have considered expressive qualities, such as Hepburn, but there has been only one detailed philosophical treatment of them, by Jane Howarth, and her discussion has a particular focus. Before I set out my own position, and in order to provide some background, I shall give an outline of her discussion of the problem.

In ‘Nature’s Moods’, Howarth considers one dimension of the problem of expressive qualities, the role of moods in environmental experience. She turns her attention not to the emotions we feel, but to the expressive qualities we perceive. Although her account is limited to moods, it gives a useful survey of some of the problems that arise when we use emotion terms to describe nature and points in the right direction for developing an account of expressive qualities.

There are various ways we might attempt to explain how environments and their objects are expressive. A first attempt can be dismissed easily. We might say, literally, that a natural environment, perhaps a loch and dark images of the hills surrounding it, actually is sombre. But this strategy fails if we are ascribing an emotional state to the loch. Inanimate objects, objects without minds, do not have emotional states.

Other possible arguments stem from attempts to say how art is expressive of emotions. Howarth considers whether or not a ‘Croce-Collingwood expression theory’ might be relevant, which claims that we call works of art sad, happy and so on because the artist is expressing her or his feeling of sadness through the medium of art. However, according to this view, we necessarily make reference to the artist, and this is nonsensical in the context of natural (as opposed to heavily modified) environments. We might bypass the artist and argue that the artist’s emotion is embodied in the artwork’s form, but this still makes an implicit reference to a creator with an intention.

Yet another approach focuses on the response of the appreciator. This is more hopeful and much more appropriate to nature, since it sets aside intentionality. A causal theory of emotions holds that when we ascribe an expressive quality to something, it is because the thing causes one to feel a particular emotion. However, consider this example. The loch environment may make someone feel content and calm, relaxed and satisfied, rather than sombre, and so in this case it would be odd to call the loch sombre. The fact that one says it makes one feel sombre isn’t sufficient to show why it is sombre, since it could affect others in a different way. Besides this problem, it may also be the case that we judge the loch to be sombre without actually feeling anything at all, so the causal account cannot explain this type of response either.

Howarth then asks us to consider the projection of emotions. For example, it is common for children to project emotions onto dolls and teddy bears. We have already seen that there is no mind in inanimate natural objects, and we
Expressive Qualities in Nature

Interestingly, elsewhere, in a discussion about expressive qualities in art, Carroll raises some examples of expressive qualities in nature. He does not develop a position specifically in relation to the natural environment but he brings to the surface some useful ideas that follow Howarth’s strategy (without relying on phenomenology). Their views are similar in the way they invoke a relation of resemblance between expressive qualities in nature and the characteristic behaviour expressed when people are in various emotional states.

Carroll argues that we can attribute expressive qualities to nature in somewhere near a literal sense regardless of the fact that sinister forests and cheerful brooks do not possess mental states. Carroll’s argument, which I think is a good one, is based on the idea that we attribute expressive properties to things – namely artworks and natural objects – because of their ‘configuration’, or the way they ‘look or sound’. (Presumably, he would be willing to accept that something’s ‘configuration’ could also be based in other sensory properties, such as texture or smell.) For example:

We see the gnarled branches of barren trees and call them anguished because they call to mind the twisted appearance of human suffering. But that does not entail that we are not speaking literally. For we are not saying that the tree is suffering (that it possesses a psychological state), but rather that it is anguished-looking – that it exhibits characteristic aspects of the physiognomy of anguish.

There are other examples too – a weeping willow is sad or sad-looking because we recognise in it the posture of someone feeling down. The activity of a furious storm ‘reminds us of how the behaviour of a furious person appears’. Poe’s howling and shrieking storm sounds like the cries of humans. On Carroll’s view the reference point is human behaviour because that is what we know so well, but it is possible that the resemblance works both ways. When my friend is furious, she ‘storms’ around the house. Nature, too, may be a reference point for recognising characteristic emotional behaviour in humans, who are, after all, part of nature themselves.

One advantage of this approach is its externalist emphasis. It relies on the perception of non-aesthetic qualities, the configuration of something, and characteristic behaviour, so that our identification of expressive qualities is easily explained to others, whom we would expect to make similar ascriptions. That particular expressive qualities exist is therefore not dependent on the subjective experience of the appreciator.

This strategy is very similar to philosophical theories of musical expression.
which have been called ‘appearance-of-expression-based views’ or more simply, ‘similarity theories’. For example, Stephen Davies argues that the emotion terms which are used to describe what Carroll has called ‘configurations’ are deeply rooted in the way we use these terms to describe emotional states. In relation to musical expression, he says that ‘emotions are heard in music as belonging to it, just as appearances of emotion are present in the bearing, gait, or deportment of our fellow humans and other creatures.’

We can identify emotion characteristics in appearances – in human faces, music, weeping willows, cars and St Bernard dogs. The claim is not that these objects feel emotions. There is no reference to a feeling of emotion but only to the look of an emotion. In the context of natural environments, we might say that we can identify emotion characteristics in appearances – the sensuous surface, or dynamic context of some landscape, natural object or phenomenon.

Peter Kivy also puts forward a type of similarity theory of musical expression. The idea of ‘contour’ is used to describe the type of resemblance that exists between expression in an object and the expression of human emotion. The similarity exists structurally, and he describes a piece of music as a ‘sound map’ of particular emotional expression. To hear music as having expressive qualities is to recognise in music a resemblance to human emotional behaviour through speech, gestures and bodily movement.

In these theories of musical expression, the role of the composer and performers is considered less relevant because the relation is based on qualities in the music alone. This move makes sense in the context of nature too, for it leaves out reference to intentional states. However, we still have to ask what place the experience of the listener has in relation to the music they hear, for little has been said about this. Critics have argued that similarity theories need to take account of the role played in hearing the music and the interpretive process that leads to the ascription of expressive qualities. The existence of resemblance alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for the existence of expressive qualities. This type of criticism of similarity theories in musical expression enables us to locate what is missing from the same type of view as applied to natural environments.

The approaches of Carroll, Davies, Kivy and Howarth give some explanation of expressive qualities in nature, but some questions are left unanswered.

The shortcomings surface when we consider the fact that some attributions of expressive qualities to landscapes will not be traceable or indeed reducible to similar emotional expression behaviours. There are two ways we can identify this problem. The first dimension is set out clearly by Hepburn, so I quote him at length:

A person who contemplates natural objects aesthetically may sometimes find that their emotional quality is describable in the vocabulary of ordinary human moods and feelings – melancholy, exuberance, placidity. In many cases, however, he will find that they are not at all accurately describable in such terms. A particular emotional quality can be roughly analogous to some nameable human emotion, desolation for instance; but the precise quality of desolation revealed in some waste or desert in nature may be quite distinctive in timbre and intensity. To put this another way: one may go to nature to find shapes and sounds that can be taken as the embodiment of human emotion, and in so far as this occurs, nature is felt to be humanized. But instead of nature being humanized, the reverse may happen. Aesthetic experience of nature may be experience of a range of emotion that the human scene, by itself, untutored and unsupplemented, could not evoke.

We should not assume that there will always be a correlation between human and natural qualities. Sometimes the correlation will be inexact or not exist at all. Hepburn is also saying that too narrow a correlation between expression in nature and expression in humans threatens to overly humanise nature and to overlook nature’s own distinctive otherness. While humans themselves are of course natural creatures, there are great differences between us and other animals, and between us and other natural things. This fact is perhaps most dramatically shown in cases where we experience the wonder and the sublimity of nature.

One way to overcome the problem (at worst a sort of projection of emotion on to an environment) is to emphasise a point made earlier by Howarth. She recognised the reciprocal relationship between human emotion and expression in nature. It is often the case that natural expression will influence our moods or determine them altogether, so that we reflect nature’s qualities rather than the other way around. In the context of music, Davies describes this as a ‘mirroring response’ where the listener’s emotions mirror the music’s emotional expression. An interesting variation of this is mon no aware, a concept of Japanese aesthetics that describes our emotional identification with natural objects or environments. The concept was developed by the eighteenth-century Japanese scholar, Motoori Norinaga, and as Saito describes it, the term can be translated as ‘pathos of things’ or ‘sensitivity of things’... sometimes compared to the Latin notion of ‘lacrimae rerum’ (‘tears of things’). Knowing mon no aware enables an emotive affinity to develop between aesthetic object and appreciator, where it seems to be the object that determines the type of identification that takes place.

Another problem in similarity theories relates back to humans and their
cultural relationship with environments. We might, for example, describe a landscape as an expression of poignant pride. Although I cannot speak for Welsh communities, it may be the case that for some people, the disused quarries found, for example, in North Wales – choppy, grey, textured expanses set against the natural contours and dramatic sweep of mountain valleys – express such feelings. Instead of being tidied up or cleared away, some disused quarries that were previously the mainstay of many communities have been left as they are. The landscapes may appear to some as ugly or scarred, but they are deeply associated with and in some sense express the hard work and hard lives of the community. These landscapes have significance as cultural heritage, and their qualities have significance within this context.

In this case, there are no non-aesthetic qualities of the landscape that bring to mind emotional behaviour linked to feeling proud. That pride is also not reducible to the simple projection of feeling on to the landscape, for the quarried mountainside, and all of its distinctive qualities, are deeply associated with the lives of people who worked there. Their associations cannot be separated from the objective, non-aesthetic qualities of the landscape: ‘the slate stairways, the hewn caverns, and the exposed slate face’. This example shows that in many cases the connections between a landscape and its expressive qualities are more complex than the similarity theory can account for. Those connections will reach beyond resemblance to include ‘complex chains of association and belief’, including cultural and historical associations, and aspects of our experience of environments that are better described through the concept of a ‘sense of place’.

Sometimes associations will be based on cultural conventions, and this phenomenon may not be dissimilar to what is happening in the quarry case. Kivy recognises this, for he adds to his contour thesis another concerning how conventions dictate some correlations of expression through the ‘customary association’ of expressive qualities in music and emotion.

In the context of the natural environment, Saito has pointed out that Japanese literature has so often associated natural phenomena with certain emotions that these associations have become conventions: ‘cherry blossoms (especially when they are falling) are often associated with sorrow in classical Japanese literature because they epitomize the transience of beauty’.

Where resemblance is missing as the basis of the attribution of expressive qualities, another explanation is needed. An account of expressive qualities that has been suggested but not fully developed by Saito and Carlson may help here. They draw on George Santayana’s ‘two-term’ account of expression to show how natural and cultural landscapes are expressive. Santayana argues that aesthetic expression occurs when two terms are fused together, or ‘lie together in the mind’: ‘The first is the object actually presented, the word, the image, the expressive thing: the second is the object suggested, the further thought, emotion, or image evoked, the thing expressed.’ He offers an example of how the association brings about expression when appreciator and aesthetic object interact: ‘moonlight and castle moats, minarets and cypresses, camels filing through the desert – such images get their character from the strong but misty atmosphere of sentiment and adventure which clings about them’. Saito applies Santayana’s ideas specifically to landscapes:

Many instances of our aesthetic appreciation of nature are based upon this ‘fusion’ between the object’s sensuous surface and various associated facts such as scientific facts, historical or literary associations, or practical values. For example, we may appreciate the way in which the fierceness of a battle is reflected in a disfigured landscape with poor vegetation.

Santayana and Saito together show how a broad range of expressive qualities may be attributed to landscapes. We might call this approach the ‘embodiment’ account, because it suggests how environments embody history, emotions, memories and so on, and we can use it to supplement the explanations given by similarity theories.

Another strength of the embodiment account is that it addresses the relational character of expressive qualities. This is brought out in Carlson’s discussion of Santayana:

for an object to express a quality or life value, the latter must not simply be suggested by it. Rather the quality must be associated with the object itself; that is, what Santayana meant by saying that the object must seem to embody that which it expresses. Clarified in this way, expression is not typically due to the unique associations resulting from an individual’s own personal history.

Carlson does not work out in detail how such expressions are held by a community as opposed to certain individuals, and this needs some careful working out. Acknowledgement of the role of the appreciator’s feelings, associations and perceptions is important, but less relevant if the aim is to find a shareable, practical understanding of the expressive character of environments. In any case, through the embodiment account it is now possible to understand how the Welsh quarry may be expressive of pride: for a community of individuals, the landscape is fused with memories and associations of their working lives in that landscape.

The embodiment account helps with the unanswered questions left by similarity theories, but one might argue that the concepts of fusion and
embodiment are vague. What exactly does it mean to say that environments or objects are ‘drenched’ with emotions or images? I am reminded of Wittgenstein’s explanation of ‘seeing-as’ as an image coming into contact with the thing perceived. Perhaps aspect perception could provide a more concrete understanding of the embodiment account, but I do not think it ought to replace it, since concepts like ‘embodiment’, ‘fusion’ and ‘drenched’, although metaphorical, capture the mood and atmospheric qualities that characterise some of our experiences of expressive qualities in environments.

I have not explored theories of metaphorical exemplification, which have been used to explain expressive properties in artworks. It is certainly the case that we can explain expressive qualities in nature through the use of metaphor. Poe’s ‘howling, shrieking surf’ is metaphorical; we grasp the expressive quality of the surf by comparing it to a wild, screaming being, sputtering and flailing about. Metaphorical imagination may have a role here too in making the connections that expressive qualities rest upon. Metaphorical exemplification is not unlike the explanation given by the embodiment account but the latter is broader because it accounts for types of expression that do not involve the application of a metaphor, and this makes it more attractive as a general theory.

I have argued that the similarity account provides part of the answer to the problem of expressive qualities in nature but that it needs to be supplemented by the embodiment account. Even though the embodiment account is a little vague, bringing the two accounts together is probably the best way to explain expressive qualities in nature, and we must be content with the fact that an entirely clear explanation may be difficult to attain (as is also the case with musical expression).

Let me finish by saying that finding a balance between the more descriptive, similarity approach and one that is perhaps more sensitive to the experience of the appreciator or appreciative community is something we also ought to aim for in the practical context of environmental planning. When we explain how expressive qualities contribute to descriptions of landscapes, we should not simply rely on discerning resemblances, which could in fact be arrived at by gathering together data on the non-aesthetic qualities of a landscape, and drawing conclusions from that. What is needed is attention to the situated context, cultural and otherwise, of the aesthetic appreciator, and the affinities we can locate between their feelings and the expressive qualities of landscapes.

When we can identify expressive qualities, we have a better idea of the predominant aesthetic characters of various landscapes. Expressive qualities, along with other aesthetic qualities, such as perceptual or imaginative qualities, provide more detail and depth to the aesthetic descriptions that issue from aesthetic responses than more general and scenically-oriented descriptions. A solid philosophical account of expressive qualities provides a clearer, non-idiomatic understanding for discussions in the practical context of conservation.

Stop reading.

KNOWLEDGE IN THE INTEGRATED AESTHETIC

At this stage, it ought to be clear that like other non-cognitivists I do not view knowledge as a necessary condition of aesthetic appreciation of nature. The intellectual component of the integrated aesthetic is not significant, but it can have a place. So far, I have argued that commonsense beliefs may be in the background in aesthetic appreciation (this would be true of any experience of the world), but on some occasions it is helpful to appreciation to feed in knowledge. In my discussion of interpretation in Chapter 3, for example, I showed how folk knowledge as well as scientific knowledge underpin equally reasonable interpretations of nature.

The type of knowledge that is fed in and the occasions on which it is fed in depend very much on the demands of the object and the appreciator’s cognitive stock. In Chapter 4, supporting other non-cognitivists, I argued that scientific knowledge can impede appreciation of aesthetic qualities, and that it does not provide more appropriate knowledge than other alternatives, such as religious or mythological narratives. I questioned the implicit claim in cognitive theories that science provides the truest foundation for appreciating nature on its own terms, and showed why science too relies on a cultural framework.

One of the main problems in cognitive theories is their lack of explanation for what actually counts as scientific knowledge in appreciation. I have said a little about how this problem might be addressed, but it would be useful to return to it here, because a better understanding helps to show why commonsense beliefs are more likely to have a role in the actual practice of aesthetic appreciation, and why it is unreasonable to demand that scientific knowledge be taken as a necessary condition or as a main component in appreciation.

That there is really no treatment of this problem by, for example, Carlson, is not altogether surprising, since distinguishing the two types of knowledge is no easy task. However, Ernst Nagel provides one of the best attempts to sort out the difference:

It is the desire for explanations which are at once systematic and controllable by factual evidence that generates science; and it is the organization and classification of knowledge on the basis of explanatory principles that is the distinctive goal of the sciences.
More specifically, the sciences seek to discover and to formulate in general terms the conditions under which events of various sorts occur, the statements of such determining conditions being the explanations of the corresponding happening.

A marked feature of much information acquired in the course of ordinary experience is that, although this information may be accurate enough within certain limits, it is seldom accompanied by any explanation of why the facts are as alleged... Much that passes as common sense knowledge certainly is about the effects familiar things have upon matters that men happen to value; the relations of events to one another, independent of their incidence upon specific human concerns, are not systematically noticed and explored.  

Scientific knowledge involves explanations and clear methodology, while common sense does not set out to search for facts, explanations and verification. Commonsense knowledge is more indeterminate while science aims at certainty. This is not to say that common sense is unreliable or always inaccurate; some scientific explanations grow out of common sense beliefs. I do not mean to devalue common sense, but rather to show that it is characterised by a more practical, everyday form of knowing. This kind of knowing comes through experience (what some philosophers have called 'knowledge by acquaintance'), and this fits more easily with the strongly perceptual character of aesthetic appreciation. This type of knowledge is more in line with a more pluralistic approach to appreciation.

Local knowledge can be described as a type of commonsense knowledge which is based in the experience of a place and local practices in relation to the land. Although I am speculating, it may be the case that common (and even more local vernacular) names for flora and fauna originate in conversations about the aesthetic or other qualities of individual plants and animals. For example, in Flora Britannica, Richard Mabey writes that 'Queen Anne's Lace', 'Fairy Lace' and 'Spanish Lace' are given as vernacular names for the plant, Anthriscus sylvestris, because of its lacy appearance. It is more humbly known as 'cow parsley', probably because it grows in or near pastures. Mabey's project covers vernacular names, folklore and literary references, art references and so on, and depends significantly on contributions of local knowledge supplied by residents of Britain. The 'Biodiversity Stories' website, sponsored by Scottish Natural Heritage and the Royal Botanic Gardens Edinburgh, brings together in one place a range of knowledges about species and habitats and our cultural relationship to them. The public is invited to contribute audio- and text-based stories about the wildlife, ecology and landscapes of Scotland, with folktales, old legends, poems, ecological accounts and stories about practical uses of nature.

Hepburn provides probably the most balanced account of the role of thought and knowledge in aesthetic appreciation, and I have already said something about this in earlier chapters. The thought-content in aesthetic appreciation is distinguished from the cognitive component and is like a reflective backdrop that fuses with other elements of appreciation: 'thought is present, as we implicitly compare and contrast here with elsewhere, actual with possible, present with past. I say 'implicitly'; there may be no verbalizing or self-conscious complexity in the experience.' The explicit, and 'serious' side of knowledge - science - has some role to play for Hepburn, as the appreciator may sometimes feel obliged to take into account facts described by science (or, for example, data of history). In his view, aesthetic appreciation is not hostile to science, but it has different aims and modes of approach to nature from the sciences.

It might be most accurate, then, to describe the thought and knowledge elements of the integrated aesthetic in terms of a reflective component that ranges from thoughts and beliefs in the background, to actively fed-in thoughts and beliefs, which are constituted by a range of knowledges, including common sense, folk and other cultural knowledges, including scientific knowledge. This kind of account makes room for the range of experience brought to appreciation by different appreciators, and it also allows for a flexible approach to truth, where a fixed or universal truth is replaced with the idea of local truth and bioregional truth.

In all cases, the content and degree of knowledge fed in is dependent on the situation of the appreciator and the demands of the object. Relevance is determined according to the qualities of the object and the appreciative situation, which includes the context of the object, the appreciator and the relationship between them. In Chapter 5, through the butterfly example I showed how disinterestedness is consistent with relevant knowledge fed into appreciation.

The aim in formulating the integrated aesthetic has been to provide a non-cognitive model that incorporates the various dimensions of aesthetic appreciation of nature. It emphasises the relationship between subject and object by recognising the way human capacities such as perception, imagination, emotion and thought, respond to features of the aesthetic object or environment. My model is intended to be inclusive of a range of individual experience without the problems associated with a strongly subjectivist stance. Disinterestedness functions to characterise my approach accordingly.

The integrated aesthetic does not require specific knowledge from the appreciator. This is especially important in the practical context where environmental decision-making involves a wide variety of individuals who enter into the deliberative process with more or with less expertise. My model is potentially more inclusive, more open to the aesthetic experiences of
inhabitants, visitors, developers, local government and so on, in working out the best solution to environmental problems.

NOTES


6. See Scruton, 1994, 1992. Gregory Currie also follows this distinction, but he gives it a special twist, by describing sensory or reproductive imagination as 'creative imagination', which simulates but does not copy actual objects and events. Creative imagination, on his view, is truly creative, and does not involve simulation. See Gregory Currie, 'Imagination and Make-believe', in Berys Gaut and Dominic McVicker Lopes (eds), The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 253-62.

7. Adherents to this view are numerous in the history of philosophy, including Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes and Hume. Kant makes a distinction between reproductive and productive imagination, and claims that imagination is the power that 'makes the absent present' (Anthropology, AK VII, 167), but he makes the further distinction between productive or transcendent imagination and reproductive or empirical imagination. The productive imagination is a transcendental condition that synthesises intuitions into conceptual experiences. Kant contrasts it with the reproductive imagination which is empirical, that is, it is given the role of image-maker for calling up images of things we have already experienced, and thus of making associations between past experiences. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), B151-152, p. 165. In the Critique of Judgment, the productive imagination is the free imagination which is the subjective ground of judgements of taste. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, [1790] 1987), Ak 241, p. 91.


10. Scruton, 1974, p. 98. Richard Moran also argues against the assumption that imagination is always associated with make-believe, and he points to the different ways our imaginings are deeply related to real-life situations and commitments. See Richard Moran, 'The Expression of Feeling in Imagination', The Philosophical Review, 103:4, 1994, pp. 75-106. Kathleen Stock makes a persuasive case for the rationality of imagination and how imagining is a means to belief: 'Imagining is an active, rational, structured process which essentially involves the possibility of conceptually constrained inferential transitions from imaginary state of affairs to imaginary state of affairs. In imagining I do not passively contemplate a picture in my head: I explore possibilities by considering conjunctions of states of affairs and what would follow from them; I think'. The Nature and Value of Imaginative Responses to the Fiction Film, Ph.D. dissertation, 2002, p. 49.


15. See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 250-1; Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 46-51, especially, p. 50. Malcolm Budd also conveys this interpretation when he says that even in free play, imagination is 'monitored' by the understanding, and that imagination must still provide an image that is 'a representation of the way the object actually is, and, accordingly, the imagination is not free to manufacture whatever form it pleases'. See Malcolm Budd, 'Delight in the Natural World: Kant on Aesthetic Appreciation. Part I: Natural Beauty', British Journal of Aesthetics, 38:1, 1998, pp. 6-7. Imagination's free play indicates the fact that judgements of taste are reflective judgements, having to do with determinate rather than determinate concepts. Also, the harmonious free play of the two faculties is what underlies the 'subjective purposiveness' of judgements of taste, and the pleasure that issues from judgements of the beautiful.


23. Ibid., §§ 59, Ak 354, p. 230. Translator's brackets. Kant does not argue that we do in fact judge them morally, but he wants to make an analogy.


30. These remarks are from an interview with Andrew Wyeth, *Wanda Corn, The Art of Andrew Wyeth* (Greenwich: New York Graphic Society, 1973), p. 55. I thank Fran Speed for drawing my attention to this quote.


33. See also Hepburn, 1993, for issues related to this point.

34. Scuton, 1974, p. 98.

35. R. K. Elliott, ‘Imagination in the Experience of Art’, *Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures*, vol. 11, 1971–1972: *Philosophy and the Arts* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1974), p. 101. Anthony Savile has also tackled this problem in the context of art. He defends his view that imagination has a proper role in aesthetic experience, but, unlike Elliott, he emphasises the importance of checking the activity of imagination though at the same time allowing it the freedom required for the richest possible experience of the work. The artwork itself controls the imaginative activity through the ‘signs that the artist lays down’. Furthermore, Savile argues that the careful use of imagination by the spectator ensures that the picture is always at the centre of the aesthetic experience, such that it never becomes a mere stimulus for some private fantasy (Savile, 1988, esp. p. 72). Unlike Savile, however, Elliott does not rely on an explicit reference to artistic attention, so his position is more easily brought into the context of natural objects. Some discussion of ways to sort relevant from irrelevant imaginings are suggested by Hepburn in Hepburn, 1993; and in ‘Landscape and the Metaphysical Imagination’, *Environmental Values*, 5:3, 1996, pp. 191–204. In the context of fiction, see Peter Lamarque, ‘In and Out of Imaginary Worlds’, in John Skorupski and Dudley Knowles (eds), *Virtue and Taste*, *Philosophical Quarterly Supplementary Series*, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

36. Susan Feagin presents a persuasive argument for the general benefits of developing imagination’s ‘affectional flexibility’ through the aesthetic experience of reading fiction. See *Reading with Feeling* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), ch. 11.

37. Rolston is one cognitivist I do not discuss in this chapter, and who does not appear to give any role to imagination. He does not make any explicit objections to my position, but he does worry that what he calls an ‘expressionist’ view of nature treats it as a ‘smorgasbord of opportunities that humans can do with as they please. No one aesthetic response is more or less correct than any other; what counts is the imaginative play, and what is remarkable is nature’s richness in launching this play.’ See Holmes Rolston, III, ‘Does Aesthetic Appreciation of Landscapes Need to Be Science-Based?’, *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 35:4, 1995, p. 376.


39. Ibid. p. 150. My emphasis.


41. Ibid. p. 53.


43. Ibid. p. 281.

44. Ibid. pp. 281–2.

45. Fudge is also concerned with defending the role of science against some of the criticisms I raised in the original article. To respond to these I refer the reader back to my arguments against cognitive theories in Chapter 4, where I deal with many of the same issues. There, I discussed some of the problems related to science as a dominant component in appreciation, and I also cited arguments by others, such as Stecker and Hepburn, to support my case.

46. Moore, pp. 53, 55.

47. I assume that the example refers to a riddle in Lewis Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland*, where the Mad Hatter asks, ‘Why is a raven like a writing desk?’ As a riddle, the question just challenges and puzzles us and does not lead imagination smoothly or easily to make connections.


59. Howarth, p. 113.
60. Ibid. p. 115.
62. Ibid.
64. Davies, p. 103.
65. Ibid. p. 223.
68. Davies, ch. 6.
71. Spackman, p. 143.
73. Saito, 1985, p. 245.
75. Ibid. p. 130.
76. Saito, 1985, p. 244.
77. Carson, 2000, p. 143.
80. www.biodiversitystories.co.uk
82. These types of truth are suggested by Jim Cheney, as cited by Saito in 'Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms', *Environmental Ethics*, 20, 1998, p. 148.

CHAPTER 7

Aesthetic Judgements of the Natural Environment and Aesthetic Communication

In this chapter I set out to establish the objectivity of aesthetic judgements of nature. My case is not only a theoretical one in relation to theories in philosophical aesthetics. If aesthetic value is to be taken seriously in the practical context of environmental planning and policy-making, objectivity, of some degree at least, is essential. Aesthetic value is often viewed as reflecting mere personal preferences rather than rational aesthetic judgements. We do argue about our aesthetic judgements, and this presents a promising starting point. Why would we bother if such matters were merely expressions of personal taste? Our own experiences do, however, matter, so the case I make here is for objectivity in terms of the intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgements, rather than a rigid objectivity that would leave out the subjective dimension of aesthetic experience altogether.

I begin with a critical discussion of a few models of objectivity, and I defend the very distinctive foundation of our judgements through the practice, explanation, and support we give in aesthetic justification. The position I put forward, which is based on the ideas of Kant and Sibley, provides a strong foundation for the idea of aesthetic communication. I argue that this type of communication gives further support to the idea that aesthetic judgements are not private expressions of taste. I conclude the chapter by showing how my model of aesthetic justification and communication encourages an environmental aesthetic education that enables the education of capacities for the discovery of aesthetic value in the environment.

AESTHETIC JUDGEMENTS AND OBJECTIVITY

The problem of establishing the objectivity of aesthetic judgement continues to be a vexing problem in philosophical aesthetics. It is possible to identify a